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Foreword 
This report presents a review of assessment methods used in plant life management of nuclear 
power plants. The report has been produced jointly by EG2 (Integrity Assessment) and EG3 
(Lifetime Evaluation) of NULIFE.  Its scope is confined to the methodology and procedures used 
in safety analysis of nuclear pressure vessel components to provide assurance of structural 
integrity.  The report is based on a review of information provided by organizations contributing to 
NULIFE EG2 and EG3, together with some additional material provided on the basis of in-kind 
contributions. 
• The report is the result of the active collaboration of professional scientists and engineers 
from 16 organizations (and as such has helped facilitate the Integration Process during 
the initial phases of NULIFE) 
• The report considers integrity assessment and lifetime management issues across the 
range of NPPs currently operating in EU Member States (PWR, WWER, BWR, AGR, 
CANDU and RBMK) (thus facilitating common understanding across a range of PLIM 
issues) 
• The report provides numerous examples of the application of good practice / best 
practice methodology at national level (further facilitating common understanding) 
• The report’s Appendices collectively provide a valuable source of information on 
numerous aspects of plant life management (thereby contributing knowledge 
preservation and management) 
• The report represents an important resource for the purpose of producing future NULIFE 
procedures and best practice advice. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the report can be regarded as a “living document”, that is to say it is 
foreseen that it could be usefully updated at appropriate intervals during the course of NULIFE 
time.  It could for example be used in the road mapping process in NUGENIA. 
 















NULIFE (12) 5   Page 7 of 230 
 
CONTENTS 
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 9 
2 OBJECTIVES & SCOPE ........................................................................................................ 11 
3 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 12 
4 DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY .................................................................................... 12 
5 SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................... 13 
6 REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY ................................................................. 14 
6.1 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL ................................................................................ 14 
6.1.1 Vessel Belt Line ....................................................................................................... 14 
6.1.2 Cladding ................................................................................................................... 18 
6.1.3 Nozzles and Penetrations ........................................................................................ 21 
6.1.4 Internals ................................................................................................................... 29 
6.1.5 References (RPV) .................................................................................................... 37 
6.2 OTHER VESSEL CHALLENGES (SG, PRESSURIZER) ............................................ 41 
6.2.1 Stress Corrosion Cracking ....................................................................................... 41 
6.2.2 CANDU Steam Generator Tubing ........................................................................... 41 
6.2.3 References (Other Vessels) .................................................................................... 46 
6.3 PIPING ......................................................................................................................... 47 
6.3.1 Degradation Mechanisms ........................................................................................ 47 
6.3.2 Assessment Methods............................................................................................... 52 
6.3.3 Lifetime Evaluation ................................................................................................... 56 
6.3.4 References (Piping) ................................................................................................. 57 
6.4 PUMPS AND VALVES ................................................................................................. 60 
6.4.1 Pumps ...................................................................................................................... 60 
6.4.2 Valves ...................................................................................................................... 61 
6.4.3 References ............................................................................................................... 63 
6.5 PRESSURE TUBES IN CANDU AND RBMK REACTORS ......................................... 64 
6.5.1 Description of the core of pressure tube reactors .................................................... 64 
6.5.2 Degradation Mechanisms ........................................................................................ 64 
6.5.3 Assessment Methods............................................................................................... 66 
6.5.4 Lifetime Evaluation ................................................................................................... 67 
6.5.5 References (Pressure Tubes) .................................................................................. 68 
6.6 HIGH TEMPERATURE COMPONENTS ..................................................................... 70 
6.6.1 Degradation Mechanisms ........................................................................................ 70 
6.6.2 Assessment Methods............................................................................................... 73 
 
NULIFE (12) 5   Page 8 of 230 
 
6.6.3 References (High Temperature Components) ........................................................ 81 
7 INTEGRATION STATEMENT ................................................................................................ 82 
8 APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................ 83 




Appendix 1 Fatigue and thermal fatigue 
Appendix 2 Considerations regarding formation of corrosive films 
Appendix 3 Delayed hydride cracking  
Appendix 4 Erosion / corrosion 
Appendix 5 Assessment on the evolution of a flaw in a class 1 Asme nuclear equipment 
Appendix 6 Oxidation 
Appendix 7 Thermal high cycle fatigue in piping system tees with leakage 
Appendix 8 PNAEG 7 002 86 (Russian Code) / IAEA-EBP-WWER-08 
Appendix 9 Delayed hydride cracking - RBMK-1500 NPP 
Appendix 10 Intergranular stress corrosion cracking 
Appendix 11 Irradiation induced dimensional and material property changes to the graphite 
Appendix 12 Irradiation induced change of fuel channel length 
Appendix 13 Guidance for application of the leak before break concept at Ignalina NPP RBMK-
1500 reactors. 
Appendix 14 Requirements for assessment of intergranular stress corrosion cracking damages 
in RBMK-1500 reactors 
Appendix 15 RPV Cladding 
Appendix 16 Pressurized Thermal Shock 




ANNEX 1  RPV Cladding  
 
 
NULIFE (12) 5   Page 9 of 230 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A key objective of the Network of Excellence NULIFE (Nuclear Plant Life Prediction) is to create a 
European-wide platform in order to achieve scientific and technical excellence in lifetime 
management and prediction methodologies and to translate these into harmonized and qualified 
procedures as part of the Common Safety Justification Framework (CSJF). 
A key element in NULIFE is the work of the four Expert Groups, which serve to cluster relevant 
expertise and provide a focus for activities, ranging from agreed contributions to “horizontal” WPs 
to internal RTD projects. Each Expert Group activity is defined as a Work Package, with a 
designated WP Leader.  Partners in the Network normally participate in at least one Expert Group 
in order to promote integration. Common exercises are defined and followed for specific NPP 
components in order to demonstrate improvements in capabilities for lifetime evaluation.  
Coordination and communication between the various Expert Group activities is strengthened by 
the horizontal WPs and by the fact that all WP Leaders work together on the Executive Group to 
plan and co-ordinate the work of NULIFE. 
The scope of the four Expert Groups (EG) is as follows: 
• EG1 (IA-2-1) on Materials Characterization deals with the material property issues, in 
particular the mechanisms of materials degradation (EAC, thermal ageing, irradiation 
embrittlement) and characterization of the properties of aged materials, i.e. as a function 
of in-service conditions.   
• EG2 (IA-2-2) on Integrity Assessment is concerned with establishing the state-of-the-art 
in methods of defect and loading assessment.  EG2 deals not only with fracture 
mechanics methods such as those used in the assessment of PTS and LBB, but includes 
also a consideration of existing Codes and Procedures, NDE, failure modes, safety 
factors and certain special topics (effects of load history, crack arrest, secondary and 
residual stresses, WPS). 
• EG3 (IA-2-3), on Lifetime Evaluation takes as its starting point the knowledge gaps 
identified by the other expert groups, and assesses these in terms of their implications for 
through-life structural integrity. In addition, EG3 assesses the potential for, and possible 
implications of, knowledge gaps outside the scope of the other expert groups. It is the 
purpose of EG3 to take a long-term perspective of component integrity, in particular the 
safety justification of components over the whole of their foreseen operational life, where 
the demonstration of safety margins becomes dominated by considerations of fatigue 
(including thermal fatigue and corrosion fatigue), irradiation embrittlement and other 
ageing processes (including creep and creep-fatigue). 
• EG4 (IA-2-4) on Risk Assessment adds to the work of EG1, EG2 and EG3 to provide 
advice on the identification, characterization and management of uncertainties in lifetime 
evaluation, through modelling structural reliability and performing risk assessments to 
provide added insights into the assessment of safety margins. 
The specific objectives of EG2 on Integrity Assessment are to: 
• Identify components and systems that contribute significantly to plant safety and 
influence the total availability of both new and operating light water reactors, heavy water 
reactors and gas cooled reactors 
• Consider potential damage mechanisms that may contribute to the degradation of 
components, and consider their consequences under normal operation and design basis 
emergency (DBE) conditions.   
• Produce global recommendations and best practices reports. 
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• Develop the basis for a common understanding between experts from across Europe, 
which may lead to a harmonization of codes and standards. 
The specific objectives of EG3 on Lifetime Assessment are to: 
• Provide a common framework for lifetime evaluation of nuclear pressure boundary 
components and RPV internal structures for light water reactor, heavy water reactor and 
gas-cooled reactor systems.   
• Provide benchmarking of specific lifetime evaluation tools (experimental and analytical 
procedures, evaluation criteria). 
• Produce global recommendations and best practice reports. 
• Develop the basis for a common understanding between experts from across Europe, 
which may lead to a harmonization of codes and standards. 
This report has been produced jointly by EG2 and EG3.  It represents a review of methodology 
and procedures used in safety analysis of nuclear pressure vessel components to provide 
assurance of structural integrity. The report is based on a review of information provided by those 
organizations contributing to EG2 and EG3 (see below), together with some additional 
information provided on the basis of in-kind contributions. 
The following organizations have contributed to this document: 
• AREVA NP GmbH, Germany ANP-G 
• British Energy Generation Limited, UK BE 
• Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique, France CEA 
• Centre of Technology and Engineering for Nuclear Projects, 
Thermo-Hydraulic & Stress Analysis Department, Bucharest, 
Romania 
CTEN 
• E.ON Kernkraft, Germany EKK 
• Electricité de France, France EDF 
• , Helmholtz-Zentrum Dresden-Rossendorf, Germany HZDR 
• Institute for Nuclear Research Pitesti, Romania INR 
• EC JRC-IE, Petten, The Netherlands JRC 
• J. Stefan Institute, Slovenia JSI 
• Lithuanian Energy Institute, Lithuania LEI 
• Nuclear Research Institute Rez plc, Czech Republic NRI 
• Phoenix Engineering Associates Inc., USA PEAI 
• SERCO Energy, UK SERCO 
• Siempelkamp Prüf- und Gutachter Gesellschaft mbH, Germany SPG 
• Valtion Teknillinen Tutkimuskeskus, Finland VTT 
• Westinghouse Europe WE 
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2 OBJECTIVES & SCOPE 
Plant Life Management comprises the technological and administrative measures which 
safeguard the safety requirements of relevant systems and components during the lifetime of a 
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).  Therefore, precautionary measures such as surveillance schemes, 
maintenance activities and in-service inspections are routinely applied to structures and 
components during plant operation to ensure maintenance of the required quality.  Nevertheless, 
during NPP operation, degradation effects like corrosion, fatigue, and in-service degradation of 
fracture toughness, may significantly impact component integrity.  Subsequently, the goal of each 
measure is to maintain component quality at the highest level, where the reference is always the 
appropriate quality level at the design and fabrication state, to fulfil the required tasks over the 
intended plant lifetime. 
Suitable and applicable assessment tools are indispensable within the framework of a 
multidisciplinary plant life management.  For providing sufficient component quality in NPPs the 
most important issues are: 
• Knowledge and understanding of ageing-related damage mechanisms in materials and 
the ability to predict their through-life consequences for the performance of systems, 
structures or components 
• Predictive models to assess the behaviour of systems, structures or components over a 
defined timescale 
• Qualified methods for the detection and surveillance of ageing-related damage 
mechanisms e.g. knowledge-based recurring maintenance actions 
• Qualified mitigation measures, including rectification and repairs 
• Quality assured plant documentation 
• Up-to-date knowledge base 
• Regular evaluation of the effectiveness of all applied measures by means of a PDCA 
circle (Plan-Do-Check-Act) 
Aspects on personal qualification and preservation of knowledge are important as well.  Herein, 
technical services comprising suitably qualified and experienced personnel (SQEP) are one key 
feature for keeping the personal qualification as good as possible.  Nevertheless, these personal 
aspects will not be considered as part of this technical document, indeed these tasks belong to 
aspects on management systems for instance. 
The purpose of this document is to provide a preliminary summary and state-of-the-art review of 
assessment and lifetime evaluation methods for assessing the structural integrity of components 
and piping in the various types of NPPs in operation within Europe (LWR, WWER, AGR, CANDU 
and RBMK) from the point of view of prevention of failure by non-ductile and ductile fracture, 
fatigue, creep and mechanical corrosion damage under operational and postulated abnormal 
conditions.  Priority areas for this activity within NULIFE are listed in Table 1: 
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Table 1 NULIFE Priority Areas  















1.  Thermal fatigue X X X  
2.  Stress 
corrosion cracking 
X X X  
3.  Welds and 
repairs 
X X   
4.  Clad properties 
and ageing 
X    




X X X  
6.  Stress 
classification 
 X   
7.  Other ageing 
issues 
   X 
 
3 REFERENCES 
References are listed at the end of individual Sections or Sub-sections. 
 
4 DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
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5 SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Symbols and abbreviations are introduced within the context of individual Sections or Sub-
sections.  However, some more general abbreviations are listed below: 
 
AGR Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor 
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
BM Base Metal 
BWR Boiling Water Reactor 
CANDU Canadian-Deuterium-Uranium 
CRD Control Rod Drive 
CS  Carbon Steel   
DHC Delayed Hydride Cracking 
EAC Environmentally-Assisted Cracking 
EG Expert Group 
FEM Finite Element method 
HAZ Heat-Affected Zone 
HWR Heavy Water Reactor 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ISO International Standards Organization 
KTA German Nuclear Safety Standards 
LBB Leak Before Break 
LWR Light Water Reactor 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
PHWR Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor 
PTS Pressurized Thermal Shock 
PWHT Post-Weld Heat Treatment 
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor 
RBMK Heavy Water Cooled-Graphite Moderated Pressure Tube Reactor 
RCC-M French Design and Construction Rules for Nuclear Power Plants 
RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel 
SCC Stress Corrosion Cracking 
SG Steam Generator 
SS  Stainless Steel 
WP Work Package 
WWER Water Cooled-Water Moderated Energy Reactor 
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6 REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY 
6.1 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL 
The reactor cores of the majority of the worlds’ nuclear power reactors are housed in steel reactor 
pressure vessels (RPVs), whose primary function is to contain both the reactor core and the 
primary coolant under operational conditions of temperature and pressure. 
The integrity of the thick walled steel RPV is vital for safety for two main reasons.  Firstly, 
because the RPV is the container for the reactor core, if it should develop a leak, and if the rate of 
coolant loss exceeds the maximum capability of the emergency cooling water system to replace 
it, then the reactor core could become uncovered, overheat and unless some remedial action is 
undertaken, ultimately melt.  Secondly, a massive failure of the RPV itself could both seriously 
damage the reactor core and, at the same time, could damage the containment building.  In this 
way a single postulated event could possibly outflank the various sequential barriers which 
prevent the escape of fission products in other postulated accident sequences, namely the fuel 
cladding, the primary circuit and possibly the containment building.  Therefore it is necessary to 
demonstrate that disruptive failure of the RPV is practically excluded and has a very low 
probability of occurrence, bordering on the incredible, throughout its working life, since such 
accidents could give rise to large uncontrolled releases of radioactivity to the public. 
Component integrity is considered in terms of: the vessel beltline (which receives the highest 
irradiation dose), cladding and nozzles / penetrations. 
6.1.1 Vessel Belt Line 
The methods and procedures used in the safety analysis of the RPV to ensure its structural 
integrity are intrinsically tied to the requirements that dangerous leakage, rapidly propagating 
cracks and brittle fracture of the vessel have to be eliminated.  The specifications of these safety 
related requirements are the objective of national Nuclear Safety Standards (per example KTA, 
ASME, RCC-M, PNAE-G etc) to ensure that reasonable precautions are taken against the 
damage arising from the construction and operation of nuclear facilities. In Germany for example 
such safety standards contain the specifications for Materials and Product Forms, Design and 
Analysis, Manufacture, and In-service Inspections and Operational Monitoring [6.1.1]. 
6.1.1.1 Degradation Mechanisms 
Irradiation Effects on the Ferritic Part (base metal, welds and HAZs) 
The specific mechanisms and phenomena that are responsible for the ageing behaviour of the 
RPV materials in LWRs can be assessed by methods and procedures that are described as 
follows. 
During the operation of a nuclear power plant the neutron flux affects the RPV material 
properties.  The irradiation of ferritic steels by (fast) neutrons with sufficiently high energy causes 
interactions of the neutrons with the atoms of the RPV steel influencing the microstructure of the 
irradiated material. This leads to dynamic dislocation generation and changes in the regular 
atomic configuration in the crystal lattice leading to so-called displacement cascades that 
contribute to the formation of dislocation loops, point defect and vacancy-solute clusters.  These 
characteristic lattice defects affect the macroscopic material properties of the irradiated material: 
the yield strength and tensile strength increases, the ductile-brittle transition temperature (DBTT) 
changes to higher temperatures and the upper shelf energy decreases. The mechanisms 
responsible for these irradiation induced embrittlement effects are well known in terms of matrix 
damage, Cu precipitation containing Ni, Mn, Si, and grain boundary segregation of P.  The main 
influencing parameters are the  
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• Weld or base material 
• material manufacturing processes  
• chemical composition (in particular content of Cu, Ni, Mn, P, N)  
• irradiation temperature 
• neutron flux  
• energy spectrum of the neutrons 
• irradiation time 
• accumulated neutron fluence (neutron flux and irradiation time). 
The main investigations for understanding the irradiation embrittlement have been summarized in 
the FP5 project ATHENA (AMES Thematic Network on Ageing) [6.1.2] and include: 
• Parametric studies with model alloys irradiated in material test reactors as a fundamental 
tool to investigate the neutron embrittlement. They have been performed to study the role 
of each element in the RPV steel (base and weld) and possible synergisms. 
• Re-evaluation of surveillance data to develop trend curves.  
• Use of reference materials (irradiation at different temperatures and at different fluence 
rates) to assess the sensitivity of specific materials to irradiation response. 
To assess the real aging behaviour it is useful to investigate RPVs of decommissioned plants. 
Thermal aging 
Thermal aging refers to hardening caused by thermally activated diffusion of alloying elements or 
impurities, resulting in increased DBTT shifts with time. The potential for thermal aging 
embrittlement in LWR RPV steels for times of up to 40 years is considered as low, but cannot be 
entirely dismissed on the basis of available data.  For steels with low Cu content, no significant 
thermal aging effects have been observed at temperatures below 300 °C.  For these materials, 
changes in DBTT due to thermal aging need not be considered as part of the overall integrity 
assessment. 
Hydrogen embrittlement 
It is known that hydrogen may contribute to the embrittlement of RPV steels, but only under very 
specific conditions. The resistance of the steel for hydrogen embrittlement is dependent on the 
chemical composition, fluence, irradiation temperature and the type of irradiation-induced defects.  
Experimental investigations, including tensile testing [6.1.3], have shown that an increasing 
susceptibility to hydrogen embrittlement was observed at room temperature for in-situ hydrogen 
charged samples at slow strain rates and low irradiation temperatures. However, at temperatures 
higher than 250 °C hydrogen embrittlement was no longer observed. From these results it has 
been concluded that in-service hydrogen embrittlement will not occur in RPV materials, and that 
hydrogen embrittlement need not be considered as a potential degradation mechanism in aging 
LWR RPVs. 
In the German code (KTA) hydrogen embrittlement is not considered for the RPV assessment. 
Research on this topic has shown that at operational temperatures (T > 250 °C) there is no 
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6.1.1.2 Assessment Methods 
Irradiation behaviour 
There are many trend curves and procedures in use worldwide to predict the irradiation behaviour 
in terms of reference temperatures for the ductile-brittle transition and their shifts induced by 
irradiation. These tools are mainly based on specific data bases.  The most common trend curves 
are: 
• Reg.-Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 [6.1.5] 
• French FIS/FIM-Formula (RSEM Code) [6.1.6] 
• French RCC-M Appendix ZG 
• Eason-Model (NUREG-CR/6551) [6.1.7] 
• ASTM E 900-02 [6.1.8] 
• Wang-Approach [6.1.9] 
• CRIEPI 2004 (Correlation describing the irradiation behaviour of Japanese RPV steels) 
• Russian Assessment Code for WWER: “Guide for strength analysis of the equipment and 
pipelines of nuclear power units” [6.1.15] 
• Guidelines on Pressurized Thermal Shock Analysis for WWER Power Plants [6.1.16] 
• Advanced RPV assessment code for WWER reactors: VERLIFE “Unified Procedure for 
Lifetime Assessment of Components and Piping in WWER NPPs” (European 
Commission, Final Report, Contract N° FIKS-CT-2001-20198, September 2003) [6.1.17] 
Moreover, so-called multi scale modelling of irradiation effects on material behaviour is 
increasingly being developed e.g. in the FP6 project PERFECT (PERFECT: Prediction of 
Irradiation Damage Effect in reactor Components) and continued in the FP7 project 
PERFORM60.  Although the use of such models for real RPV materials is still not yet ready for 
application, essential and very promising progress has been demonstrated for some binary alloys 
in the Virtual Reactor simulation tools RPV-1 [6.1.10] and RPV-2 [6.1.11]. The long term 
irradiation behaviour (80 years of operation) of real RPV steels is investigated by means of 
microstructural investigations and testing in the FP7 project LONGLIFE.   
Heterogeneities: 
The Master Curve concept was extended to cover the brittle fracture behaviour of ferritic steels 
with heterogeneities.  The following evaluation procedures have been developed: 
• SINTAP Master Curve Extension [6.1.12] 
• Master Curve extension for materials consisting of two populations [6.1.13] 
• Master Curve extension for materials with random heterogeneities [6.1.13], [6.1.14] 
Residual stresses: 
Residual stresses are stresses that are not caused by external loadings but by heterogeneous 
deformations as a result of thermal stresses and phase transformations.  The manufacture of the 
cladding on the inner RPV wall generates tensile residual stresses in the cladding and, to a lesser 
extent, compressive residual stresses in the ferritic part underneath the cladding.  Residual 
stresses have to be taken into account in a proper way for structural integrity assessments in 
structures such as RPVs. 
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In some countries, residual stresses need to be considered when performing structural integrity 
assessments of welds.  For example in the UK, methods for their treatment are included in both 
the EDF Energy R5 [5.6.12] and R6 [5.6.14] procedures.   
The effect of residual stress on the fracture of components containing defects is considered in R6 
[5.6.14].  Residual stresses contribute to the crack driving force for fracture, with interaction 
between primary and secondary stresses treated using the rho or V parameters.  R6 categorises 
short- and medium-range welding residual stresses as secondary stresses whereas long-range 
stresses are categorised as primary.  The distinction is that secondary stresses do not affect 
plastic collapse. 
The magnitude and distribution of the residual stress field across a section of interest in a welded 
component depend on a number of factors.  An assumption of uniform yield stress magnitude is 
termed a Level 1 estimate by R6.  Level 2 estimates are upper-bound profiles for particular types 
of as-welded joints, normalised by an appropriate yield stress; they are not necessarily self-
balancing but provide conservative estimates.  However, there is now a significant drive to 
develop more realistic Level 3 profiles from syntheses of weld modelling and measurement, using 
statistical approaches to quantify scatter, in order to lessen over-conservatism.  R6 includes a 
compendium of Level 2 profiles and some limited information on Level 3 profiles for the particular 
case of austenitic butt welds.  This is a rapidly developing research area in the UK as well as 
other countries. 
6.1.1.3 Lifetime Evaluation 
The integrity of the RPV has to be guaranteed under operation and emergency conditions for the 
foreseen period of operation. In this context the structural integrity analysis of the ferritic RPV belt 
line near the core is an essential part of the safety assessment of the RPV since the high level of 
neutron irradiation in this area may lead to an enhanced material embrittlement. For this reason 
the behaviour of the RPV beltline materials in the RPV pressure-retaining walls of LWRs is 
monitored under irradiation conditions by RPV irradiation surveillance programmes or dedicated 
irradiation programmes in other host reactors, respectively.   
Irradiation surveillance 
The aim of such irradiation surveillance programmes is to determine, by means of accelerated 
irradiated specimen capsules, the strength and toughness properties of RPV base and weld 
materials in the core beltline region of the RPV as a function of a defined neutron irradiation level. 
It is common knowledge that the heat affected zone properties are covered by the base and weld 
metals. The accurate determination of neutron fluences, neutron spectra and irradiation 
temperatures over the surveillance period and at the irradiation specimen positions is an 
important part of such surveillance programmes. The detailed surveillance requirements (number, 
orientation and location of specimens, time of insertion and withdrawal of specimen sets, testing 
specifications, etc) are described in special safety standards such as KTA 3203 [6.1.18], ASTM 
E-185 [6.1.19] and 10CFR Part 50 Appendix H, RSEM-B7213.  The material behaviour 
characterization part of safety assessment of the RPV is based either on the RTNDT concept by 
comparing test results (mainly from Charpy-V impact tests) obtained from advanced-irradiated 
specimens and unirradiated specimens, or on the fracture toughness concept by examining 
irradiated fracture toughness specimens (e.g. by determination of the reference temperature T0 
according to ASTM E 1921 [6.1.20]).  The material curve (fracture toughness) will then be 
compared with the loading curve (stress intensity factor) of postulated transients resulting from 
PTS events.   
The activities of AMES (Ageing Materials European Strategy) European network and many 
national and European projects like REDOS, PISA, FRAME, COBRA, ATHENA, GRETE, 
RADAMO, CLAD, PRIMAVERA, CUPRIVA, CARISMA have substantially improved the 
understanding of RPV irradiation embrittlement issues.  The ageing behaviour of the RPV 
materials in LWRs is governed by specific mechanisms and phenomena that are well-
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characterized by the research results from national and international projects supported by the 
European Commission.   
A dedicated irradiation surveillance programme is the best method for ensuring quantification of 
the irradiation effects on the reactor pressure vessel materials and to predict the changes in 
macroscopic material behaviour of these materials by subsequent testing of the surveillance 
specimens.  The irradiation of specimens can be performed in the specific RPV of concern itself, 
but nearer to the core to receive the irradiation in advance, or in a host reactor. Typically, the high 
energy neutron fluence or the dpa are used as damage function to define the lead factor for the 
determining the transfer function of the surveillance results to the RPV wall.   
Micro-structural investigation techniques  
The knowledge of the micro-structural material behaviour is a fundamental basis to understand 
and to explain the mechanisms that are responsible for the irradiation induced embrittlement 
effects. Micro-structural investigation techniques have emerged as sufficiently mature to be 
reliably applied to provide the necessary information for accurate assessment of irradiated RPV 
steels.  The main techniques identified in the FP5 project ATHENA are [6.1.2]: 
• Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM) 
• Field Emission Gun Scanning Transmission Electron Microscopy (FEGSTEM) 
• Small Angle Neutron Scattering (SANS, determination of a statistically representative 
size distribution of clusters) 
• Atom Probe Field-Ion Microscopy (AP-FIM) 
• Scanning Auger Electron Spectroscopy (AES) 
• Positron Annihilation Spectroscopy (PAS), using the positron lifetime and coincidence 
Doppler broadening for studying open-volume type atomic defects and defect impurity 
interactions 
These methods, along with others, are able to provide information on composition and size of 
irradiation induced precipitations (Cu), depending on Cu, Ni, Mn content, and may give 
indications of any potential dose rate and late blooming effects (fast growing irradiation induced 
Mn-Ni precipitations in RPV steels with high Ni but low Cu content at high fluences), respectively.   
Integrity assessment 
The loading of postulated cracks in the RPV belt line region under emergency conditions has to 
be determined by fracture mechanics analysis. It has to be demonstrated that a sufficiently large 
safety margin exists between the loading curve and the material resistance. 
For structural integrity analyses concerning RPV under PTS event, see an example in App. 16 
and in [5.1.47 and 5.1.48]. For WWER reactors see also Appendix 8. 
6.1.2 Cladding 
Austenitic stainless steel cladding, up to a few millimetres in thickness, is applied by the weld 
deposition of one, or more, layers (usually two) to the inside wall of LWR RPVs.  This is to inhibit 
general corrosive attack of the ferritic low-alloy steel base material, and to minimise any 
associated radioactive contamination of the reactor coolant system. Cr-Ni steel is the clad 
material used for most of these surfaces.  As a rule, the RPV cladding should be welded in at 
least two passes to ensure re-crystallization of the heat affected zone in the ferritic base metal 
and to eliminate the potential for relaxation cracking.  To neutralize dilution with the base metal, to 
prevent hot cracking and to induce resistance to inter-granular corrosion, a highly over alloyed 
clad metal is used for depositing the first pass of the austenitic cladding and a less over alloyed 
clad metal is used for the second pass and any subsequent passes.   
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The cladding is a structural feature which can be taken into account in RPV integrity 
assessments.  A full understanding of the behaviour of clad regions under PTS conditions is 
essential to the development of improved methods of RPV assessment.  The need for this 
understanding is particularly important in relation to crack front behaviour in the clad/HAZ/base 
metal interface region.   
Comprehensive results of cladding investigations (specifically dealing with WWER claddings) are 
given in Annex 1. 
6.1.2.1 Degradation Mechanisms 
For the RPV cladding on the inside of the vessel, the following degradation mechanisms should 
be considered: 
Irradiation embrittlement  
The irradiation embrittlement is the main ageing mechanism of the RPV cladding.  RPV claddings 
consist of welded austenitic steel with some delta ferrite. Determining the irradiation effects in 
RPV claddings has been the objective of more recent investigations of both WWER and western 
RPV claddings. As an example the Charpy-V impact tests for WWER-440 claddings did not 
indicate any significant shift of DBTT but a remarkable reduction of USE.  Irradiation was found to 
increase the yield and ultimate tensile strength of the cladding slightly, see references [6.1.21] to 
[6.1.27]  In general both the ductile initiation, fracture toughness and the tearing modulus 
decreases with increasing irradiation, [5.1.47]. A summary of the objectives and a list of final 
reports of relevant EC projects on this topic is given in Appendix A15. 
Thermal aging  
Thermal aging is typical ageing mechanism in cast and welded stainless steels.  Some research 
results show that thermal ageing of RPV cladding is limited due to the applied very clean welding 
strips or wires and the operation temperature. 
Corrosion 
Because of the required water chemistry in the primary circuit of RPV-s generally no corrosion of 
the RPV cladding is discovered. 
Thermal fatigue 
No real thermal fatigue trend curves of RPV cladding are available, consequently the allowed 
number of thermal cycles are determined with very high safety factors. In general the cumulative 
usage factor is very low. 
6.1.2.2 Assessment Methods (see also Reference in Appendix A15.1) 
There is currently no clear consensus in Codes and Standards for assessing the influence of 
austenitic cladding in RPV assessments. Having said this, current nuclear safety codes for 
assessment of defects generally adapt simplifying assumptions for consideration of the clad 
region, whereby: 
• the cladding is considered as a discrete region for the heat transfer analysis 
• the HAZ is ignored implicitly 
• only through clad flaws are considered 
• flaws are allowed to initiate in the clad region 
Assessment of sub-clad defects based on the above simplifying assumptions will be 
conservative, providing  
• the sub-clad defect is modelled as an appropriate 3D surface breaking defect 
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• estimates of the crack driving force are made on the basis of 3D elastic-plastic finite 
element analyses 
The presence of clad defects with sizes of depths range from 3 to 10 mm can contribute 
significantly to the overall probability of fast fracture from PTS loading. 
The presence of residual stresses is an important factor in assessing the behaviour of under-clad 
cracks in RPVs. Depending on the temperature of the vessel relative to the so-called “stress free” 
temperature, tensile residual stresses can exist in the cladding, with a steep gradient to much 
lower, possibly compressive, stresses in the base metal. 
Because of this gradient effect, cladding residual stresses are likely to have only a relatively small 
effect on the driving force for fracture at positions on a crack front below the clad-base metal 
interface. 
During a PTS transient, the cladding is subject to significant plastic deformation, which serves to 
reduce the cladding stresses to a low level after the transient. 
Warm pre-stressing, linked with the presence of cladding, is a factor that will tend to inhibit crack 
initiation in cleavage during PTS transients. WPS benefits refer here to the so-called 
“conservative” WPS principle, whereby cleavage fracture is predicted not to occur for that part of 
the transient where dKI/dt < 0, even if KI > KJC. It is important to note that the conservative WPS 
principle is not applicable to the reloading phase of a PTS transient, for which dKI/dt > 0. 
Further details see also in Appendix A16. 
Cladding defects and underclad defects can be detected by UT, eddy current and visual tests.  
These tests are usually included in the manufacturing program and in the periodic in-service 
inspections. Since the austenitic cladding is a tough material, crack propagation during service is 
highly unexpected. 
6.1.2.3 Residual and thermal stresses  
Residual stresses in RPV claddings are tensile stresses caused by the higher thermal expansion 
coefficient of the austenitic cladding compared to the ferritic base metal.  Residual stresses occur 
during welding and after weld stress relieving heat treatment.  During the cooling down from the 
heat treatment temperature this causes very high residual stresses, during the operational heat-
up and cool-down cycles thermal stresses occur. The residual stresses after annealing are 
partially eliminated during the first hydrotest and during operation. 
Numerical and experimental investigation concerning residual stresses in RPV claddings were 
performed in the PHARE 2.03/97 project “Qualification of new materials for replacements/repair 
of original materials in WWER (440/213)” and in the FP5 project ENPOWER (Management of 
Nuclear Plant Operation by Optimizing Weld Repairs). 
6.1.2.4 Lifetime Evaluation 
The cladding is a part of the RPV thus the lifetime cannot be evaluated separately.  The main 
cladding dependent factors are: 
 Residual and thermal stresses caused by the cladding manufacture 
 Shielding of the base/weld material against the neutron flux 
Information relevant to RPV lifetime assessments is presented in Appendix 1 (Fatigue and 
Thermal Fatigue), Appendix 5 (Assessment of the Evolution of a Flaw in Class 1 ASME Nuclear 
Equipment) Appendix 8 (Russian Code for WWERs, and VERLIFE) and Appendix 15 (Overview 
about the EU projects concerning cladding).  
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6.1.3 Nozzles and Penetrations 
This section summarises the design and integrity assessment of three types of RPV nozzles of 
the Nordic BWR design. This is taken as an example to demonstrate the design, function and the 
assessment methods of nozzles and penetrations. 
Nozzles and penetrations are important parts of the RPV. There are in total 279 nozzles and 
penetrations on the BWR 75 model of the Westinghouse (former ASEA) BWR RPVs.  
Oskarshamn unit 3 and Forsmark unit 3 (1200 MW) are both of BWR 75 design.  In this report the 
three main types of nozzles for the BWR 75 are described as regarding design, material and 
methods for integrity assessment.   
The three main nozzles are: 
• large nozzles, 
• internal set-on bottom nozzles, 
• partially welded set-in nozzles. 
Examples of the large nozzle type are the feed water inlet nozzles and the steam outlet nozzles.  
Nozzles for the control rods are of “internally set-on nozzles” type.  Set-in nozzles are used 
typically for connection of small bore pipe systems to the RPV, such as system for reactor water 
level control (totally 13 nozzles), boron system and system for core water supply. 
6.1.3.1 Design and Function of Nozzles 
Feed water nozzles 
The principal design of a feed water inlet nozzle is shown in Figure 1.  The function of the nozzle 
is to lead the feed water to the RPV.  The temperature of the feed water is approximately 100°C 
lower than that of the reactor water inside the RPV.  The cold feed water must be carefully mixed 
with warm reactor water in order to avoid cracking of the nozzle, the RPV or the internals.  Inside 
the feed water nozzle is a concentric pipe.  The pipe conveys the feed water to the feed water 
sparger.  The pipe and the nozzle form together an ejector that sucks up warm reactor water to 
the space between the pipe and the nozzle.  The ejector function keeps the nozzle warm and 
eliminates risks for thermal fatigue.  A proper design of the feed water sparger eliminates thermal 
fatigue cracking of the internals and RPV. 
A so called “safe-end” is welded to the nozzle.  A safe-end is in principle a spool-piece of a pipe 
made of nickel base alloy.  The purposes with this design are twofold;  
1. The critical weld between the nozzle and the safe-end is a shop weld that is made 
before the RPV is transported to site.  This critical weld is made under best possible 
conditions in the work shop.  The weld between the safe-end and the connecting 
stainless steel feed water pipe is a metallurgical “simpler” weld which can be made at 
site.   
2. The nickel base alloy, Alloy 600, has a thermal expansion coefficient that is in-
between those of the nozzle material, being low alloy carbon steel, and the 
connecting austenitic stainless steel pipe.  This design will reduce the thermal 
stresses caused by differences in thermal expansion coefficient values. 
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Figure 1 Feed water nozzle with safe-end. 
 
The material of the nozzle is ASME SA-508 Grade 3 Class 1, quenched and tempered low alloy 
steel forgings for pressure vessels with a carbon content of max 0.25 w-percent.   
The safe-end is made of Alloy 600, UNS N06600, which is a nickel-chromium-iron alloy.  The 
weld configuration between the safe-end and the nozzle is show in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 Principal configuration of nozzle to safe-end weld and 
safe-end to connecting stainless steel pipe weld. 
 
The feed water nozzle has been manufactured in the following sequence (main steps):  
• Forging-out, heat treatment and machining. 
• Welding the stainless steel (SS) cladding. 
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• Buttering with Alloy 182 
• Machining 
• Welding the nozzle into the RPV 
• Final heat treatment of the RPV 
• Welding the safe-end to the nozzle 
• Final machining 
• Welding the SS pipe to the safe end (site weld). 
Internal set-on nozzles 
Nozzles of this type are used in the bottom part of the RPV, a typical application being nozzles for 
the control rods.  The principal design is shown in Figure 3 below.  There are totally 169 control 
rod nozzles for the BWR 75 design. 
 
 
Figure 3 Control rod nozzle principle design. 
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The locations of the connecting weld between CRD nozzle and the CRD housing and of the weld 
between the CRD nozzle and the bottom part of the RPV are shown above.  These locations are 
illustrated in detail in Figure 4 and Figure 5. 
 




Figure 5 Details of the weld between the CRD nozzle & bottom part of RPV. 
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The material of the bottom part of the RPV is ASME SA-533 Type B Class 1.  This material is 
very similar to the material for the large nozzles, ASME SA-508 Grade 3 Class 1.   
The material of the CRD nozzles is Swedish Standard material SS 2103.  This is a forged carbon 
steel with a carbon content of max C 0.16 wt-percent.  The material is used in normalized 
condition. 
The bottom part of the RPV has CS cladding and SS cladding.  First are two layers of carbon 
steel welded to the RPV steel plate.  On top of the carbon cladding are two layers of welded SS 
cladding.  The purpose for welding the carbon steel cladding layer is to simplify the welding and 
heat treatment sequences and procedures.  The connection weld to the RPV is made with carbon 
steel filler material.   
The CRD nozzles have been manufactured in the following sequence (main steps):  
• Welding of stainless steel cladding to the carbon steel pipe. 
• Buttering with Alloy 182 to the top of the carbon steel pipe. 
• Machining and weld bevel preparation. 
• Welding the CRD nozzle to the RPV. 
• Rough machining of the nozzle. 
• Heat treatment of the complete bottom part of the RPV. 
• Final machining of the nozzle. 
Partially welded set-in nozzles 
The principal design of a partially welded set-in nozzle, system for reactor water level control, is 
shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 Principle design of a partially welded set-in nozzle. 
 
The set-in nozzle is in principle an Alloy 600 pipe inserted from the inside of the RPV.  The nozzle 
is welded to the RPV with Alloy 182 filler material, J-groove weld.  The set-in nozzle pipe is not 
press fitted or shrink fitted to the RPV wall.   
Note, the design of the nozzle and the through hole of the RPV wall make it impossible for the 
high pressure inside the RPV to push out the Alloy 600 nozzle even if the J-grove weld is 
completely cracked.   
Alloy 600 has been chosen for the material of the partially welded set-in nozzles.  The reason is 
that Alloy 600 has a thermal coefficient close to the low alloy steel of the RPV.  Alloy 600 is also 
relatively easy to weld both to the RPV and to the connecting stainless steel pipe.   
The set-in nozzles have been manufactured in the following sequence (main steps):  
• Machining of the Alloy 600 nozzle pipe. 
• Machining of the through hole and the J-groove 
• Weld bevel of the RPV. 
• Buttering with Alloy 182. 
• Final heat treatment of the RPV upper part. 
• Positioning and welding (Alloy 182) the set-in nozzle. 
• Welding connecting stainless steel pipe to the nozzle (at site). 
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6.1.3.2 Assessment Methods 
Structural verification 
Structural verification, or regular stress analysis, is performed typically according to ASME code 
Section III, Paragraph NB-3200 [6.1.30].  Verification uses all loads and combinations in the 
design specification for the actual component.  Loads include design, normal, upset, emergency 
and faulted conditions.  For nozzles and penetrations, loads in the vessel and loads from 
attaching pipes are considered. 
3D Finite Element Analysis can be done using general purpose finite element (FE) codes, such 
as ANSYS [6.1.31] and Abaqus [6.1.32].  Pipe loads generally come from piping analysis 
performed with special purpose codes, such as PIPESTRESS [6.1.33] and FPIPE [6.1.34]. 
In a 3D model, critical high stress sections are defined as analytical sections (ASN).  As an 
example, the section can start on the inside of the nozzle go through the thickness of the tube 
and end on the outside.  ASNs shall represent a probable failure path for the actual geometry.  
ASNs are generally not only chosen at weld positions.  Examples are shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 Typical Analytical Sections (ASNs) for stress evaluation in a feed water 
nozzle.  Stresses [Pa] results from design pressure 84 bar including pipe 
load.     
(Structural strength of cladding is not considered for primary loads and it is not shown here) 
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Stresses at the ASNs are linearised and primary and secondary stresses are checked against the 
corresponding allowable stresses, as given by the ASME Codes. Total stress, including peak 
stresses, are used in fatigue analysis using normal operation and upset loads.  This includes 
thermal transients for an expected lifetime of 40 to 60 years.  Fatigue usage is calculated for 
surface points (end points) on ASNs.  ANSYS linearization and fatigue capabilities are modified to 
meet the ASME Code evaluation procedure. 
Stress distributions from the structural verification may be used to provide input to subsequent 
fracture mechanics calculations.   
Fracture mechanics 
Fracture mechanics is used to determine the largest possible inspection interval in weld regions.  
A minimum detectable flaw is used in a crack growth calculation over time until maximum critical 
defect size is reached. 
Additional structural calculations are often needed to define the stress state at the presumed flaw.  
Models from structural verification often need refinement and additional load cases must be run.  
Weld residual stresses are never included in the structural verification.  For pipes and vessels 
there are standard solutions for the stress distribution in the literature.  For more complex 
geometries weld residual stresses could be calculated using FEA. 
Fracture mechanics analyses can be carried out by using the geometries and methods in 
handbooks/guidelines and with applicable structural integrity analysis codes, such as SACC 
(Safety Assessment of Components with Cracks). SACC contains routines for fracture 
assessment based on the R6 Method [6.1.42] and on Section XI of ASME code [6.1.35]. There 
are also routines for calculation of crack growth due to fatigue and stress corrosion cracking 
(SCC). Often, the fracture mechanics parameter driving the crack growth in the computations is 
the mode I stress intensity factor, KI. Concerning surface cracks, when computing the crack 
growth increment by increment, one can include to the computations the KI value from only one 
point along the crack front, typically crack tip/bottom, from two points, typically crack tip and 
surface points, or from several points. Most often the maximum KI value along the crack front is 
that in crack tip. Bamford discusses this issue in ref. [6.1.43], and concludes concerning crack 
growth computations based on the above mentioned one or two points, that keeping the aspect 
ratio (crack depth divided by its length) as 1/6, leads always to conservative results. However, to 
include the possible changes of crack shape in the computed crack growth realisation, it is 
necessary to use KI values from at least two points along the crack front. Concerning using KI 
information from several points along the crack front, Cruse and Besuner [6.1.44] were the first to 
utilise the concept of an integrated average of the stress intensity factor. This procedure uses all 
available KI values along the crack front. They achieved good matching between experimental 
and computed crack growth results.   
For fatigue induced crack growth, Paris-Erdogan equation [6.1.36] is typically used. Whereas for 
SCC, the rate equation [6.1.37] is often used. Concerning these two equations, a separate task is 
to find applicable values for their material, temperature and environment specific parameters. 
Concerning metallic NPP component materials, for Paris-Erdogan equation [6.1.36] such 
parameter values are given e.g. in Appendix C of Section XI of ASME code [6.1.35] and SSM 
handbook [6.1.45]. Whereas in case of SCC, there are several sources providing more or less 
applicable parameter values, such as refs. [6.1.38], [6.1.39], [6.1.40], [6.1.41] and [6.1.45]. One 
important notion concerning loads is that in case of fatigue induced crack growth the typically high 
weld residual stresses can most often be excluded from the crack growth computations, whereas 
in case of SCC they need to be taken into account in full. 
In general, the detection of a crack during inspection will lead to a repair job.  Fracture mechanics 
can be used to show that continued operation until next outage is allowed and repairing can be 
postponed until then. The repaired geometry is compared to the original geometry. Any significant 
geometry deviation results in a new or revised structural verification for the actual component. 
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6.1.4 Internals 
Core support structures are those structures or parts of structures which are designed to provide 
direct support or restraint of the core (fuel and blanket assemblies) within the reactor pressure 
vessel. 
Internal structures are all structures within the reactor pressure vessel other than core support 
structures, fuel3 and blanket assemblies, control assemblies, and instrumentation. 
These structures do not function as pressure boundaries but they play an important role as they 
contain the core of the reactor, channel water flow inside the vessel and both support and guide 
the instrumentation necessary for controlling and monitoring the reactor. Basically, the strength 
and fatigue analyses should be performed in accordance with the provisions of standards and 
procedures such as the ASME (ASME III NG) [6.1.49] for design stage. Although the operating 
experience has shown that high dose irradiation of stainless steel reactor internals can lead 
degradations that were not taken into consideration at the design stage. 
 
6.1.4.1 Design and Function 
The reactor vessel internals, namely the guide tubes, core barrel, core basket and lower core 
barrel constructions (Figure 8). The Internal structures of water reactors are essentially made of 
austenitic stainless since they are generally considered as having a good resistance to both water 
corrosion and neutron irradiation embrittlement. But after an operation for a long time, same 
cracking appeared.  
  (a) 
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  (b) 
Figure 8: (a) Construction of WWER 440 RPV and internals and  (b) core basket of 
VVER-440 [6.1.51] 
The core barrel assembly of the RVI makes the transition between the polygonal core contour 
and the circular shape of the core barrel. The vertical baffle plates and horizontal former plates 




The loadings that shall be taken into account in designing core support structures include, but are 
not limited to the following [6.1.49]: 
• pressure differences due to coolant flow; 
• weight of the core support structure; 
• superimposed loads such as those due to other structures, the reactor core, steam 
separating equipment, flow distributors and baffles, thermal shields, and safety 
equipment; 
• earthquake loads or other loads which result from motion of the reactor vessel;  
• reactions from supports, restraints, or both; 
• loads due to temperature effects, thermal gradients and differential expansion, or 
both; 
• loads resulting from the impingement or flow of reactor coolant, or other contained or 
surrounding fluids; 
• transient pressure difference loads, such as those which result from rupture of the 
main coolant pipe; 
• vibratory loads; 
• loads resulting from the operation of machinery, such as snubbing of control rods; 
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Functional temperature and fluence information 
The nominal inlet and outlet temperature in the reactor vessel is usually around 270-300°C for the 
water but components can reach locally significantly higher temperatures (up to 370-380°C) due 
to gamma heating. 
Former research results of neutron physics calculations concern the position of the wall of the 
reactor vessel. The fluence of the test sample estimated for 60 years practically equals with the 
load of the outer surface of the core barrel, and it is ~12dpa. It can be proved that the fluence 
value of the core boundary can be multiplied (~5-10) of the value of the core barrel, namely it can 
be estimated 35-60 dpa (90 dpa for bolt’s head) for 60 years operation time. Table 2 shows the 
estimated irradiation dose on location with maximum dose. 
Table 2 Estimated irradiation dose on location with maximum dose 
Irradiation time [years] 
Irradiation [dpa] 
Bolt head, baffle Shank of the bolt  Core basket 
30 42 36 34 
50 75 61 58 
60 91 73 70 
  
Based on the estimation, the results show 20% decrease in the bolt head and 40% decline in the 
shank of the bolt in radial direction. The estimated irradiation value at the bolt neck is circa 85 
dpa. 
6.1.4.2 POTENTIAL DEGRADATION, MATERIAL MODELS AND EVALUATIONS 
Nowadays the issues concerning the RPI are a very important research area, but the available 
opened literature does not contain enough information of its failures and there is no a common 
accepted assessment method. Contrary to the reactor pressure vessel, there are few surveillance 
programs in place to monitor the evolution of the reactor internals materials properties. However 
several research projects are running such as the PERFORM 60 European project that 
contributes to model irradiation effects on microstructure, environment, mechanical behaviour and 
their interactions leading to irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC). 
The possible ageing mechanisms of RPI is shown in Figure 9. Evaluation of these mechanisms is 
based on service experience, laboratory data and relevant experience from other industries. 
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Figure 9 Evaluation methodology 
 
During the fracture mechanical evaluation it should be examined that the changes of the material 
characteristics how influence the size of the allowable cracking, and the velocity of the crack 
propagation in RVI. Further purpose is to determine that size of crack, where in case of highest 
cracking exist an operating or breakdown transient, to which the examined environment loses its 
stability.   
The austenitic steels and the base material of the reactor internals are characterized by ductile 
fracture mode. At the same time the effect of irradiation causes embrittlement mechanisms in the 
material, which can lead to decrease of the toughness of the material. These embrittlement 
mechanisms can decrease the Charpy test values and the J-R curve (and J0.2). The J-R curve 
can be applied (beside the strength material characteristics) to the investigation of the stability of 
the crack or the stable crack propagation. The evaluation can be based on FAD or J-R curve, for 
instance according to Appendix K of ASME BVPC, Volume XI. 
The main stream of the researches concentrates on the baffle bolt cracking. Up to now this 
operating experience is mostly limited to the baffle bolt cracking issue in PWRs. 
6.1.4.3 Material Characteristics 
The main structural material used for Western type reactors  are A304, A304L, A316, A316L, for 
WWER it is titanium stabilized austenitic stainless steel 08Ch18N10T (equivalent to A-321); minor 
parts were made from nickel alloy ChN35VT-VD (this material is used for studs and is tungsten 
alloyed) and the steel 14Ch17N2.  
Static strength material characteristics  
The evolution of the defect microstructure during LWR irradiation strongly affects the strength and 
mechanical properties of the alloy. With increasing dose, the yield strength increases, and 
ductility and fracture toughness decrease. Relative to the unirradiated value for an annealed 
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material, the yield strength can increase by a factor of 4 at moderate dose.  The increase in yield 
strength can be seen to follow a square root dose dependence reaching saturation by ~10-20 
dpa. Radiation-induced hardness increases consistently with the dislocation loop microstructure.  
The RVI suffer by several degradation mechanisms in course of reactor operation, from among 
these the most serious problem is the change of material properties and J-R curve due to neutron 
irradiation. The requested data to characterize the operational change of material properties 
means the material changes due to irradiation. To perform the calculations the material 
characteristics and J-R curve should be determined concerning 50 and 60 years relevant to the 
expected maximum fluence.  
The Jc static crack growth resistance and the KJC stress intensity factor as a function of the size of 
irradiation also can be determined. For example for 30 dpa JC = 15 kJm-2 and KJC = 51 MPa√m 
(for the base metal), and both material characteristics turn into saturation over 30-35 dpa (in case 
of the base metal and the weld material too).     
Material characteristics concerning resistance of the fatigue and fatigue crack propagation  
Fatigue curves applied in the design stage are quite conservative and can be valid after long time 
operation. For instance fatigue curves for WWER can be calculated based on strength 
characteristics. Investigations show that the calculated fatigue curves run above the fatigue curve 
according to PNAE. In this manner the earlier fatigue analyses will be valid for the 50-60 years 













N, number of cycles
Lower core barrel 
K205, 9,7 dpa
Control rod guide 
tubes K602, 9,7 dpa







Figure 10 Fatigue curves concerning 60 years operation time, r=0   
Since the operating load cycles do not cause neither significant load, neither large number of 
cycles and the CUF value is usually much smaller than 0.2, thus these do not cause fatigue crack 
propagation. The crack propagation can result only from the vibration of the reactor internals, if 
the stress intensity factor due to vibration load effects larger than the threshold SIF of the fatigue 
crack propagation (∆Kth). The vibration caused numbers of cycles are as big that the small crack 
propagation velocity can cause promptly a larger crack size. Therefore the allowable crack size 
has to be as small that the vibration load cannot cause crack propagation.          
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The currently known examinations did not reveal cracks in the dangerous cross-section of the 
control rod guide tubes and lower core barrel. 
Material characteristics concerning the resistance of the stress corrosion crack 
propagation  
After longer operation, the appearance of stress corrosion cracking cannot be excluded in the 
reactor vessel internals. This crack propagation is function of the temperature, the media and 
other outer effects, like the neutron irradiation. To investigate the possibility of the crack 
propagation the threshold of the KISCC stress intensity factor is needed. Although the initiation 
decreases with increasing fluence up to a dose, unfortunately there is no consensus on the exact 
level of this threshold, nor the dose of the saturation. Some available experimental results are 
summarized in [6.1.53].  
Stable crack propagation analysis for the crack appearing in fastener bolts can be performed. The 
ASME standard does not contain information regarding calculation of the crack appearing in bolt, 
thus the calculations can be performed according to the FITNET procedure [6.1.52] (based on BS 
7910).  
From the point of view of the irradiation induced stress corrosion crack the critical environment 
are the fastener bolts of basket, which can be characterized with fast irradiated neutron fluence 
and the stagnant environments.   
Swelling 
The irradiation swelling of austenitic stainless steels is well known in fast reactors, where the 
operating temperatures and neutron fluxes are higher than in PWRs. Until recently, it was 
considered that irradiation swelling did not occur at temperatures below 365°C and that PWR 
internal structures would not be affected. According to [6.1.55], after long-term operation and high 
neutron doses (mainly baffle bolts and flux thimble tubes) have shown the presence of bubbles or 
voids. The resulting swelling remains however very limited.  
Test results about the creep and swelling of the materials of the VVER internal structures due to 
irradiation are only available in limited quantity. There are abundant data available about the 
swelling of the steels 304 and 306 in literature, which steels have similar chemical composition to 
the Russian steels marked with Ch18N9, 08Ch18N10T and Ch16N11MZ, and it is likely to 
happen that the  changes in the physical-mechanical attributes due to irradiation will be alike.    
It was established in the CIR program that almost all of the austenitic steels damage at the same 
level due to swelling caused by radiation, in the range of determined temperature and irradiation 
dosage. 
It was also stated that at the same integrated dosage, the temperature dependency of the 
swelling with the increase of the speed of the irradiation dosage will move to higher temperature 
range, i.e. at lower temperature the slower rate of irradiation can cause the same damage as the 
fast irradiation  at higher temperature. There are only limited quantities of data available about the 
relation of the swelling of the austenitic stainless steel and the flux in point of neutron radiation. 
The decrease of the swelling at the increase of the irradiation flux can also be seen at the 
08Ch18N10T and AISI 304L steels. 
The mechanical stress also greatly affects the swelling of the austenitic steels. The testing of 
pipes under pressure, showed at the AISI 316 austenitic steel [6.1.56] that the irradiation at the 
stress level not greater than the yield strength of the material, in non-irradiated status (∼138 MPa) 
will cause the increase of swelling. At the same time the decrease of swelling can be experienced 
with the given irradiation conditions at the stress level greater than the yield strength of the 
material. Practically the effect of the algebraic sign of the stress to the swelling due to irradiation 
in the austenitic steels is unknown.    
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In the research program of the Prometey Institute, they’ve irradiated specimens consisting of 
08Ch18N10T steel as base material and its welds in BOR-60 reactor at the temperature of 
330÷350°С and at the damaging dosage of 30-46 dpa. They’ve noticed that in the case of the 
irradiation of the 08Ch18N10T base material and weld at lower temperature (330÷350°С), the 
swelling is almost non existent (less than 0,1%) (see also Fig. 15), i.e. if the components of the 
internal equipment are made from 08Ch18N10T base material and weld and their maximum 
operating temperature is 350 °C  the swelling can be neglected. The swelling of the 08Ch18N10T 
steel with the conservative estimation relative to the small damaging flux is ~2,6 %, at the 
conditions stated above at the increase of the length of the irradiation to 60 dpa. The Prometey 
Institute has used plenty of research results analyzed and generalized in [6.1.57] to create a 
database concerning the swelling of the 08Ch18N10T steel.  
The data and the experimental results published by H. M. Chung [6.1.55] confirm that while the 
materials irradiated in fast reactor at the temperature typical in our case, don’t swell notably, at 
the irradiation intensity according to a polygon cope swelling can be expected on larger scale. So 
the swelling of the PWR internal structures operating for 50-60 years should be reckoned with 
even at a relatively lower temperature. So during the analysis the connections verified for the fast 
irradiated specimens have to be adapted to the measuring results of the specimens exposed to 
lower irradiation intensity.            
Up to now the highest swelling measured in PWR components remains limited (below 0.25%) 
[6.1.57], but there is an uncertainty on the long term effects, especially considering 60 years of 
operation. 
Effect of swelling 
The swelling will appear primarily in the component exposed to high gamma irradiation. The 
changes of the swelling appearing in the wall of the basket should be determined in order to 
demonstrate the distribution of the swelling of the wall. In the wall of the basket (at the half of the 
height of the zone) can be described the swelling along the wall with the help of the swelling 
relation given by Prometey Institute [6.1.58], assuming that the value of the irradiation can be 
decreased with 40 % in the wall.   
The examination results show that the swelling and the irradiation induced stress corrosion crack 
are the most significant degradation mechanisms (among the degradation mechanisms) in the 
course of prolongation of the operation time of the RVI.       
From the point of view of the swelling the critical environments are the follows: basket component 
at the middle part of the zone, baffle, fastener bolts and cylinder of the core basket.    
Based on measurement results and the presumable irradiated and temperature data, with 
complete certainty cannot be excluded that 0.5-1.0 % swelling will cause deformation, tightening 
in the fasteners bolts after 30 years operation time. The deformation of the baffle can influence 
the installation, assemblage and the joints too. The appearance of abrasion places on the matt 
surfaces will be the first sign of this deformation.        
The swelling caused hindered expansion of the bolt and the possible stress corrosion cracking of 
the bolts can lead to fracture.                 
Stress relaxation 
Under irradiation the initial prestress applied in the baffle bolts is reduced by irradiation-enhanced 
creep, at least in a first phase. In a later phase the irradiation swelling of the baffle plates could 
induce an increase of the stresses. This is shown when baffle bolts are replaced, by a decrease 
of the unbolting torque as a function of the dose received by the bolt. Up to now the potential 
increase due to swelling is not seen in the plants 
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6.1.4.4 Conclusions 
The examination results show that the swelling and the irradiation induced stress corrosion crack 
are the most significant degradation mechanisms (among the degradation mechanisms) in the 
course of prolongation of the operation time of the RVI.       
From the point of view of the swelling the critical environments are the follows: basket component 
at the middle part of the zone, baffle, fastener bolts and cylinder of the core basket.    
Based on measurement results and the presumable irradiated and temperature data, with 
complete certainty cannot be excluded that 0.5-1.0 % swelling will cause deformation, tightening 
in the fasteners bolts after 30 years operation time. The deformation of the baffle can influence 
the installation, assemblage and the joints too. The appearance of abrasion places on the matt 
surfaces will be the first sign of this deformation.             
From the point of view of the irradiation induced stress corrosion crack the critical environment 
are the fastener bolts of basket, which can be characterized with fast irradiated neutron fluence 
and the stagnant environments. The swelling caused hindered expansion of the bolt and the 
possible stress corrosion cracking of the bolts can lead to fracture.                            
It is necessary to perform more accurate estimation in order to examine the expected actual 
damage of the components under the influence of swelling. The point of these estimation is to 
accurate the present conservative determination of the life expectancy considering the actual flow 
and irradiation conditions. To make these examinations it is necessary to determinate the actual 
irradiation temperature of the bolts, polygon skirt and the basket skirt considering the real gamma 
heating and local flow conditions. Based on the actual irradiation temperatures the estimated 
swelling values of the given components and hereby the extent of the examinations probably 
significantly can be reduced.    
Using the accurate swelling value, FEM analyses are needed in order to determine the 
presumable deformation of the basket components. With these FEM analyses we get previous 
information relating to limited assembling and manageability, permissibility of hindered expansion.   
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6.2 OTHER VESSEL CHALLENGES (SG, PRESSURIZER) 
6.2.1 Stress Corrosion Cracking 
The CEA/Corrosion Service chairs the TC 156/WG 9 and the CEA best practice guidelines have 
been formalized, modified and adopted gradually since 1987 as ISO standards.  They are 
updated frequently.  The following standards are generally applied for Stress Corrosion Cracking 
experiments and can be used as reference guidelines: 
• ISO 8044 Corrosion of metals and alloys Basic terms and definitions 
• ISO 11845 Corrosion of metals and alloys General principles for corrosion testing 
• ISO 7539 Corrosion of metals and alloys  Stress corrosion testing 
  • ISO 7539-1 Part 1 General guidance on testing procedures 
  • ISO 7539-2 Part 2 Preparation & use of bent-beam specimens 
  • ISO 7539-3 Part 3 Preparation & use of U-bend specimens 
  • ISO 7539-4 Part 4 Preparation & use of uniaxially loaded tension specimens 
  • ISO 7539-5 Part 5 Preparation & use of C-ring specimens 
  • ISO 7539-6 Part 6 Preparation & use of pre-cracked specimens for tests under constant 
load or constant displacement 
  • ISO 7539-7 Part 7 Method for slow strain rate testing 
  • ISO 7539-8 Part 8 Preparation & use of specimens to evaluate weldments 
  • ISO 7539-9 Part 9 Preparation & use of pre-cracked specimens for tests under rising load 
or rising displacement 
 
6.2.2 CANDU Steam Generator Tubing  
A detailed and comprehensive life assessment of the steam generating equipment will include the 
pressure boundary, the external support structure, the tubing, and all the key internal sub-
components.  Tubing is a key sub-component.  For CANDU-6 NPPs, the steam generator (SGs) 
tubing is made from alloy 800.  These have experienced relatively little SG tube corrosion to date.  
For instance, at the Wolsong NPP Unit 1 plant (having 21 years of in-service experience), there 
are only nine SG tubes that are plugged, none as a consequence of corrosion.  Seven of these 
exhibited plugging before in-service operation, out of the total population of over 14,000 tubes.  
For other CANDU-6 SGs and Indian PHWRs the situation is similar.  Elsewhere, the record with 
Alloy 800 SG tubing is similar after more than 30 years’ in-service experience, [6.2.1]. 
Based on the detailed plant SG studies performed to date, the overall SG condition at several 
CANDU 6 plants appears to be good with no obvious compromise to attaining the design life.  
However, there is sufficient uncertainty over the condition of SG secondary side internals that the 
life extension assessment requires additional inspection and analysis.  The conclusions and 
recommendations are focused on water chemistry control, proactive inspections/monitoring 
program, and periodic cleaning on both primary and secondary sides of the steam generators. 
6.2.2.1 Degradation Mechanisms 
The operation and maintenance of steam generators is one of the most crucial and complex 
element in the success of pressurized water reactor operations.  For many nuclear utilities steam 
generators remain the leading cause of plant outage hours, high maintenance costs and reduced 
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generating capacity.  As a result, more and more utilities are faced with the reality that steam 
generators will not endure for the life of the plant, and will require either expensive repairs or 
complete replacement.  Therefore, the effective management of steam generators requires more 
than solving the problems as they arise; it requires anticipation of issues so that effective planning 
can be performed in advance.  Consequently, it is necessary to set-up a comprehensive Steam 
Generator Degradation Program in order to support implementation of an operating, maintenance 
and replacement strategy.  All these actions will support power production, safely, reliably and a 
competitive cost of the nuclear energy.  A steam generator strategy must specify a balance 
between the objectives of reducing short and long term capital, and operation and maintenance 
budgets.  To extend steam generator life, most of the remedial measures must address 
operational effects on steam generator degradation, [6.2.2].   
Maintenance activities intended to extend steam generator life and reduce the potential for costly 
forced shutdowns must be implemented at the NPP.  A comprehensive inspection program is 
able to detect problems at an early stage so that necessary actions can be implemented.  The 
flexibility of several tube repair options can reduce the effect of reduced thermal performance due 
to plugging of tubes.  Defective steam generator tubes can be sleeved at the location of the 
defect to permit the tube to remain in service.  Understanding the impacts and benefits of the 
different mitigation strategies is important so that implementation can occur at the optimal time. 
Decisions which affect the conditions in the steam generator must consider the impact of any 
mitigation strategies on the steam generator degradation and life.  These decisions may include 
operating temperature versus production efficiency, water chemistry strategies, controls 
impurities and the performance improvement of related equipment (e.g. condensers). 
Water chemistry is not the main damaging factor of the steam generator.  Although water 
chemistry can contribute to, or in extreme cases, cause steam generator degradation, materials 
and associated failure mode susceptibility can be more correlated to long-term steam generator 
degradation.   
The main types of CANDU 6 steam generator tubing degradations are shown in Table 3.  Figure 
11 shows the main types of damage occurring in the steam generator. 
Table 3 : Main types of CANDU 6 steam generator-tubing degradations 
Region Importance to SG Life Management 
Tubing-boiling 
zone  
Secondary side  





Circumferential stress corrosion cracking at the tube sheet rolled joint area 
has been a significant concern for SG 




Design influences fouling susceptibility, which affects corrosion and 
thermal hydraulic performance 
Tube sheet area In the tube sheet area the corrosion cause problems consisting in tubes 
degradation near the tube sheet at the contact with the sludge pile 
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Figure 11 Main types of damage occurring in the steam generator [6.2.3] 
 
6.2.2.2 Assessment Methods 
The main goals of the experimental program, developed at INR Pitesti on the important steam 
generator materials (Iy-800 and carbon steel SA508cl.2) are: assessment of the corrosion 
kinetics, development of corrosion testing simulation devices for tube-tube sheet joints with and 
without deposits in normal and abnormal steam generator operation conditions, chemical 
cleaning of deposits.  Other issues of the Program were focused on: concentration of impurities 
and corrosion products on simulated defects, the influence on the corrosion of tubes and tube 
sheet materials, the achievement of correlation between the presence of deposits and the 
intensity of crevice corrosion at tube-tube sheet joints. 
6.2.2.3 Lifetime Evaluation 
The main aspects of the material ageing management of steam generator tubing are the 
described below [6.2.4], [6.2.5], and [6.2.6]: 
Material ageing management of steam generator tubing 
The operation and maintenance of steam generators is one of the most crucial and complex 
elements in the success of pressurized water reactor operations.  For many nuclear utilities 
steam generators remain the leading cause of plant outage hours, high maintenance costs and 
reduced generating capacity.  As a result, more and more utilities are faced with the reality that 
steam generators will not endure for the life of the plant, and will require either expensive repairs 
or complete replacement.  Therefore, the effective management of steam generators requires 
more than solving the problems as they arise; it requires anticipation of issues so that effective 
planning can be performed in advance.  Consequently, it is necessary that a comprehensive 
Steam Generator Degradation Programme exists to support implementation of an operating, 
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maintenance and if required, a replacement strategy that supports power production, safely, 
reliably and a competitive cost.  A steam generator strategy must specify a balance between the 
objectives of reducing short and long term capital, and operation and maintenance budgets, with 
the risk of unscheduled or extended outage and a reduced plant availability factor.  To extend 
steam generator life, most of the remedial measures taken must address operational effects on 
steam generator degradation.   
Maintenance activities intended to extend steam generator life and reduce the potential for costly 
forced shutdowns must be implemented at the NPP.  A comprehensive inspection programme is 
able to detect problems at an early stage so that necessary actions can be implemented.  The 
flexibility of several tube repair options can reduce the effect of reduced thermal performance due 
to plugging of tubes.  Defective steam generator tubes can be sleeved at the location of the 
defect to permit the tube to remain in service.  Understanding the impacts and benefits of the 
different mitigation strategies is important so that implementation can occur at the optimal time. 
Having in view the experimental results and the INR Pitesti experience in the field of steam 
generator degradation we consider that the main aspects of the material ageing management of 
steam generator tubing are as follows: 
Design criteria for corrosion prevention and control: 
• Minimizing number of crevices; 
• Reducing excessive dry out regions; 
• Optimizing recirculation ratio; 
• Modifying flow distribution to improved the sludge management ; 
• Increasing blow down capacity; 
• Improvement of accessibility for inspection and maintenance; 
• Improvement of stress distribution in the tube – tubesheet area . 
Specific actions for corrosion prevention and control: 
• Condensate polishing systems (full flow or side arm); 
• Magnetic filter systems for feed water; 
• Systems for detecting and locating condenser leaks; 
• Balance of plant systems; 
• Materials selection for condensers feed water heaters, and moisture separator reheaters; 
• Drain routing for heaters and MSR; 
• Optimization of turbine plant chemistry; 
• Analytical systems for continuous monitoring of feed water; 
• Low-down heat recovery systems; 
• Improved make-up water systems. 
Water chemistry control and treatment measures for corrosion prevention and control: 
•  All Volatile Treatment (AVT): specification for impurity limits; 
•  Amines for condensate pH control: morph line, cyclohexilamine; 
•  Oxygen scavengers: hydrazine, catalyzed hydrazine; 
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•  Inhibitors for denting: crevice neutralizers, boric acid; 
•  Chelating treatments: continuous, intermittent; 
•  Lay-up treatment. 
Operating practice and maintenance measures for corrosion prevention and control 
These measures consist of:  
• condenser maintenance, 
• air in leakage control practices, 
• sludge removal by water jet lancing, 
• chemical cleaning, intermittent high blow down rate, 
• periodic tube inspections, 
• inspections of internals, 
• tube removal and examination; 
• preventive plugging, 
• lay-up procedures. 
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6.3 PIPING 
Piping systems are an integral part of nuclear power plants and require different levels of 
structural integrity justification depending on their safety significance.  Examples of piping 
systems include PWR primary loops, feed water and main steam lines, BWR main feed water 
lines and AGR boiler feed and steam lines.  Piping materials are predominantly ferritic and 
austenitic stainless steels.   Welds in particular are important feature from a structural integrity 
point of view.  Welds to be considered may include those joining similar material pipes together or 
to other components and dissimilar metal welds connecting pipes to other components. 
Piping systems exhibit degradation mechanisms due to different types of mechanical and thermal 
loading in combination with environmental effects and susceptible material. For design basis 
conditions, such mechanical and thermal loadings include: 
• Loadings caused by the fluid, e.g. by its pressure, temperature, pressure transients, 
temperature transients, thermal stratification, striping, mixing, fluid forces and vibrations, 
• Loadings arising due to the pipe itself, e.g. dead weight, pre-stressing and residual 
stresses (due to fabrication), 
• Loadings imposed by adjacent components, caused e.g. by restraint to thermal 
expansion or pump oscillations, and 
• Ambient loadings transferred by component support structures and imposed e.g. by 
anchor displacement, vibrations or due to earthquake.  
If of sufficient magnitude, these loads can result in the following failure modes/degradation 
mechanisms: 
• fracture, 
• fatigue failure,  
• inadmissible deformations, 
• at higher temperatures creep failure (not at service temperatures of LWR) and 
• corrosion-assisted cracking. 
Thermal aging may degrade material properties resulting in an increase of susceptibility to 
cracking.  Water chemistry, flow behaviour and susceptible material contribute to erosive wear on 
piping inner walls, localized and general corrosion and increase susceptibility to corrosion-
assisted cracking and fatigue.  All of these issues result in a complex array of degradation 
mechanisms that must be accounted for within any piping system management program.   
6.3.1 Degradation Mechanisms 
Piping systems exhibit degradation mechanisms due to various types of loading mentioned 
above, susceptible material and environment.  Thermal aging degrades material properties, 
resulting in increased susceptibility to cracking under load and environmental conditions. 
Susceptible material, water chemistry and flow behaviour contribute to erosive wear on piping 
inner walls, localized and general corrosion and increases susceptibility to corrosion-assisted 
cracking and fatigue.  All of these issues result in a complex array of degradation mechanisms 
that must be accounted for within any piping system management programme. 
Knowledge of pipework aging is the key to effective life management.  This means coordinating 
aging management activities within a systematic management programme, managing aging 
mechanisms through prudent operating procedures and practices; detecting and assessing aging 
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effects through effective inspection, monitoring, and assessment methods; managing aging 
effects using proven maintenance methods and effective control of water chemistry.  
In parallel, this requires profound understanding of piping materials and material properties; 
stressors and operating conditions; likely degradation sites and aging mechanisms; and effects of 
aging on safety margins.  
For example in LWRs, the primary piping ageing knowledge is derived from the primary piping 
baseline data, the operating and maintenance histories, and external experiences.  Numerous 
reviews are available on the issues involved and approaches used in different countries; 
examples include the IAEA reports [6.3.1], [6.3.2]. A systematic approach to piping aging is also 
prominent in the sophisticated in-house component/ageing damage matrices used by most 
operators.  A prominent example at national level is the GALL (generic ageing lessons leaned) 
report [6.3.3], in which the US-NRC brought together relevant US experience of both aging 
mechanisms and the associated TLAA (time-limited aging assessment) methods. The IAEA is 
currently exploring an analogous approach at international level. In view of this, the following 
subsections highlight issues raised by the EG2/EG3 participants where such scope exists for 
developing further guidance on dealing with the relevant age related degradation mechanisms. 
These descriptions are not intended to be comprehensive. 
6.3.1.1 Fatigue 
Thermal fatigue  
Generally both stainless and carbon steels should be considered susceptible to thermal fatigue 
when subjected to cyclic loading. Degradation caused by thermal fatigue may be found in either 
weld or base metal locations, but it is restricted to non-main coolant loop piping in PWRs, except 
for high cycle fatigue in high temperature difference mixing nozzles.  The specific design of the 
piping system is also a critical factor in determining its susceptibility to thermal fatigue.  Thermal 
fatigue can be caused by  thermal transients, thermal stratification, thermal striping, and/or 
turbulent penetration.  The requirements on maintaining fatigue cumulative usage factors below 
1.0 should be examined when the impact of thermal fatigue is assessed.  In-service inspection 
requirements should be followed and augmented if necessary.  The in-service inspection, 
monitoring, and assessment element can in some cases be supported by qualified inspection 
techniques (e.g. those qualified to the requirements of European Network for Inspection and 
Qualification [6.3.4], Appendix VIII of Section XI of the ASME Code [6.3.31] or French RSE-M 
Code [6.3.32]) and German KTA 3201.4 [6.3.45] and 3211.4 [6.3.46] codes for primary and 
secondary piping respectively, since the detection of fatigue cracking is difficult.  Effective local 
leakage detection techniques and thermal fatigue monitoring systems (e.g. local thermocouple 
matrices arranged azimuthally on the piping OD) should be considered.  If thermal fatigue 
degradation is discovered, the user needs to analyze the flaw or flaws, including the root cause, 
in order to determine if the flawed component is fit for continued operation.   
Vibration fatigue 
Vibration fatigue is a high cycle mechanical fatigue mechanism which may affect any piping 
system.  Small diameter piping and socket weld locations particularly have been shown to be 
susceptible to high cycle fatigue. For these cases, vibratory fatigue cracking is often caused by 
pump- or cavitations-induced pressure pulsations if an excitation frequency coincides with the 
structural (natural) frequency of the piping.  Cracking often initiates at the toe of the weld  and 
may be detected by inspection techniques or leak monitoring.   
When justification for continued operation cannot satisfactorily be made, management of fatigue 
degradation may require repair or replacement. Operating experience may provide insight 
regarding locations susceptible to vibratory fatigue degradation. 
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Environmentally Assisted Fatigue (EAF) 
In recent years, the influence of LWR coolant environment to the fatigue behaviour of 
components has been discussed internationally. In 2007 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission provided a “Guideline for evaluating fatigue analyses incorporating the life reduction 
of metal components due to effects of the light-water reactor environment for new reactors” 
[6.3.43].The publication is mainly based on NUREG/CR-6909 [6.3.44] which provides relevant 
fatigue data for carbon steels, low-alloy steels, Ni-Cr-Fe alloys and austenitic stainless steel 
grades (e.g. 304, 316, 316NG). NUREG/CR-6909 has indicated that current design curves may 
be non-conservative for piping in LWR environments. The US-NRC Regulatory Guide endorses 
the design curves developed in [6.3.43] for the incorporation in design of new reactors while 
stating that “the design of the current fleet of reactors is satisfactory” because of “significant 
conservatism in quantifying other plant-related variables (such as cyclic behaviour, including 
stress and loading rates) involved in cumulative fatigue life calculations”.  The ASME Boiler and 
Pressure Vessel code is currently being updated by the development of code cases that follow a 
similar approach to that established in NUREG/CR-6909. The Japanese JSEM code has similarly 
been updated.  The German KTA 3201.2 code contains environmental fatigue attention levels 
(0.2 for stainless steels and 0.4 for ferritic steels). 
The extent of environmental influence on fatigue initiation is still a matter of ongoing international 
debate.  Whilst the small specimen data underpinning the model developed in NUREG/CR-6909 
indicate a significant environmental effect, this is not necessarily reflected in operating experience 
or the results of component-like specimen testing.  NUREG/CR-6909 introduces an 
environmental penalty factor (Fen) to describe the relation between admissible load cycle in air in 
comparison to admissible load cycles in LWR environment. Various numerical procedures were 
developed. All of these methods have in common that they numerically “fit” admissible load 
cycles obtained in air environment to admissible load cycles obtained in LWR coolant 
environment. The relation is defined by the scalar variable “Fen” which varies e.g. depending on 
material batches under consideration as well as testing techniques and conditions like the 
definition of failure criterion.  
Existing approaches like NUREG/CR-6909 [6.3.44] can be seen as a first approach for 
assessment of EAF, but is widely regarded as excessively conservative. Concerted international 
effort is currently focussed on development of assessment procedures that account for 
environmental effects in a way that is more representative of LWR plant.  
Thermal Stratification and Striping (Mixing Problems) 
 Thermal stratification in horizontal sections of piping systems due to hot and cold portions of the 
fluid may occur when the fluid is stagnant or flowing very slowly.  This causes global bending 
(“banana” effect) and local deformation (“pear” effect), see Figure 12.  
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Figure 12 Thermal Stratification Phenomena. 
In case of changes in time in the interface between the hot and cold portions of the fluid, this load 
becomes cyclic and causes fatigue as well.  Thermal striping (rapid oscillation of the thermal 
boundary interface along the piping inside surface) causes, on the whole, cyclic local thermal 
stresses at the inner surface of the pipe wall, see Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13 Thermal striping due to fluctuation of the interface in a stratified flow. 
Plant experience of turbulent mixing has shown that crack initiation under conditions of high cycle 
fatigue can occur in a relatively short time (i.e. several hundred operational hours in relation to a 
typical design lifetime of 40 years or more).  A key development in the understanding of high 
cycle fatigue came about with publication of USNRC Bulletin 88-08 [6.3.1]-[6.3.8] in response to 
three thermal fatigue failures in un-isolable portions of piping systems attached to the reactor 
coolant loop piping.  This was followed by bulletin 88-11 [6.3.9] specifically addressing 
pressurizer surge line thermal stratification.  PWR plants have subsequently developed a range of 
measures for the management of high cycle fatigue, including inspection of susceptible locations, 
instrumented piping to measure thermal stratification and made permanent modifications to 
preclude thermal fatigue failures.  
Whilst assessment tools are in place for addressing high-cycle thermal fatigue in the U.S. [6.3.16] 
and Japan [6.3.26] and to an extent in Europe with the publication of the NESC thermal fatigue 
report [6.3.24], no full international consensus on assessment approach has yet been reached.  
This, to an extent, reflects the fact that national development programs are geared towards 
specific national integrity issues, e.g. small bore non-isolable pipework in the U.S. and mixing 
tees in Europe.  Significantly, IAEA Guidelines [6.3.27] claim that pressure and temperature 
monitoring of piping susceptible to thermal cycling is the most reliable method to ensure structural 
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integrity.  This would imply that further application and validation of available assessment 
methods is required to confirm applicability in actual plant applications. Assessment methods for 
fatigue initiation and growth are discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.2. Appendix 1 provides 
additional information relating to fatigue and thermal fatigue.  
6.3.1.2 Thermal Ageing 
Thermal ageing degradation is primarily of interest for cast stainless steel materials and welds 
made from stainless steel filler material.  Cast stainless steels and stainless steel weld materials 
have a duplex structure consisting of austenite and (delta)-ferrite phases.  This (delta)-ferrite 
decomposition results in a reduction in the material's fracture toughness and Charpy-impact 
energy.  The effect of thermal ageing should be taken into account for any location where cast or 
weld stainless steel materials are used.  This is especially true if a leak-before-break (LBB) 
analysis is to be justified for an affected piping component (e.g. sections of the main coolant 
loops in PWRs).  Thermal ageing of primary coolant piping can be a safety issue if a material 
develops a very low level of fracture toughness which reduces the defect tolerance of the 
component.  Ideally, piping materials should be chosen that are not susceptible to thermal 
ageing.  Where degradation does occur in piping, it may be necessary to consider repair or 
displacement.  Where components are replaced, a comprehensive analysis of the removed 
component would be recommended. 
6.3.1.3 Corrosion 
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) 
In general, SCC is a concern for instrument penetrations made from Alloy 600 and welded to the 
piping via Alloy 182 filler material.  The most susceptible degradation site is the inside surface of 
the penetration where some Alloy 182 can be directly in contact with primary water in which case 
the degradation mechanism is known as Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)  
Degradation of PWR stainless steel piping can also occur due to SCC, typically as trans-granular 
SCC from the outside surface due to contamination by chloride residues in combination with 
water condensation.  Augmented in-service inspection programmes may be required for 
susceptible  components (e.g. Alloy 600 penetrations and  Alloy 182 dissimilar metal welds).  
Intergranular SCC (IGSCC) 
is associated with sensitised material.  For example, sensitised austenitic stainless steels are 
susceptible to IGSCC in an oxidising environment. Sensitisation of unstabilised austenitic 
stainless steels is characterised by a precipitation of a network of chromium carbides with 
depletion of chromium at the grain boundaries, making these boundaries vulnerable to corrosive 
attack. Heat Affected Zones (HAZs) may become sensitised as a consequence of manufacture, 
and therefore control of heat input needs to be carefully considered.  
Transgranular SCC 
is caused by aggressive chemical species, especially if coupled with oxygen and combined with 
high stresses [6.3.33], [6.3.34]. Degradation generally occurs at a slow rate in terms of both crack 
initiation and propagation. (10-9 to 10-6 m/s). The sequence of events involved in the SCC process 
is usually divided into three stages [6.3.35]: 
1. crack initiation, 
2. steady state crack propagation, and 
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Boric acid corrosion (BAC) 
BAC may cause degradation of PWR primary components due to leakage of boronated coolant.  
A reduction in PH levels leads to enhanced corrosion rates.  Evaporation of boronated water at 
high temperatures results in concentration of the boric acid and corrosion rates are increased.  
Field experience and test results indicate that the corrosion rates for carbon steels and low-alloy 
steels exposed to PWR primary coolant leakage are greater than previously estimated and could 
be unacceptably high.  PWR plants now typically have augmented inspection programmes that 
effectively control BAC.  These have been developed based on plant experience, particularly the 
Davis-Besse plant in the USA where significant degradation was revealed by inspection of the 
RPV head. 
Flow accelerated corrosion (FAC) 
FAC is associated with the combined action of corrosion and erosion (i.e. the mechanical action 
of a fluid on a metal surface) [6.3.36], [6.3.37]. The corrosion resistance of unalloyed or low 
alloyed ferritic steels in water and steam depends on the formation of protective oxide layers. If 
these layers are removed, the corrosion attack on the metal surface can occur in the form of 
metal dissolution. The flow conditions shift the equilibrium between protection layer removal and 
formation which determines the material consumption. The severity of erosion varies with the 
material type, the fluid temperature, the fluid velocity, the oxygen content in the fluid and the 
component geometry. As previously noted, carbon and low-alloy steels are susceptible to FAC 
[6.3.33], [6.3.34]. FAC takes place at low flow velocities and the corrosion rate is constant. The 
difference between generalised corrosion and FAC is the effect of water flow at the oxide-feed 
water interface [6.3.36]. Consequences of the corrosion/erosion mechanism are the thinning of 
component walls, which if undetected may result in leakage or rupture.  The severity of the 
degradation depends on the total stress as well as on the deposition of the eroded particles at 
locations where there is a low flow velocity (wastage) [6.3.34]. 
6.3.2 Assessment Methods 
To prevent ductile fracture, all nuclear design codes provide rules to calculate sufficient wall 
thickness of pipes in order to limit the primary stresses.  Furthermore, by means of a stress 
analysis along with a classification of stresses and limitation of stress intensities it has to be 
proved, in conjunction with the material properties, that neither primary stresses nor the range of 
primary and secondary stresses cause relevant plastic deformations or progressive distortions 
(ratchetting).  The design codes commonly used within Europe include ASME III, the German 
KTA code and the French RCC-M code.    
To design against fatigue failure, analyses are performed limiting the equivalent stress range 
derived from primary, secondary and peak stresses in conjunction with the number of cycles on 
the basis of strain range based fatigue curves.  Fatigue usage factors are commonly calculated to 
justify component lifetimes at the design stage.  Design code assessments are often updated 
throughout plant life (e.g. following repair or replacement activites) and also via periodic safety 
reviews that are scheduled at intervals throughout plant life. Design codes include defect 
tolerance assessment procedures to provide continued justification of component integrity 
throughout plant lifetime. These defect tolerance assessments provide assurance against 
through-life failure by comparison with either postulated defect sizes, manufacturing inspection 
results or defects revealed by in-service inspection.  Codes and procedures also exist to provide 
supporting analyses throughout plant life. Examples include R5 and R6 in the UK, ASME XI, 
RSE-M (France) and KTA (Germany). Throughout plant life, assessments/analyses are often 
referred to as Engineering Assessment Methods (EAMs). These generally include fracture 
mechanics based procedures for assessing the significance of real or postulated defects in 
structures. Several of the key EAMs used in the European nuclear industry are described in the 
following paragraphs. 
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The ASME code is widely used in Europe, together with other locally developed EAMs for nuclear 
engineering assessments, some examples of which are shown below: 
 France – RCC-M (App. ZG), RCC-MRx (App. A16), RSE-M (App. 5.4 – 5.6) 
 UK – R6 , R5 (High temperature creep), BS7910 
 Germany – KTA (KTA 3201, KTA 3206, KTA 3211, KTA 1403) 
 Czech Republic – NTD AME (App. X – XIV), VERLIFE (App. X - XIV) 
 Finland – YVL Guides 
 Sweden – SSM Guides and SSM Handbooks 
EAMs provide assurance of component integrity that form an important constituent of nuclear 
safety justifications throughout Europe. The philosophy of demonstrating nuclear safety varies 
according to the regulatory requirements of individual countries and also according to the nuclear 
safety significance of the component. For example, EAMs are one strand of the Break Preclusion 
Concept (BPC) in Germany and also provide one part of a multi-legged safety argument for the 
more safety significant components in the UK.  
6.3.2.1 LBB 
For justifying the structural integrity of piping systems in nuclear power plants, the leak-before-
break (LBB) concept is considered in many European countries.  LBB is aimed at demonstrating 
that forewarning of defect growth will be provided by detectable leakage well in advance of 
catastrophic failure.  
There are basically four distinct approaches used within Europe that are available for undertaking 
LBB assessments.  It must be emphasized however, that all approaches have some similarities to 
each other.  Of the four approaches, the UK and French are country specific and not generally 
adopted elsewhere.  Both the German Basis Safety Concept (BSC), which is now being called 
the Integrity Concept (IC), and the American Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.6.3, form the basic 
foundation for most countries.  An overview of the four different approaches is provided below: 
BSC / IC 
This method originated in Germany, and is used in other countries such as Spain and the 
Netherlands.  The BSC / IC provides the overriding safety procedure for the assessment and 
structural integrity maintenance of nuclear power plants and includes the Break Preclusion 
Concept (BPC) as one of the arguments.  The BPC provides a means by which the complete 
cleavage of a pipe should be avoided.  One of the legs of the BPC includes LBB so that, even if a 
crack forms, the leakage of fluid will be detected with significant margin to pipe failure.  As such, 
the LBB section of the BPC forms a “defence in depth” argument for the prevention of pipe failure; 
which will be accompanied by preclusion of other failure mechanisms and other detection and 
prevention measures.   
The LBB assessment itself is applied only to the most probable locations, such as welds, sections 
of increased load or material degradation and geometric features.  The assessment applied uses 
the detectable leak rate to determine the crack size required for confident LBB detection and 
compares this to the critical crack size.  In these calculations, only deterministic calculations are 
used.  This deterministic approach and defence in depth argument within the BSC / IC renders 
probabilistic approaches unnecessary.  
SRP-3.6.3 
This method originated in the USA, and is used in other countries such as Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, Spain and Finland. SRP-3.6.3 is a detectable leakage procedure for LBB.  The 
procedure was initially developed to remove the need for multiple pipe-whip restraints.  These 
can be removed where it can be shown that a crack will be detectable prior to pipe failure, thus 
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allowing intervening action before a pipe-whip occurrence.  The procedure is only applicable to an 
entire section of piping, not individual components or welded joints.  The procedure also excludes 
the use of LBB when water-hammer, corrosion, creep, erosion, fatigue or environmental condition 
can lead to component failure within the lifetime of the NPP. 
The LBB argument in SPR-3.6.3 can only be applied once the reliability of the detection system 
can be demonstrated.  As with other LBB procedures the basic principle is to use the detectable 
leak rate to determine the crack size required for confident LBB detection and compares this to 
the critical crack size to ensure suitable margins exist.  One difference with the SPR-3.6.3 
procedure is the allowance for additional margins to be applied.  For example, in the Czech 
Republic, factors of 1.4 and 2 are required by the Czech regulator on the loads applied and crack 
sizes respectively.   
R6 
The R6 procedure for LBB originates and is primarily applied in the UK. The approach is based 
on two methods: 1) the “detectable leakage method” where it is required to demonstrate that 
there is a sufficient margin between detectable leakage crack length and limiting crack length 
assuming a through-wall defect from the onset (in line with SRP-3.6.3 referred to above), and 2) 
the “full LBB procedure” whereby a known or postulated defect is initially considered which has 
not yet penetrated through the wall. The second of these is more complex and involves crack 
growth calculations through life for the initially part-penetrating defect.  The R6 approach is 
heavily based on sensitivity analyses within deterministic calculations and does not apply specific 
safety margins.   
The LBB argument in R6 can usually only be used as part of a defence in depth argument and 
can not usually be applied when there are multiple defects (consistent with most of the other 
approaches). Allowances for some more complex situations, i.e. to allow for high temperature 
creep and/or complex geometries, are provided.  
RCC-MRX Appendix 16 
The RCC-MRX procedure for LBB originates and is primarily applied in France. Appendix 16 of 
RCC-MRX includes details of how to implement a LBB analysis. As with the other methods, LBB 
estimates are made by comparing the crack size that allows for the leak to be detected and that 
which causes component failure.  This comparison is quantified by a reserve factor of 2 in the two 
crack sizes and a factor of 10 on the detection capability (i.e. detectable leak rate).  Some 
account for the crack dimensions are provided by accounting for different internal and external 
crack lengths.  
6.3.2.2 Fracture Mechanics Methods 
Simplified fracture mechanics concepts are used for the demonstration of LBB.  The 
corresponding conservative calculation of the critical through-wall crack length (TWC) is 
necessary.  The methods usually used by AREVA NP GmbH for the evaluation of ductile failure 
of components are the Flow Stress Concept (FSC) and the Plastic Limit Load (PLL) for 
circumferential cracks.  For axial cracks, the formula developed by the Battelle Memorial Institute 
(BMI) and the RUIZ formula are applied to correlate the material parameters (yield strength, 
ultimate tensile strength, and Charpy toughness), defect data (through-wall crack length), 
geometry data (pipe diameter, wall thickness) and loading conditions (internal pressure, external 
bending moment) for a theoretical prediction of ductile failure.  The prerequisites for the 
applicability of simplified fracture mechanics methods for circumferential cracks (FSC, PLL) and 
for axial cracks (RUIZ-, BMI- formula) are; first, the fulfilment of a ductility criterion (i.e. impact 
energies of the material of more than 45 Joule at the relevant temperatures), and second, the use 
of material properties of the base material (instead of weld material or HAZ properties). 
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Fracture mechanics based structural integrity analyses are also needed when assumed/identified 
degradation mechanism(s) can locally drive crack growth. For NPP piping systems, these 
mechanisms are mainly SCC and fatigue.  
Fracture mechanics analyses can be carried out by using the geometries and methods in 
handbooks/guidelines, such as SINTAP procedure [6.3.38], R6 Method [6.3.39] and SSM 
handbook [6.3.40], and with applicable structural integrity analysis codes. Often, the fracture 
mechanics parameter driving the crack growth in the computations is the mode I stress intensity 
factor, KI. Concerning surface cracks propagated by SCC or fatigue, the KI or KI range based 
crack growth is usually computed increment by increment, until a case specific maximum 
allowable crack size is reached. For fatigue induced crack growth, Paris-Erdogan equation 
[6.3.41] is typically used. Whereas for SCC, the rate equation [6.3.42] is often used. These 
analysis issues are discussed in more detail in earlier section concerning "nozzles and 
penetrations", and therein in section "assessment tools". 
Definitions for maximum allowable crack sizes concerning NPP piping components are given e.g. 
in Section XI of ASME code [6.3.31]. When having detected a crack, the purpose in this approach 
is to assess with fracture mechanics procedures whether the crack can grow to reach/exceed the 
maximum allowable size before the next inspection or not. In the former case, a repair or 
component replacement has to carried out right away, whereas in the latter case the remedial 
actions can be postponed at least until the next inspection, allowing thus more time to plan and 
prepare these actions. 
6.3.2.3 German Safety Standard KTA 
Integrity assessment of these effects is performed in German NPPs as part of the integrity 
concept according to German Safety Standard KTA [6.3.28], e.g. described in the final report of 
the NESC Thermal Fatigue Project [6.3.29].  Temperature monitoring (stratification, plug-type 
transients, etc.) is a key issue in this concept.   
The analytical integrity evaluation may be performed as piping code analysis or alternatively as a 
detailed finite element (FE) calculation to provide more realistic data instead of conservative 
assumptions.  As load input for these integrity analyses, either specified conservative loads or 
temperature measurement results may be used.  The basis for the analysis procedures is given in 
technical codes and standards as amongst others the ASME-Code Section III [6.3.30] or the 
German Safety Standard KTA [6.3.28].  Based on these analyses, it has to be shown that no 
repeated plasticity occurs and that the fatigue usage factor doesn’t exceed the cyclic load bearing 
capability of the material. 
Appendix 7 provides additional information regarding thermal high-cycle fatigue in piping system 
tees with leakage.  
6.3.2.4 Fatigue crack initiation and growth 
In Japan, the U.S and Europe, separate but similar initiatives are being undertaken with a view to 
providing guidance on significance and assessment of high-cycle fatigue.  A distinction can be 
made between the efforts being made in Japan and the U.S, and those in Europe, with respect to 
environmental effects.  Both Japan [6.3.26], [6.3.17] and the U.S [6.3.43], [6.3.16] have produced 
similar guidelines to allow for the influence of primary water chemistry on fatigue endurance in 
terms of fatigue strength reduction factors.  It is emphasized that the issue of environmental 
fatigue is a general concern in relation to cyclic loading and is not necessarily specific to high-
cycle thermal fatigue as considered here.  In Europe, in the context of high-cycle thermal fatigue, 
this concept (environmental fatigue) has not yet been generally accepted.  Whilst it is accepted 
that environment may play a role in fatigue endurance in general, the uncertainty in many other 
parameters associated with high-cycle thermal fatigue (e.g. local heat transfer and loading 
frequency to name but two) suggests these need to be investigated further if consistent safety 
factors are to be proposed and accepted. 
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In other respects, the methodologies being followed to assess high-cycle thermal fatigue in the 
U.S., Japan and Europe, appear similar in strategy.  They all recognize the difficulty in 
generalizing an evaluation method given that mixing conditions will be dependent upon local 
pipework geometry and the flow pattern and have all made use of operational experience to date 
in defining screening criteria to determine the potential significance of thermal fatigue.  In the U.S, 
a survey of fatigue related plant integrity issues, identified non-isolable small-bore branch lines (≤ 
4”) as a potential area for further investigation.  Testing and evaluation has lead to models being 
developed for determining the fatigue susceptibility of non-isolable, normally stagnant branch 
lines [6.3.13]-[6.3.15].  For swirl flow in particular, the models allow the location of cyclic 
interaction to be predicted and an estimate of the cyclic frequency [6.3.16]. 
In contrast, work being undertaken in Japan [6.3.17] and Europe [6.3.18]-[6.3.24] addresses 
larger diameter pipework and specifically addresses turbulent mixing at tee intersections.  
Assessment guidelines include a phased assessment approach with phases of screening, 
simplified analysis and lastly detailed analysis. 
A key issue of the simplified (sinusoidal) assessment method proposed in Europe is that it has 
been developed taking plant experience into account. In ref. [6.3.22] examples are provided of 
predicted fatigue usage factors related to observed crack depths. On the basis of the correlations, 
it is concluded that: 
• A usage factor of 1 corresponds to a crack less than 1 mm in base metal areas 
• A usage factor of 4 corresponds to a crack less than 1 mm in weld areas. 
As a general observation, the method is considered significantly conservative is the case of weld 
assessment. 
In Germany, a practical monitoring-based approach to managing high cycle-thermal fatigue is 
being applied [6.3.25].  Supporting sensitivity analysis to key issues and variables associated with 
predicting crack initiation, in terms of usage factor, show a variation of a factor of one hundred in 
terms of predicted crack initiation depending on the choice of variables and values taken into 
account during the assessment. 
6.3.3 Lifetime Evaluation 
Information on aspects of lifetime evaluation of piping is detailed in the following appendices: 
Appendix1 (Fatigue and Thermal Fatigue), Appendix 7 (Thermal High Cycle Fatigue) and 
Appendix 17 (CANDU piping). 
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6.4  PUMPS AND VALVES  
The design and construction of pumps and valves should fulfil the functional requirements and 
not lead to an increase of loads or stresses. In order to achieve this, the following aspects need to 
be considered: 
• Favourable conditions for component service loadings taking system loads into account 
(e.g. actuating, closing and fluid forces) 
• Favourable distribution of stresses, especially in areas of structural discontinuity  
• Avoidance of sharp corners (significant stress raisers)  at wall thickness transitions, 
especially for components subjected to transient temperature loadings 
• Avoidance of welds in areas of high local stresses 
Selection of materials appropriate to operational conditions (e.g. medium, temperature, loadings, 
functional requirements) 
• Qualified manufacturing process 
6.4.1 Pumps 
Pump casings may be of forged, cast or welded design. The pump casings should be so 
designed that the required functional capability is maintained in the event of pipe forces and 
moments as well as loadings from external events occurring in addition to the operational 
hydraulic and thermal loads [6.4.1] and [6.4.2]. 
The design of the pump casing and the pertinent systems should permit adequate accessibility for 
maintenance, replacement of wear parts and repair purposes. 
6.4.1.1 Pump Design 
The adequacy of the design of the pump casing shall be demonstrated either: 
• by an investigation through experimental stress analysis, 
• by detailing satisfactory service performance of other comparable pumps under similar 
operating conditions, or 
• by finite element (FE) stress analysis, or 
• by an analytical stress analysis (e.g. analysis of cylindrical or spherical shells, 
torispherical, ellipsoidal or flat heads and branch connections, for instance according to 
refs. [6.4.1] and [6.4.3]). 
In any case, the design of the pump needs to meet the stress limits for the different loading 
levels, as defined e.g. in refs. [6.4.1] and [6.4.2]. 
An example of the design of a main coolant pump, relevant to  a German PWR 1300 MW system, 
is illustrated in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14 Design of a main coolant pump of a German PWR 1300 MW. 
 
6.4.2 Valves 
Valves serve to open the flow, close the flow or regulate flow through piping sections. Valve 
bodies may be of forged, cast or welded design. The valve bodies should be designed to be so 
stiff that the required stability is maintained in the event of excessive pipe forces and moments as 
well as loads from external events occurring in addition to the operational thermal loads. The 
design of the valve bodies and the pertinent systems should permit adequate accessibility for 
maintenance, replacement of worn parts and repair purposes. The design should particularly 
provide smooth tapers and cross sectional transitions. 
Valves can be safety important components and, as a minimum, continued functionality must be 
ensured during emergency and fault conditions. The pressure boundary of safety important 
valves should be designed so that at emergency loads no inadmissible deformations occur.  
The adequacy of the design of the valve bodies can typically be demonstrated by appropriate 
design codes such as KTA[6.4.1] and ASME [6.4.2].  For valves designed to these codes an 
example calculation is given below.   
6.4.2.1 Calculation Example 
The most highly stressed region of the body under internal pressure is ait the neck to flow 
passage junction and is characterized by circumferential tension stress normal to the plane of the 
centre line, with the maximum value at the inside surface. The following rules are intended to 
control the general primary membrane stresses and secondary stresses in this crotch region. 
Primary Membrane Stress due to Internal Pressure 
In the crotch region the maximum primary stress is to be determined by the pressure area 
method (see Figure 15). From an accurately drawn layout of the valve body, depicting the 
finished section of the crotch region in the mutual plane of the bonnet and flow passage centre 
lines, determine the fluid (load bearing) area Ap and the effective cross–sectional (metal) area 
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A. Ap and A are based on the internal surface of the body after complete loss of metal 
assigned to corrosion allowance. 
 
 
Figure 15 Pressure Area Method. 
 
General stress analyses 
For valve bodies meeting the geometric requirements of ASME III, NB 3500 [6.4.2] or KTA 
3201.2, Chapter 8.3 [6.4.1], it should be checked based on the critical section A-A at the crotch, 
whether the range of allowable primary membrane plus bending stresses in loading level 0, A and 
B is not exceeded: 
meblp SPP ⋅≤+ 5,1  [6.4.1] 
where: 
Plp: local membrane stress due to internal pressure, 
Peb: secondary stresses due to pipe reaction. 
Due to the design of the valve body, it should also be satisfied that the range of primary plus 
secondary stresses due to internal pressure, pipe reaction and thermal effects does not exceed 3 
times the value of Sm: 
mnTebp SSQPQ 32 3 =≤⋅++ , 
where Qp is  the sum of primary plus secondary stresses at crotch resulting from internal pressure 
and QT3 is the maximum thermal secondary membrane plus bending stress resulting from 
structural discontinuity and fluid temperature change rate. Figure 16 illustrates the critical cross 
section A-A for valve bodies.  
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Figure 16 Critical cross section A-A for valve bodies. 
 
Fatigue analysis 
A fatigue analysis should be performed for all valves with the specified number of load cycles 
according to ASME III, NB 3545.3 [6.4.2] or KTA 3201, chapter 8.3.6 [6.4.1], respectively. 
The maximum total stresses, Sp1, on the body inside and, Sp2, on the body outside is determined 
by assuming a fluid temperature change rate not exceeding 55 K/hr. 
With the larger value of Sp1 and Sp2 taken as, Sa, the allowable number of load cycles is obtained 
from the fatigue curves for ferritic or austenitic materials. 
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6.5 PRESSURE TUBES IN CANDU AND RBMK REACTORS 
Two types of pressure tube reactors are or have recently been under operation in Europe: the 
CANDU6 reactor (CANada Deuterium Uranium–Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor) in Romania, 
with heavy water as coolant and moderator, equipped with horizontal pressure tubes and the 
RMBK-1500 (Reaktor Bolchoj Mochnosti Kanalnij (in Russian) – Channelized Large Power 
Reactor) in Lithuania water cooled, graphite moderated vertical pressure tube reactor.  As 
opposed to the single pressure vessel PWR concept, these reactor types are based on a number 
of individual pressure vessels, called pressure tubes (PTs).   
6.5.1 Description of the core of pressure tube reactors  
The CANDU-PHWR design uses natural uranium, as UO2 pellets and heavy water as both 
coolant and moderator.  The reactor core is contained in a cylindrical austenitic stainless steel 
tank (calandria), which holds the heavy water moderator at low temperatures (< 80°C) and low 
pressure (~0.1 MPa).  The ends of the cylinder are closed with two parallel end shields which are 
perforated with holes for the fuel channels, the holes are arranged in a square lattice pattern.  
Thin walled Zircalloy 2 tubes are fastened to each inner tube sheet and act as stays for the end 
shields in order to form a leak tight tank.  The holes in each end shield are connected with 
stainless steel tubes (lattice tubes).   
Each fuel channel consists of a Zr–2.5%Nb pressure tube of 103 mm diameter joined to 
martensitic stainless steel end fittings, and occupies the tubular holes or lattice sites formed by 
each combined lattice tube and calandria tube. In the reactor, there are 380 channels. The fuel 
channel end fittings are supported on a pair of sliding bearings at each end, and the pressure 
tube is supported and separated from the calandria tube by annular spacers. 
The RBMK-1500 is a graphite moderated, boiling water, multi-channel reactor [6.5.4].  The RBMK 
reactor is designed to use a graphite moderator in the graphite brick form, surrounded by 
zirconium-niobium pressure tubes containing the nuclear fuel and coolant.  The graphite structure 
consists of 2488 channels, made up of columns of bricks each with an axial hole for the channel 
tube.  There are 2052 PTs in total.  These are used for fuel (1661 PTs), control rods and 
instruments (391 in total).  The remaining 436 channels around the edge of the core are filled with 
graphite rods to act as the reflector.  The central segment pressure tubes are an 88 mm outside 
diameter (4 mm thick wall) tube, made from zirconium-niobium alloy (Zr + 2.5% Nb).  The primary 
ageing mechanisms for Zirconium Pressure Tubes operating in both CANDU and RMBK reactors 
are: 
• Delayed Hydride Cracking; 
• Irradiation and thermal creep resulting in  the diameter to increase; 
• Material property changes due to embrittlement of zirconium alloy under irradiation and 
hydrogen absorption. 
 
6.5.2 Degradation Mechanisms 
6.5.2.1 Delayed Hydride Cracking (DHC) 
Zirconium and its alloys have a low absorption of heat neutrons and maintain good mechanical 
properties at temperatures up to 390-400 oC. However, zirconium alloys can absorb hydrogen 
during operation as a consequence of corrosion reaction with water. Hydrogen redistributes easily 
at elevated temperatures.  At high temperature the hydrogen migrates under concentration and 
stress gradients. Hydrogen has very limited solubility in zirconium alloys, this being less than 1 
ppm at room temperature and about 80 ppm at 300 oC. Whenever the solubility is exceeded a 
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zirconium hydride phase will be precipitated and as this phase is brittle it can have an impact on 
the mechanical properties of the alloy. The worst embrittlement in PTs occurs when hydrides are 
oriented normal to the principal stress. When the terminal solid solubility is exceeded in a 
component such as a pressure tube that is highly stressed for long periods of time, delayed 
hydride cracking (DHC) failures may occur. DHC is a phenomenon where a crack can propagate 
in stepwise fashion as a result of hydrogen redistribution ahead of the crack tip under a stress 
level below the yield stress [6.5.10]. The high mobility of hydrogen enables hydrides to 
redistribute. If stress levels are sufficiently high the local hydrogen concentration can exceed the 
terminal solid solubility, and the hydride platelets precipitate in the primary cracking direction.  
Delayed hydride cracking has been recognized as the potential cause of failure of pressure tubes 
in both CANDU and RBMK reactors. The DHC velocity in the pressure tubes in both types of 
reactor was evaluated experimentally. The results of the evaluation with thermomechanical 
treatment are presented in [6.5.15], [6.5.23]. Applicable testing standards and assessment 
procedures for characterising DHC are described in Appendixes 3 and 9. 
6.5.2.2 Creep 
The hexagonal close packed crystal structure of zirconium alloys and the operating conditions 
(temperature and neutron field) are responsible for thermal creep, irradiation growth and 
irradiation creep of the material.  Four types of pressure tube deformation are taken into account 
[6.5.16]:  
• Axial Elongation 
• Diametral Expansion 
• Wall Thinning  
• Fuel Channel Sag   
Axial Elongation 
The pressure tube elongation is a linear function of time, the maximum elongation rate being 5 
mm/year for the first CANDU reactors.  This fact has required a modification of the bearing length 
at both ends of the tubes, feeder pipe spacing and fuel machine offsets.  Due to the large 
variation of the elongation rate from one tube to the other, this parameter is monitored for each 
tube.  This offers information on the lead time planning for corrective action. 
In respect of the linear elongation of the RMBK pressure tubes, the maximum-recorded 
elongation value after 8 years of operation was 8.45 mm [6.5.17].  The design allowance for PT 
bellows extension from PT tube elongation in the reactor is 50 mm.  For the Ignalina NPP, the PT 
tube elongation was not a limiting feature for the PTs. 
Diametral Expansion 
Diametral expansion increases the amount of the primary coolant to flow around the fuel bundles,  
slightly reduces the critical channel power at constant flow but could be the cause of an 
unacceptable fuel cooling.  Although the diametral expansion rate is about 0.1 mm/year, in the 
CANDU type reactor, the design requirement of pressure tube diametral expansion is limited to 
5% of the initial diameter to avoid creep rupture and squeezing of the garter spring spacers 
between the pressure and the calandria tubes. 
Regarding RBMK PTs, the tube diameter increases with time is of high importance; such changes 
can become a critical factor in determining whether or not a gap exists between the tube and the 
surrounding graphite stack.  A systematic inspection of tube diameters during operation is 
implemented to develop a reliable prediction of tube diameter increase.  The operation 
temperature and irradiation dose in the RBMK reactors pressure tube radial expansion will be 
linear for the lifetime of the reactor with the intercept at 111.60 mm and the slope coefficient being 
6.94 x 10-5 mm/MWd [6.5.17]. 
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Wall thinning  
The periodic inspection of this parameter has proved that the wall thickness of the pressure tubes 
during the operation is within the value assumed in the design analysis.   
Fuel channel sag 
The horizontally-oriented pressure tube sags between the spacers, separating each pressure 
tube from the surrounding calandria.  Increasing the number of spacers (from two to four) ensures 
that the pressure tubes do not contact the calandria tubes during the 30 year design life.   
6.5.2.3 Irradiation Effect on Mechanical Properties 
Irradiation increases yield and tensile strength, tube hardness and reduces ductility and fracture 
toughness.  In addition, the susceptibility to DHC increases slightly and the DHC crack velocity 
increases particularly at the inlet end of the CANDU PT due to the lower irradiation temperature, 
[6.5.19].  An effect of irradiation on the material properties of Zr-2.5Nb pressure tubes occurs 
after the first few years of operation.  It is expected that the mechanical properties will be 
adequate to achieve the 30 years  design life.   
In Romania, INR initiated an irradiation programme to study the influence of neutron irradiation on 
cold–worked Zr-2.5Nb, used as structural pressure tube material in the CANDU Unit-1 in the 
Cernavoda NPP.  Irradiation has been performed for more than six years in the INR TRIGA 
Steady State and Testing Materials Reactor.  The testing conditions (inert helium atmosphere, 
high temperature and neutron flux) have been assured in a Capsule-type device, placed in the 
TRIGA reactor active zone.  After 11400 hours of irradiation, the fluence  attained a value  of 
about 3.5 x 1024 n/m2 (E>1 MeV), which is characteristic for mechanical properties saturation.  
Post-irradiation examination has been conducted to characterize the pressure tube samples from 
the mechanical point of view, as a function of the testing temperature, direction of loading 
(longitudinal or transversal) and type of material (cut from the rolled joint area or from tube). The 
experimental results and the structural integrity evaluation have been presented at the E-MRS 
Conference, [6.5.19]. 
During the operation of RBMK reactors, the irradiation dose causes material property changes of 
the zirconium alloy pressure tubes.  Compared with initial properties, it has been observed that 
the yield limit is increased by 32-57%, ultimate strength by 26-49%, and the relative elongation is 
decreased 1.5-3 times.  Studies have shown that the stabilization of short-term mechanical 
properties of PT tube material occurs approximately after the fluence (1-1.5) x 1024 n/m2 (E>1 
MeV).    
6.5.3 Assessment Methods 
Leak-before-break based on DHC 
It is important to determine the life of the pressure tubes due to both crack initiation and the 
subsequent DHC propagation before the crack penetrates the pressure tubes and catastrophic 
failure occurs.  It is also important to predict the Critical Crack Length (CCL) - condition for which 
crack initiation and DHC propagation can be prevented before the crack can grow to instability.  
The ability to shut down the reactor before the pressure tube ruptures is the basis for the leak 
before break (LBB) criteria.   
To ensure LBB in a pressure tube it is required that: 
• The crack length at the wall penetration is less than the CCL for unstable propagation; 
• The leak from the through wall crack is detectable; 
• The reactor can be put into a depressurized condition before the crack exceeds the 
critical crack length - CCL 
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The acceptance criteria for a deterministic assessment is t > T, where t is the time available to 
detect the leak and to take action and Tis the time required to detect the leak and to take action.  
The information required to support LBB are: crack length at leakage, critical crack length and the 
DHC crack velocity.   
The new CANDU pressure tubes have a large margin between leak and break.  Inspite of this 
advantage, efforts are made to improve the performance of PTs under operation, to extend the 
service-life time. 
Fracture toughness plays a major role in  critical crack length determination and is thus important 
from a LBB perspective.  For this reason improvements have been made to minimize the 
concentration of the trace elements, like chlorine and phosphorous, and to control the carbon 
concentration, [6.5.6] so as to minimise embrittlement. 
6.5.4 Lifetime Evaluation 
Further information on lifetime evaluation of pressure tubes is presented in Appendices to this 
document.  Appendix 3 and Appendix 9 cover aspects of delayed hydride cracking (DHC); 
Appendices 13 and 14 respectively cover leak before break (LBB) and intergranular stress 
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6.6 HIGH TEMPERATURE COMPONENTS 
 
High temperature reactors in Europe have mainly been the Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors  
(AGRs), which are still operating in the UK and Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) that have operated 
in the UK and France.  These reactors operate at temperatures up to approximately 600oC and 
many components manufactured from austenitic stainless steel are susceptible to creep and 
creep-fatigue degradation mechanisms.  Such components include piping associated with the 
steam generation systems in AGRs and various components in the primary circuit in FBRs . 
6.6.1 Degradation Mechanisms 
6.6.1.1 Thermal Ageing 
Since diffusion rates are higher in body-centred cubic (B.C.C.) structures (ferritic steels) than in 
face-centred cubic (F.C.C.) structures (austenitic steels), the former are more susceptible to 
thermal aging degradation.  The important parameters for these mechanisms are the operating 
time and temperature, as well as the chemical composition and more generally the manufacturing 
conditions (existence of heterogeneities).   
When assessing the consequences of thermal aging, the main problem lies in the fact that the 
long-term evolution of the microstructure and of the mechanical properties must be precisely 
known.  General models are available, which predict the kinetics of phase transformation; 
however they must be used very carefully since the studied systems are very complex.   
The term of “thermal aging” covers many diffusion-based mechanisms that enable metallurgical 
systems to revert to stable thermodynamic equilibrium states.  This reversion to equilibrium 
occurs through a micro-structural evolution that results in an evolution of the material properties.  
Since the formed microstructures contain obstacles to dislocation motion – precipitates, etc. - , 
thermal aging often induce hardening and embrittlement characterized by a decrease in ductility 
and/or increase in ductile brittle transition temperature (DBTT).   
The main thermal aging mechanisms that may occur in PWR components are the following: 
Spinodal decomposition  
This is the de-mixing of the initial phase into two new phases occurring instantaneously in a 
progressive and very slow way.  This mechanism is encountered in the chromium-rich ferritic 
phase of cast duplex stainless steels that are used for some primary circuit components (elbows, 
pipes, pump casings, valve casing, etc.).  It results in an important hardening and embrittlement. 
Segregation 
When affecting grain boundaries, the segregation of chemical elements can reduce either the 
interfacial cohesion (thus promoting inter-granular fracture) or the corrosion resistance of 
boundaries (in case of their chromium depletion).  For instance the segregation of phosphorus at 
grain boundaries may result in the detrimental embrittlement of bainitic steels used for PWR 
pressurizers that operate at about 350°C. 
Precipitation 
This consists in the nucleation, growth and possible coarsening of a second phase, up to 
thermodynamic equilibrium.  When the precipitation is very fine and homogeneously distributed 
within grains, this mechanism can be highly hardening.  Precipitations seldom occur at low 
operating temperatures as encountered in PWRs (around 300°C).  However, the precipitation of a 
hardening Cr-rich phase in martensitic stainless steels (Type 13-4 PH, 17-4 PH) used for valve 
stems exemplifies this mechanism. 
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Dynamic strain aging  
DSA consists in a coupling between deformation (dislocations mobility) and diffusion of solute 
atoms such as nitrogen and carbon.  These atoms pin dislocations, which results in material 
hardening.  This may occur for carbon steels used in secondary piping.   
Ordering 
Finally, ordering may occur.  It is a regular arrangement of atoms of different chemical species 
which are initially randomly distributed.  This highly hardening mechanism takes place in alloys 
containing nickel and chromium, where Ni2Cr compound is formed.  However, for temperatures 
lower than 400°C, this phenomenon has never been found in nickel alloys (type 600) in the 
absence of neutron irradiation.   
6.6.1.2 Creep  
Creep may be defined as a time-dependent deformation at elevated temperature and constant 
stress. It follows, then, that a failure from such a condition is referred to as a creep failure or, 
occasionally, a stress rupture. The temperature at which creep begins to be an active mechanism 
depends on the alloy composition. and the actual operating stress will, in part, dictate or 
determine the temperature at which creep begins. 
The end of useful service life of the high-temperature components in a boiler (the superheater 
and reheater tubes and headers, for example) is usually a failure by a creep or stress-rupture 
mechanism. The root cause may not be elevated temperature, as fuel-ash corrosion or erosion 
may reduce the wall thickness so that the onset of creep and creep failures occur sooner than 
expected. 
However, regardless of the cause, the failure will exhibit the characteristics of a creep or stress 
rupture. Indeed, the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code recognizes creep and creep 
deformation as high-temperature design limitations and provides allowable stresses for all alloys 
used in the creep range. One of the criteria used in the determination of these allowable stresses 
is 1% creep expansion, or deformation, in 100,000 hours of service. Thus, the code recognizes 
that over the operating life, some creep deformation is likely. Indeed creep failures do display 
some deformation or tube swelling in the immediate region of the rupture.  
At elevated temperatures and stresses, much lower than the high-temperature yield stress, 
metals undergo permanent plastic deformation called creep. Figure 17 shows a schematic creep 
curve for a constant load; a plot of the change in length verses time. The weight or load on the 
specimen is held constant for the duration of the test.  
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Figure 17 Schematic creep curve.  
There are four portions of the curve that are of interest: 
An initial steep rate that is at least partly of elastic origin, from point "0" to point "A" in Figure 17. 
This is followed by a region in which the elongation or deformation rate decreases with time, the 
so-called transient or primary creep, from region "A" to "B" of Figure 17. The portion from point 
"0" to point "B" occurs fairly quickly. 
The next portion of the creep curve is the area of engineering interest, where the creep rate is 
almost constant. The portion from "B" to "C" is nearly linear and predictable. Depending on the 
load or stress, the time can be very long; two years in an experiment and several decades in 
service. 
The fourth portion of the creep curve, beyond the constant-creep-rate or linear region, shows a 
rapidly increasing creep rate which culminates in failure. Even under constant-load test 
conditions, the effective stress may actually increase due to the damage that forms within the 
microstructure. 
Without going into a detailed discussion of the atom movements involved in creep deformation, 
suffice it to say that creep deformation occurs by grain-boundary sliding. That is, adjacent grains 
or crystals move as a unit relative to each other. Thus, one of the microstructural features of a 
creep failure is little or no obvious deformation to individual grains along the fracture edge. 
The first two stages will not leave any microstructural evidence of creep damage. Somewhere 
along the linear portion of Figure 17, the first microstructural evidence of damage appears as 
individual voids or pores. The location of these first voids or holes varies, often noted at the 
junction of three or more grains, occasionally at nonmetallic inclusions. These individual voids 
grow and link to form cracks several grains long, and finally failure occurs. The ultimate rupture is 
by a tensile overload when effective wall thickness is too thin to contain the steam pressure. 
Since creep deformation occurs by grain-boundary sliding, the more grain boundary area, the 
easier creep deformation will be. Creep deformation and creep strength are a grain-size sensitive 
property. Thus a larger grain size improves creep strength. For austenitic stainless steels, SA213 
TP321H for example, the ASME Code requires a grain size of #7 or coarser, to assure adequate 
creep strength. The elevated temperatures where creep occurs lead to other microstructural 
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changes. Creep damage and microstructural degradation occur simultaneously. For carbon steels 
and carbon-1/2 molybdenum steels, iron carbide will decompose into graphite. For the low-alloy 
steels of T-11 and T-22, the carbide phase spheroidizes. Thus, creep failures will include the 
degraded microstructures of graphite or spheroidized carbides along with the grain-boundary 
voids and cracks characteristic of these high-temperature, long-time failures. 
While creep failures are expected for superheaters and reheaters operating at design conditions, 
deviations from these parameters will promote early failures. The steam temperature always 
varies somewhat from individual tube to tube, and the design allows for this variability. However, 
when the range of temperatures is larger than accounted for, the hottest tubes fail sooner than 
expected. A more likely cause of premature failure is the slow increase in tube-metal 
temperatures due to the formation of the steam-side scale. 
Steam reacts with steel to form iron oxide along the inner surface of the tube.  The 
microstructures themselves will show the grain-boundary sliding and the resultant creep cracks or 
voids. For stainless steels, the microstructures are similar in that the failure is by grain-boundary-
sliding and crack formation. 
In a superheater or reheater tube, often the first indication of creep damage is longitudinal cracks 
in the steam-side scale. As creep deformation expands the tube diameter, the brittle ID scale 
cannot follow the expansion. Cracks develop in an axial or longitudinal direction which is 
perpendicular to the principle hoop stress. With time, the tube continues to expand, and these 
cracks widen. This wide crack shortens the path from steam to steel; iron oxide forms 
preferentially at the tip of the crack, as there is less oxide thickness to protect the steel; and a 
cusp forms within the steel tube. The cusp acts as a notch or a stress raiser, reducing the local 
wall thickness. Creep voids form here, often before any other obvious grain-boundary damage 
appears elsewhere within the microstructure. With continued high-temperature operation, creep 
cracks grow from the cusp and ultimately weaken the cross section to the point where failure 
occurs. Creep failures are characterized by the following: 
• bulging or blisters in the tube 
• thick-edged fractures often with very little obvious ductility 
• longitudinal "stress cracks" in either or both ID and OD oxide scales 
• external or internal oxide-scale thicknesses that suggest higher-than-expected 
temperatures 
• intergranular voids and cracks in the microstructure 
In components which operate at high temperatures, changes in conditions at the beginning and 
end end of operation, or during operation, result in trainsient temperature gradients.  If these 
transients are repeated, the differential thermal expansion during each transient results in 
thermally induced cyclic stress.  The extent of the resulting faitgue damage in dependent of the 
nature and frequency of the transient, the thermal gradient in the component, and the material 
properties.  Components which are subject to thermally induced stresses generally operate within 
the creep range so that damage due to both fatigue and creep have to be taken into account; 
methods for such assessments are described in the following section.  
6.6.2 Creep/Fatigue Assessment Methods 
6.6.2.1 The RCC-MR Code 
The RCC-MR code [6.6.1] “Design and Construction rules for mechanical components of FBR 
nuclear islands and high temperature applications” was developed to support the design of 
Sodium Fast Breeder Reactors in France.  The rules and requirements provided by this Code are, 
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however, not limited to fast reactors and RCC-MR is therefore applicable to other types of high 
temperature reactors. 
The rules for piping systems deal in particular with : 




Table 4 illustrates the general presentation of the RCC-MR code.  The RCC-MR is split into five 
sections defined as follows: 
• Section I provides sets of design rules for various types of components, 
• Section II contains procurement specifications for parts and products which can be 
used for components designed and manufactured according to RCC-MR, 
• Section III is devoted to rules for applying the various destructive and non destructive 
examination methods, 
• Section IV gives the rules relating to the various qualifications for welding operations 
and welding procedures, 
• Section V provides rules relating to manufacturing operations other than welding. 
Table 4 Contents of the RCC-MR code [6.6.1] 
 
Subsection Z contains a number of appendices referenced in the other subsections of Section I.  
Table 5 lists the content of Subsection Z. 
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Table 5 Contents of subsection Z – Appendices  
 
 
The A16 Appendix – LBB analysis and defect assessment 
The RCC-MR proposes, in its appendix A16, all tools required to evaluate the defect parameters 
in the frame of the Leak Before Break (LBB) procedure:  
• Appendix A16.2000 : defect used in the analysis 
• Appendix A16.3000 : defect assessment (general rules) 
• Appendix A16.4000 : Leak Before Break 
• Appendix A16.7000 : methods (detailed procedure for flaw analysis) – parameters 
• Appendix A16.8000 : compendium 
• Appendix A16.9000 : material properties 
All of these nuclear type rules can be easily adapted for non-nuclear components.  The more 
specific nuclear aspects are the safety factors associated with the rules. 
An important effort in development of the analytical methods for the calculation of fracture 
parameters (KI, J,…) has been made in the last 10 years within the framework of collaboration 
between CEA, EDF and AREVA-NP, and of R&D actions involving CEA and IRSN.  These 
activities led to a unified presentation of the common methods of the RCC-MR code and the 
RSE-M code ("Rules for In-service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components" which 
defines the requirements for in-service inspection of French Pressurized Water Reactors).  The 
calculation of fracture mechanics parameters, and in particular the stress intensity factor KI and 
the J integral, has been widely developed for industrial configurations.  These improvements have 
been made using an important three-dimensional Finite Element (F.E.) calculation data base of 
cracked piping components.  Concerning the J parameter, the accuracy of the method has been 
presented to the French Safety Authority: each year, a meeting is organized to present new 
developments and discuss the accuracy of the predictions.  This has led to a systematically 
conservative method but still sufficiently accurate.  All the developments have been integrated 
into the 2005 edition of RSE-M [6.6.2] and in the 2007 edition of RCC-MR [6.6.1]. 
The analytical methods proposed in the RCC-MR code [6.6.1] to calculate the stress intensity 
factor and J are provided in [6.6.3], [6.6.4], [6.6.5], [6.6.6], and [6.6.7].  These methods are the 
basic tools of the proposed defect assessment procedures.  The following sub-sections give an 
overview of these procedures. 
The Leak Before Break procedure 
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The Leak Before Break (LBB) procedure can be applied for safety demonstration of a nuclear 
power plant.  The aim is to check that a postulated or a detected defect will not lead to the 
component failure, even when it grows to full penetration, which would lead to a leakage large 
enough to be detected.  This procedure is mainly developed for Sodium Fast Breeder Reactors.  
This LBB procedure is based on a series of analyses (defect assessment, flow rate evaluation, 
etc.), each needing specific tools.  Important work at CEA focused on checking and improvement 
of these tools [6.6.8] and some modifications will be included in the 2006 addendum of RCC-MR 
[6.6.1]: 
• Influence of the initial size of the defect 
• Consideration of the defect straightening after penetration 
Fatigue analysis 
Fatigue crack initiation 
The time of the initiation phase that takes place before growth of a crack-like fabrication defect 
can be handled through an initiation usage factor, roughly evaluated with a similar methodology 
to that for an uncracked body fatigue usage factor, replacing the stress range by a relevant 
parame 
ter calculated at a material characteristic distance from the defect. 
The method is based on conventional material properties used for the design: for each cycle, the 
elastic singular stress is first calculated using the Creager field at a distance d from the crack tip 
(this distance is supposed as a material property), and the Neuber rule is applied to account for 
plasticity.  The obtained elastic-plastic strain is then used to determine the number of cycles to 
failure through the fatigue curve, and allows the definition of the fatigue usage factor for the 
considered cycle.  The summation of the usage factors for all the load history gives an estimation 
of the remaining life before fatigue initiation.  A specific treatment is performed if creep loading is 
not negligible.  Reference [6.6.9] gives the detail of this approach. 
Fatigue crack growth 
Crack growth rate evaluation is then based on the Paris law criteria (da/dN – ∆K), eventually 
taking into account a crack closure effect, and has to be determined for one, two or three crack 
tips depending on the crack shape (three crack tips for the embedded flaw for example). 









where ∆J is the J parameter variation, calculated for the complete loading variation and assuming 
a material cyclic behaviour.  This formulation is more appropriate for high level of cyclic loading 
[6.6.10] and thermal loading (dominant at high temperature). 
Critical crack size evaluation 
In the A16 appendix [6.6.1], modifications were performed to improve the determination of the 
critical defects in terms of stability: the knowledge of this defect is an important input into the LBB 
procedure.  Different parts of the RSE-M procedure are codified: 
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• Numerical algorithms for 1-D (through wall crack) or 2-D (surface crack) crack 
propagation analysis (i.e. direct determination of the maximum endurable load and the 
associated crack growth). 
• Crack growth rate evaluation with the classical JR-∆a criteria or with the alternative Gfr 
criteria [6.6.11]. 
Creep analysis 
For creep crack initiation, an adaptation of the fatigue rule is proposed: at the same distance d, 
the elastic stress is calculated from the Creager field, and used to determine the elastic-plastic 
stress through the Neuber rule.  This stress is related to the corresponding failure time on the 
creep design curve.  This failure time allows the creep usage factor calculation.  The stress 
relaxation could also be taken into account.  If a creep-fatigue combination is considered, for 
each cycle, the fatigue and creep usage factors are determined independently and used in an 
interaction diagram to determine the margin to crack initiation. 
In the frame of crack propagation analyses under creep conditions, Appendix A16 provides an 
analytical method for the C* calculation [6.6.1], [6.6.9], similar to the method for the J calculation. 
This C* parameter (essentially time dependent J) is used to determine the creep crack growth 
rate through the creep crack growth curve relating in general da/dt to C* with a power law.  When 
a creep-fatigue loading is considered, the crack extension is determined cycle by cycle: the 
fatigue and creep loadings are treated independently and leads to a fatigue and creep crack 
extensions which are summed to the previous crack length to update the defect geometry.  
Specific decomposition of the cycle has to be performed to determine the part of the cycle which 
effectively contribute to the creep loading (in particular in presence of a cyclic thermal loading). 
6.6.2.2 R5 Procedure for Lifetime Assessment of High Temperature Components 
UK procedures for assessing the lifetime of high temperature components were developed in the 
1970s and 1980s within the former Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB).  These enabled 
assessments of the integrity of both fossil-fired and nuclear power generating plants.  Although 
there were design codes for high temperature plants at that time, more accurate life assessment 
methods were needed to address, for example, weldments and defect tolerance, which were not 
covered in the design codes.  The procedures developed within the CEGB became known as the 
R5 Procedures and were based on reference stress and shakedown methods in order to lessen 
the conservatism in design code routes based on elastic analysis.  R5 is now maintained by EDF 
Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd (formerly known as British Energy Generation Ltd) in 
collaboration with Serco, Rolls-Royce and ANSTO.  A continuing R5 development programme 
ensures that advances in R5 address the key issues relevant to UK high temperature nuclear 
plants.  The R5 development programme runs in parallel with materials data test programmes 
covering the principal materials of interest, e.g. austenitic 300 series and Esshete 1250 stainless 
steels and ferritic steels such as 0.5CrMoV, 2.25Cr and 9Cr.  These materials test programmes 
reflect the increasing interest in long term material properties, of austenitic steels in particular, 
due to the safety case requirements for PLEX justifications for the UK Advanced Gas-Cooled 
Reactor (AGR) fleet, and also thermal aging effects on materials properties.   
The R5 procedures [6.6.12] are a UK nuclear power industry standard, regularly used in safety 
cases for structural integrity assessments of AGR components operating in the creep range.  The 
procedures are also relevant to high temperature plants outside the nuclear power generation 
industry.  Although R5 does not have the status of a national code or standard, similar 
approaches to those in R5 for defect assessments are now included in BS 7910 [6.6.13], for 
example.  Confidence in the application of R5 has been obtained by programmes of experimental 
validation and numerical research.  In individual assessments, further confidence is obtained by 
the use of appropriately conservative materials data and by sensitivity analyses.  Such analyses 
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are an important element of an R5 assessment and are used to demonstrate that the result of the 
assessment is not sensitive to realistic variations in the input parameters. 
Assessment of the safe operating life of components, operating at temperatures that are 
sufficiently high for creep to be a potential failure mechanism, may be divided into two types.  The 
first is assessment of the time for cracking to occur in an initially defect-free component as a 
result of combined creep and fatigue damage, which can be performed using the R5 Volume 2/3 
procedure. The time to initiate a defect of a defined size can be calculated using Volume 2/3. The 
second type is assessment of the time for an existing crack in a component to grow to a limiting 
size as a result of creep and fatigue mechanisms, which can be performed using the R5 Volume 
4/5 procedure. This latter defect may have been detected in service, be postulated to occur in a 
component based on inspection limitations for example, or result from a Volume 2/3 assessment. 
The limiting size of the defect is determined using the R6 defect assessment procedure [6.6.14], 
also maintained by EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd in association with Serco, Roll-Royce, 
TWI, Frazer-Nash Consultancy and NRG (R6 is also used for assessing defect tolerance of the 
UK PWR reactor).  
The R5 procedures provide an assessment of the continuing integrity of a component, where the 
operating lifetime might be limited by one of the following mechanisms: 
• excessive plastic deformation due to a single application of a loading system, 
• creep rupture, 
• ratchetting or incremental plastic collapse due to a loading sequence, 
• creep deformation enhanced by cyclic load, 
• initiation of cracks in initially defect-free material by creep and creep-fatigue mechanisms, 
• the growth of flaws by creep and creep-fatigue mechanisms. 
R5 is now at Issue 3.  The former Volumes 2 and 3 of R5 have been combined into a single 
procedure for assessing defect-free structures and the former Volumes 4 and 5 were combined 
into a single procedure for assessing defects in structures.  Thus, in R5 Issue 3 there are now 5 
volumes in total: 
Volume 1 The overview 
Volume 2/3 Creep-fatigue crack initiation procedure for defect-free structures 
Volume 4/5 Procedure for assessing defects under creep and creep-fatigue loading 
Volume 6 Assessment procedure for dissimilar metal welds 
Volume 7 Behaviour of similar weldments: guidance for steady creep loading of ferritic 
pipework components 
 
Volume 1 provides an overview, which indicates the overall scope and restrictions of R5 by 
reference to the other volumes, provides a route for following the detailed procedures given 
elsewhere in R5, and compares R5 with other approaches.  Materials data requirements for 
performing an R5 assessment are also described. Volumes 6 and 7 are essentially specialized 
applications of the creep-fatigue damage calculations of Volume 2/3 and the creep and creep-
fatigue crack growth calculations of Volume 4/5, respectively, to particular weldments and 
operating conditions found in AGRs.   
The creep-fatigue methods of Volume 2/3 address components that operate within creep-
modified shakedown limits. These cover both strict shakedown and global shakedown conditions, 
where the latter allows zones of cyclic plasticity in the steady cyclic state in the component 
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provided these are restricted to at most 20% of the component cross-section. Outside this 
limitation, more detailed assessment is required, and R5 gives some advice on the use of cyclic 
inelastic analysis. An important difference between R5 Volume 2/3 and some other high 
temperature assessment procedures is the use of ductility exhaustion rather than life fraction 
rules to assess creep-fatigue damage accumulation. Damage accumulation prior to the steady 
state is also quantified in R5 Volume 2/3 and is of particular relevance to components containing 
high initial residual stresses (see Section 5.6.2.4). 
Volume 4/5 covers the growth of defects. Rules are set down for determining whether creep and 
fatigue are significant or insignificant and creep-fatigue interaction effects are addressed. The 
defect tip can lie either within or outside any region of surface cyclic plasticity. For short defects, 
where the tip is within the surface cyclic plastic zone, the creep-fatigue crack growth law is based 
on a creep-modified high strain fatigue law. For defects outside a cyclic region, and for cases of 
strict shakedown, crack growth is based on adding creep crack growth characterised by C* or C(t) 
and fatigue extension obtained from a Paris fatigue law. Appendices to Volume 4/5 provide 
advice on treating defects in weldments, the calculation of an incubation time for crack growth 
based on sigma-d or failure assessment diagram methods, probabilistic fracture mechanics 
calculations and advice on crack growth under combined primary and secondary stresses. This 
last area, in particular, has undergone significant recent development, driven by the needs to 
assess austenitic welds where the component may operate within the transient creep regime (see 
Section 5.6.2.4).    
High temperature leak-before-break assessment is not included in R5 but is addressed within the 
R6 procedure. A procedure for performing a high temperature LBB assessment is set out based 
on detection prior to the defect growing to a limiting size or failing by creep rupture. Reference 
stress methods are described for calculating the time-dependent change in crack opening area 
and hence the leak rate.  
R5 is routinely used within EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd for justification of continued 
operation of high temperature components, both inside and outside the containment.  Table 6 
gives a summary of some of the areas of application.  Assessments may consider either damage 
or crack-like flaws detected during service or, particularly for areas which are difficult to inspect, 
flaws postulated for the purposes of safety case arguments. 
During high temperature service, welding residual stresses relax and redistribute due to the 
accumulation of creep strain.  The AGR reactors have tended to operate at temperatures lower 
than original design.  Hence the times for relaxation of the welding residual stresses can be a 
significant proportion of planned plant life.  These relaxation creep strains, additional to those 
occurring due to primary stress, can lead to accelerated creep damage and possible reheat crack 
initiation, particularly at locations with high stress triaxiality and in materials with low creep 
ductility.  For example, repair welds are a potential location of reheat crack initiation due to the 
high levels of tensile residual stress that can exist over the length of the repair.  An important 
parameter in assessing the rate of stress relaxation of the secondary stress, and hence the 
additional creep strain accumulation, is the elastic follow-up factor, quantified by the scalar Z in 
R5 [5.6.12]], where Z approaches infinity in the limit of primary, load-controlled stress.  Methods 
for evaluating Z at the point of interest, for example based on simple bounding estimates or 
elastic-creep analysis, are given in R5.   
Welding residual stress also affects crack growth rates.  The driving force for creep crack growth 
is quantified by C(t), the transient equivalent of the steady-state parameter, C*.  C(t) reduces with 
increasing time, approaching the value of C* for the primary loads as the secondary stresses 
relax, at a rate dependent on a value of the elastic follow-up factor Z.  The magnitude of C(t) can 
also reduce with increase in crack size for cases where the stress intensity factor due to the 
residual stress is falling as the crack grows.  Creep crack growth is then calculated in R5 by 
integrating a crack growth law of the form da/dt=A(C(t))q, where q is a material constant, so that 
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increased crack growth rates are predicted in the presence of tensile residual stress, where 
C(t)>C*.   
Table 6 Typical Applications of R5 on UK Nuclear Plant 
R5 
Volume 






600 and 800  
Boiler components also 
reactor internals; e.g. 
insulation, superheater and 
reheater headers 
Hot end,  
mostly thinner sections  
Volume 
2/3 
Ferritic E.g. superheater pipework Thermal transients, e.g. bore 
thermal fatigue cracking 
Volumes 
4/5, 7 






Headers and pipework E.g. reheat cracking, mainly thick-
walled but also some thin-wall 
components  
Volume 6 316:2.25Cr; 
316:9Cr;  
316:C-Steel 
E.g. Upper transition joints Crack initiation; but also some 
consideration of crack growth 
using Volume 4/5.   
Fatigue only for C-Steel Joints  
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7 INTEGRATION STATEMENT 
The ability of NULIFE to deliver procedures and best practice advice is a key integration driver, 
one that is critical to the Network’s success.  
The overall policy is to target the production of advanced technological approaches compatible 
with available higher level harmonized guidance e.g. IAEA TEC DOCs.  Well established 
standards in specific areas such as the ASTM materials testing standards and the ASME code 
section for boilers and pressure vessels have to be considered as part of this process.  
Additionally, national standards and procedures such as the German KTA Rules, the French 
RCC-M code, and the UK R6 and R5 procedures, have also to be considered, along with 
examples of the way in which they are applied to different reactor systems in different countries.   
The knowledge base so obtained will form the basis for the development of good-practice / best-
practice and guidance documents on integrity assessment, component qualification and plant life 
time management.  Procedures and best practice documents are considered important in 
facilitating the following activities within NULIFE: 
• Integration 
• Education and training of new generations of engineers urgently needed for the life 
extension of Generation II, deployment of Generation III and development of 
Generation IV reactors 
• Future harmonisation of safety standards and safety requirements within the EU Member 
States, and wider 
The four Expert Groups (materials, integrity, lifetime and risk) provide a framework for ensuring 
consensus and peer review within the NULIFE community, i.e. beyond that of the 
organizations/experts directly involved in the development of specific procedures.  
At its highest level, the Network actively supports the development of a Common Safety 
Justification Framework.  This report represents a first step towards creation of such a 
Framework on the following counts: 
• The report is the result of the active collaboration of professional scientists and engineers 
from 16 organizations (and as such has helped facilitate the Integration Process during 
the lifetime of NULIFE) 
• The report considers integrity assessment and lifetime management issues across the 
range of NPPs in EU Member States (PWR, WWER, BWR, AGR, CANDU, RBMK and 
FBR) (thus facilitating common understanding across a range of PLIM issues) 
• The report provides numerous examples of the application of good practice / best 
practice methodology at national level (further facilitating common understanding) 
• The report’s Appendices collectively provide a valuable source of information on 
numerous aspects of plant life management (thereby contributing knowledge 
preservation and management) 
• The report represents an important resource for the purpose of producing future 
procedures and best practice advice within the EC. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the report can be regarded as a “living document”, that is to say it is 
foreseen that it could be usefully updated at appropriate intervals during the course of time.  It 
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8 APPENDICES 
Appendices 1-17 provide further details regarding degradation mechanisms and lifetime 
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Table 7 Summary of Appendices 
Appendix No.   Title Contributor(s) Applicable Systems Topics 
Appendix 1 Fatigue and thermal fatigue JRC 
ANP-G 
• LWR  
(PWR, WWER) 
• PHWR  
(CANDU) 
• AGR  
(steam pipe work) 
• Introduction, materials, service conditions 
• Physical Description of the Mechanism 
• Applicable Testing & Standards For 
Characterisation of Mechanisms 
• Governing Codes & Specification For Application 
In Power Plants 
• Research Possibilities To Improve Code & 
Standard and Gaps 
Appendix 2 Considerations regarding 
formation of corrosive films 
  • Carbon and martensitic steels 
• Nickel alloys 
Appendix 3 Delayed Hydride Cracking 
(DHC) 
INR CANDU,RMBK Pressure 
tubes 
PWR, BWR, CANDU 
Zircaloy-4 fuel claddings 
• Physical description of mechanism 
• Service conditions/environment 
• Materials 
• Susceptible components 
• Applicable testing standard(s) for characterising 
mechanism 
• Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures 
for NPP integrity and lifetime assessment 
• Current research programmes 
• Knowledge gaps 
• Future research requirements 
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Table 7 Summary of Appendices 
Appendix No.   Title Contributor(s) Applicable Systems Topics 
Appendix 4 Erosion / Corrosion  INR High Pressure feedwater 
heaters, Steam 
Generator inlets, 
feedwater pumps, and 
CANDU feeders. 
Steam extraction piping, 
cross-over piping (High 
Pressure turbine to 
moisture separator), 
steam side of feedwater 
heaters, and CANDU 
feeders. 
Flow-Assisted or Flow-Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) 
• Physical description of mechanism 
• Service conditions/environment 
• Materials 
• Susceptible components 
• Applicable testing standard(s) for characterising 
mechanism 
• Current research programmes 
• Knowledge gaps 
Appendix 5 Assessment On The 
Evolution of A Flaw In A 
Class 1 ASME Nuclear 
Equipment 
CTEN Cernavoda NPP#2 
Pressurizer 
Presents an evaluation of the flaws (weld indication) at 
PZX found during the inaugural inspection for the 
Cernavoda NPP #2 pressurizer.   
All the indications have been evaluated based on the 
procedure in ASME Code Section XI. 
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Table 7 Summary of Appendices 
Appendix No.   Title Contributor(s) Applicable Systems Topics 
Appendix 6 Oxidation INR Piping; SG Tubesheet; 
SG tubing. 
Study focus on CANDU plant.  Topics include: 
• Physical description of mechanism 
• Service conditions/environment 
• Materials 
• Susceptible components 
• Applicable testing standard(s) for characterising 
mechanism 
• Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures 
for NPP integrity and lifetime assessment 
• Current research programmes 
• Knowledge gaps 
• Future research requirements 
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Table 7 Summary of Appendices 
Appendix No.   Title Contributor(s) Applicable Systems Topics 
Appendix 7 Thermal High Cycle 
Fatigue in Piping System 
Tees with Leakage 
 
SPG Piping Tees with 
relevant temperature 
differences between run 
and branch fluid, 
especially with a “dead 
end” and possibly valve 
leakage. 
• Physical Description of Mechanism 
• Service conditions/environment 
• Materials 
• Susceptible components 
• Applicable testing standard(s) for characterising 
mechanism 
• Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures 
for NPP integrity and lifetime assessment 
• Current research programmes 
• Knowledge gaps 
• Future research requirements  
• Useful Resource Documents 
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Table 7 Summary of Appendices 
Appendix No.   Title Contributor(s) Applicable Systems Topics 
Appendix 8 PNAE G 7 002 86 (Russian 
Code) / IAEA-EBP-WWER-
08 
FZD Fracture mechanical 
evaluation of the RPV of 
WWER type reactors 





Sequences To Be Considered 
Acceptance Criteria  
Assumptions For Pts Analysis  
Thermal Hydraulic Analysis  
Structural Analysis  
Integrity Assessment  
Material Properties 
Corrective Actions  
Computer Codes  
Quality Assurance  
• Details of the PTS analysis 
Irradiation effects to material properties 
PTS Analysis for WWER reactors 
• Current R&D activity 
• Knowledge gaps 
• Future research requirements  
• References 
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Table 7 Summary of Appendices 
Appendix No.   Title Contributor(s) Applicable Systems Topics 
Appendix 9 Delayed Hydride Cracking  
RBMK-1500 NPP 
LEI RBMK-1500 nuclear 
power plant reactor fuel 
channels 
• Physical Description of Mechanism 
• Service conditions/environment 
• Materials 
• Susceptible components 
• Applicable testing standard(s) for characterising 
mechanism 
• Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures 
for NPP integrity and lifetime assessment 
• Current research programmes 
• Knowledge gaps 
• Future research requirements 
Appendix 10 Inter-granular Stress 
Corrosion Cracking 
LEI RBMK-1500 nuclear 
power plant reactor 
cooling system piping 
components 
• Physical Description of Mechanism 
• Service conditions/environment 
• Materials 
• Susceptible components 
• Applicable testing standard(s) for characterising 
mechanism 
• Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures 
for NPP integrity and lifetime assessment 
• Future research requirements  
• References 
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Table 7 Summary of Appendices 
Appendix No.   Title Contributor(s) Applicable Systems Topics 
Appendix 11 Irradiation Induced 
Dimensional and Material 
Property Changes To The 
Graphite 
LEI RBMK-1500 nuclear 
power plant reactor fuel 
channels and the 
graphite moderator 
bricks 
• Physical description of mechanism 
• Service conditions/environment 
• Materials 
• Susceptible components 
• Applicable testing standard(s) for characterising 
mechanism 
• Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures 
for NPP integrity and lifetime assessment 
• Knowledge gaps 
• Future research requirements 
Appendix 12 Irradiation induced change 
of fuel channel length 
LEI RBMK-1500 nuclear 
power plant reactor fuel 
channels 
• Physical description of mechanism 
• Service conditions/environment 
• Materials 
• Susceptible components 
• Applicable testing standard(s) for characterising 
mechanism 
• Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures 
for NPP integrity and lifetime assessment 
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Table 7 Summary of Appendices 
Appendix No.   Title Contributor(s) Applicable Systems Topics 
Appendix 13 Guidance for application of 
the leak before break 
concept at Ignalina NPP 
RBMK-1500 reactors. 
LEI RBMK-1500 reactors • Introduction 
• Scope 
• Methodology 
• Applications to lifetime assessment of degraded 
materials & components 
• Associated material test standards 




Damages in RBMK-1500 
Reactors 
LEI RBMK-1500 reactors • Introduction 
• Scope 
• Methodology 
• Applications to lifetime assessment of degraded 
materials & components 
• Associated material test standards 
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Table 7 Summary of Appendices 
Appendix No.   Title Contributor(s) Applicable Systems Topics 
Appendix 15 
 
RPV Cladding various LWR, WWER & western 
RPV claddings 
(N.b. the following are contained within Annex 1) 
• Introduction, materials 
• Chemistry of RPV Claddings 
• Defects in the Cladding 
• Microstructure of the cladding 
• Mechanical properties 
• Properties and Assessment Tools for 
Characterizing PWR Cladding Crack 
Susceptibility 
• Characterization of Residual Stresses Under 
Cladding 
• Properties and Assessment Tools for 
Characterizing WWER Cladding Crack 
Susceptibility 
• Lifetime Evaluation considering cladding 
properties 
• Summary and suggestions for further study 
Appendix 16 
 




• Thermal stresses 
• Fracture mechanics 
• Brittle fracture 
• Finite element method 
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Table 7 Summary of Appendices 
Appendix No.   Title Contributor(s) Applicable Systems Topics 
Appendix 17 CANDU Feeder Piping Various CANDU • Degradation Mechanisms 
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Appendix 1 Fatigue and thermal fatigue 
Appendix 2 Considerations regarding formation of corrosive films 
Appendix 3  Delayed hydride cracking (dhc)  
Appendix 4 Erosion / corrosion 
Appendix 5 Assessment on the evolution of a flaw in a class 1 
Asme nuclear equipment 
Appendix 6 Oxidation 
Appendix 7 Thermal high cycle fatigue in piping system tees with 
leakage 
Appendix 8 PNAEG 7 002 86 (Russian Code) / IAEA-EBP-WWER-08 
Appendix 9 Delayed hydride cracking - RBMK-1500 NPP 
Appendix 10 Intergranular stress corrosion cracking 
Appendix 11 Irradiation induced dimensional and material property 
changes to the graphite 
Appendix 12 Irradiation induced change of fuel channel length 
Appendix 13 Guidance for application of the leak before break 
concept at Ignalina NPP RBMK-1500 reactors. 
Appendix 14 Requirements for assessment of intergranular stress 
corrosion cracking damages in RBMK-1500 reactors 
Appendix 15 RPV Cladding 
Appendix 16 Pressurized Thermal Shock 
Appendix 17 CANDU Feeder Piping 
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A1.1 Introduction, Materials, Service Conditions 
Fatigue is present as an active damage mechanism on structural components in all reactor types.  
It is considered in the design codes for different operational transients (ASME A and B levels 
(normal and upset conditions).  Separate assessments may be made for local phenomena such 
as vibration loads.  Table A1.1 provides a general overview of the affected components and 
materials. 
Table A1.1 Overview of Fatigue-Affected Components and Materials 
Reactor type Component class Materials Fatigue phenomena 
LWR  
(PWR, WWER) 
Primary piping Stainless steels  
Carbon steels 
Thermal fatigue (LCF, HCF) 
Vibration fatigue (HCF) 
Vessel, flanges and 
penetrations 
Carbon steels,  
Ni-based alloys 
Thermal fatigue (LCF) 
Vibration fatigue (HCF) 
Internals Stainless steel 
Ni-based alloys 
 
 Steam generator Stainless steels  
Carbon steels 
Thermal fatigue (LCF, HCF) 
Vibration fatigue (HCF) 
PHWR 
(CANDU) 
Steam piping  Stainless steels  
Carbon steels 
Thermal fatigue ( HCF) 
Vibration fatigue (HCF) 
Steam generator Stainless steels  
Carbon steels 
Thermal fatigue ( HCF) 
Vibration fatigue (HCF) 
AGR (steam 
pipe work) 
Main steam piping Stainless steel Creep-thermal fatigue 
Reheat outlet CrMoV Creep-thermal fatigue 
Reheat inlet Carbon steel Thermal fatigue 
 
A1.2 Physical Description of the Mechanism 
Fatigue is the progressive structural change that occurs in materials subjected to cyclic stresses 
and strains that may result in cracks or fracture after a sufficient number of cycles.  Fatigue 
damage is caused by the simultaneous action of cyclic stress, tensile stress and plastic strain.  
The cyclic stress starts the crack and the tensile stress produces crack growth.  The process 
consists of three stages: 
• initial fatigue damage leading to crack nucleation and crack initiation; 
• progressive cyclic growth of a crack until the remaining un-cracked cross section of a part 
becomes too weak to sustain the loads imposed 
• final fracture or collapse of the remaining cross section. 
Fatigue cracks initiate and propagate from regions of strain concentration.  Since components 
contain local strain concentration at welds, geometric discontinuities or flaws, these provide 
natural locations from which cracks can initiate and grow.  The driving forces for fatigue include 
operational transients, but also vibration or localized cyclic thermal gradients.  It is noted that the 
environment often plays a role in the initiation and growth process. 
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Reactor coolant components are subject to several different aging mechanisms, and the fatigue is 
one of the most significant [A1.1].  Locations known to experience fatigue on LWRs include: 
• the surge and spray lines and several branch lines and nozzles (charging line, safety 
injection lines) experience significant low thermal fatigue caused by thermal 
stratification and cycling, and high cycle fatigue caused by striping; 
• the bimetallic welds made with stainless steel filler metal experience low cycle fatigue 
damage caused by thermal expansion mismatch during heat-up and cool down 
transients, combined with corrosion sensitivity; 
• the cast stainless steel piping experiences a low fatigue in the inclined nozzle of the 
safety injection line; 
• the socket welds between instrument penetration lines and piping experience 
cracking caused by vibration fatigue; 
• thermal sleeves experience cracking caused by vibration and thermal fatigue. 
LWR primary system piping has not experienced ruptures in operation, except some small 
diameter piping that failed by vibration fatigue.  The potential failure consequences are small, 
intermediate or large break loss of coolant accident, which can lead to severe accidents.   
Assessment of fatigue damage is typically performed in accordance with procedures given in 
structural design and operation assessment codes.  There are three main options: 
1) exclusion of fatigue damage by demonstrating that cyclic loads are below a threshold 
2) evaluation of the cumulative usage factor in relation to fatigue design curves 
3) flaw evaluation, i.e. assessment of fatigue crack growth and demonstration of LBB.   
 
A1.3 Applicable Testing & Standards for Characterisation of Mechanisms  
Laboratory fatigue tests can be classified as crack initiation or crack propagation.  In crack 
initiation testing, specimens are subjected to the number of controlled loading cycles required for 
a fatigue crack to initiate and grow to a critical size or fracture. 
In crack propagation testing, fracture mechanics methods are used to determine the crack growth 
rates of pre-existing cracks under cyclic loading.  Fatigue crack propagation test can be 
performed in environment (corrosion fatigue).   
Some standard testing methods are available [A1.2].  ASTM E606 is the standard practice for 
strain-controlled fatigue test.  This practice covers the determination of fatigue properties of 
nominally homogenous materials by the use of test specimen subjected to uniaxial forces.  No 
restrictions are placed on environmental factors such as temperature, pressure, humidity, 
medium and others provided they are controlled throughout the test and are detailed in the data 
report.   
ASTM E 466 is the standard practice for conducting force controlled constant amplitude axial 
fatigue tests.  The axial force fatigue test is used to determine the effect of variations in material, 
geometry, surface condition and stress on the fatigue resistance of metallic materials subjected to 
direct stress for relatively large number of cycles.  For thermo-mechanical fatigue, a code of 
practice has been developed in the form of CEN Workshop Agreement.   
ASTM E647 is the standard test method for measuring of fatigue crack growth rates.  This 
method covers the determination of fatigue crack growth rates from near-threshold to Kmax 
controlled instability.  Results are expressed in term of the crack tip stress intensity factor range, 
defined by the theory of linear elasticity.  This test method is divided into two main parts.  The first 
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part gives general information concerning the recommendations and requirements for fatigue 
crack growth rate testing.  The second part is composed of annexes that describe the special 
requirements for various specimen configurations, special requirements for testing in 
environments and procedures for non visual crack size determination.  In addition, there are 
appendices that cover techniques for calculating da/dN, determining fatigue crack opening force 
and guidelines for measuring the growth of small fatigue cracks. 
Feature tests i.e. tests involving simulated fatigue performed under laboratory conditions, have an 
important role to play for verification of assessment procedures and for establishing transferability 
of standard fatigue curves to component-life situations.  In case of NESC-Thermal Fatigue project 
five cases have been brought together for thermal fatigue, including digital records of the induced 
temperature distributions, as well as calculated thermal stresses from reference finite element 
calculations, where available.  Detailed information form each test has been collected in a 
dedicated report [A1.3].   
It is noted that AREVA and CEA have the FATHER program on a large scale metallic tee (data is 
restricted) and that further feature testing is on-going at CEA, EDF, JRC and Serco.  The OECD 
IAGE group has also proposed to develop a database of component fatigue tests. 
A1.4 Governing Codes & Specification for Application in Power Plants  
Design of the reactor coolant system piping components is based on the expected number of 
transients during the plant operation.  The fatigue analyses serve as a basis for verification of 
adequate margin of safety against the initiation of a fatigue crack.   
The kinetics of fatigue damage experienced by components of nuclear power facilities with light 
water reactors is governed by a number of simultaneous processes:  
• unsteady mechanical and thermal stresses loading in transients, alternating in a general 
case with steady-state conditions and giving rise to a series of loading half-cycles with 
various amplitudes and maximum stresses, which are separated by steady-state loading 
conditions with possible coincident vibrations;  
• variations of metal condition for in-service conditions (loss of ductility due to aging, 
coolant effects and irradiation, hardening or softening under cyclic elastic–plastic loading, 
radiation hardening, formation of oxide films with properties dissimilar to those of the 
metal);  
• corrosive and mechanical interaction between coolant and metal. 
For all the above processes is difficult to produce integrated models based on empirical data for 
the accumulation of fatigue and corrosion fatigue damage in the component metal, with 
allowance, operational factors and their interaction.  The equations employed to assess the 
condition of components in terms of cumulative fatigue damage are modified fatigue curve 
equations of Manson-Coffin-Langer type, in which the essential data on the metal are confined to 
mechanical characteristics under static tension.  These equations determine the durability at the 
time of crack initiation and make allowance for operating conditions.   
The fatigue analyses methods from the ASME codes section III and XI [A1.4], [A1.5] are widely 
used in the US and internationally, and have formed a basis for several other codes.  Recent 
proposed developments (revision of the fatigue strength curves and margins, explicit inclusion of 
environment effects and possibility to use apply an “initiation + crack growth approach”) can have 
wide implications in the industry. 
The German practice is described in the KTA Standard [A1.6].  The procedure is principally 
equivalent to the ASME Code.  The fatigue design curves in this standard are identical those 
presently in the ASME Code up to 106 cycles. 
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The French design rules presented in the RCC-M [A1.7] and RCC-MR [A1.8] (for high 
temperature) were originally derived from ASME fatigue analysis methods, but have added 
different aspects, some directly concern fatigue analysis of piping systems: 
• crack like defect fatigue analysis method ( RCC-M appendix ZD); 
• Ke optimization for stainless steel piping (RCC-M B3650); 
• combination of finite element approaches and piping rules (RCC-M appendix ZE). 
In Japan some dedicated standards have been developed for low and high cycle fatigue [A1.9] 
and also for thermal fatigue [A1.10], [A1.11].   
In the case of WWER NPPs the design for most of Class 1 components followed the Soviet 
norms [A1.12].  Recently the Soviet norms and ASME III were used. 
In Europe, there is now EU directive on pressure equipment safety (PED = Pressure Equipment 
Directive).  Components subject to ionizing radiation i.e. on NPPs are not formally subject to the 
PED.  However in some cases compliance with its requirements and those of the related 
harmonized standards such as EN13445 are being requested by safety authorities. 
The thermal fatigue is not a major aging mechanism for the main coolant piping but could be for 
surge, spray and branch lines.  The surge and spray lines and branch lines are made of austenitic 
stainless steel in all PWRs.  Licensees were informed [A1.13] of unexpected surge line 
movements in the plant in an NRC Information Notice 88-80, followed by Bulletin 88-11 [A1.14], 
[A1.15].  The welds joining the austenitic stainless steel piping and ferritic piping are called 
dissimilar metal welds.  These welds experience thermal fatigue experience thermal fatigue 
damage.  A principal source of fatigue damage in the pressurized surge line and nozzles is the 
thermal stresses associated with design-basis thermal transients and the thermal stratification.  
No specific standard are dedicated to thermal fatigue, and the evaluation are performed in the 
general fatigue framework of already mentioned standards by means of cumulative usage factors. 
Two French nuclear codes include flaw assessment procedures: the RSE-M code [A1.16] and 
RCC-MR [A1.17].  An important effort of development of these analytical methods has been 
made for the last 10 years in the frame of collaboration between CEA, EDF and AREVA-NP, and 
in the frame of R&D actions involving CEA and IRSN.  The calculation of fracture mechanics 
parameters and in particular the stress intensity factor KI and the J integral has been widely 
developed for industrial configuration.  In the R6/rev.4 British procedure [A1.18] the limiting 
condition of a structure is evaluated by reference to two criteria, fracture and plastic collapse.  
Structural integrity relative to the limiting condition is evaluated by means of a Failure 
Assessment Diagrams (FADs).  These procedures require assessment points to be plotted on the 
FAD, the location of each assessment point depending upon the applied load, flaw size, material 
properties, etc.  Another Fitness-for-Service procedure [A1.19] defines fitness-for-service as the 
ability to demonstrate the structural integrity of an in-service component containing a flaw or 
damage.  It is a result of a need for standardization of the fitness-for-service assessment 
techniques for pressurized equipment. 
A1.5 Research Possibilities to Improve Code & Standard and Gaps 
The following areas have been identified: 
Load evaluation (particularly for thermal and vibration fatigue) 
• Development of more reliable methods for determining thermal fatigue loading spectra for 
fast, turbulent mixing time: a) transfer functions from mock-ups; b) CFD and LES 
simulation codes; 
• Methods to define areas concerned by fluctuations for establishing ISI requirements; 
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• Optimization of load monitoring procedures for vibration fatigue. 
Strain evaluation and fatigue crack initiation 
• Strain evaluation through elastic and plastic correction for stainless steels on account of 
the very complex cyclic stress-strain curve; 
• High cycle fatigue curve from 105 to 109 cycles, and the question of endurance limit 
existence for stainless steel under constant or random loads; 
• Mock-up tests confirm all the methodologies; 
• Improved understanding of the effect of potentially detrimental factors on fatigue 
resistance (crack initiation): un-flushed weld, counter-bore surface finished, mean strain 
or stress, etc.; 
• More fundamental work on surface behaviour under high cycle fatigue loads: crack 
initiation criteria and corresponding key parameters, fatigue crack growth of small cracks 
(0.1 to 3mm), effects of detrimental parameters, etc. 
• Develop multiscale approaches to predict strain localisations. These shall include 
multiscale features, such as for example grains, inclusions, grain boundaries, dislocations 
etc. 
Crack growth analysis 
• Fatigue crack growth procedure for thermal cycling with one crack;  
• Determining the consequences of periodic under/over loads; of networks of small cracks 
and of mean stress or strains. 
Others 
• Procedures for non-cylindrical component and nozzle corners in particular: local loads, 
strain evaluation, mean stress or strain definition, critical crack size in forged stainless 
steel nozzle; 
• Improved ISI performance requirements, mainly for thick stainless steel with welds or 
cast pipe; 
• Integration of advanced fatigue assessment approaches in probabilistic codes; 
• Assessment method and safety factor differences between class 1, 2 and 3 components; 
• Comparison nuclear and non-nuclear codes for fatigue assessment. 
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APPENDIX 2 CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING 
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A2.1 Introduction 
The films formed by corrosion of the structural materials contain a variety of oxides and 
hydroxides as a function of chemical composition of the materials, having different thicknesses 
and porosities depending on coolant oxidation conditions. 
In formation process of the corrosive layers on surface two mechanisms exists: one as result of 
physic-chemical reaction between fluid and metallic ions and other of the corrosion products 
deposition, the both depending on alloys nature and chemical composition of the environment. 
A2.2 Carbon and Martensitic Steels 
Under highly reducing (O2<0,1ppm) and alkaline (pH=10.2x108) conditions and at temperatures 
more than 180oC, the magnetite film (Fe3O4) is the major corrosion product formed on carbon and 
martensitic steel, by Schikorr’s reaction [A2.1] 
Fe + 2D2O → Fe2+ + D2 + 2OD 
and  
3F2+ + 6OD-⇔Fe3O4 ↓ + 2D2O + D2 
The magnetite solubility has an important role in formation mechanism of the oxide layers.  It 
depends on electrochemical potential of the solution, which depends on the solution pH, the 
concentration of H2 (D2), O2, Cl- and temperature [A2.2]. 
By analysis complementary methods was evidenced that the magnetite, formed into composition 
very close by stoichiometric report, ensures from beginning an adherent and protective oxide film. 
The protective oxide film confers the metallic interface with resistance to oxidation and 
hydratation, phenomena, which appear at fluid/metal, interface and generate corrosion products 
as different oxides, hydroxides and oxi-hydroxides of iron and alloying elements from steels. 
Magnetite evolution by iron reaction with aqueous environment conducts to thinness of the 
component walls and to an excessive transport of the crud in system. 
The corrosion mechanism of these materials in alkaline environment at high temperature consists 
in the formation of two overlapped layers of iron oxide compounds and was assume to conform to 
the Potter and Mann model [A2.3].   
Initially, an amorphous oxide film forms, but magnetite nuclei develop on this film and increase 
without a preferential orientation, conducting after certain time to formation of thin film with fine 
granulation.   
This interior oxide layer is a compact, continuous, adherent and fine-grained (granule dimension 
being 0.05÷2µm) oxide.  He grows into the metal at the metal-oxide interface and occupies the 
volume of the corroded metal. 
In the second stage, over this internal film, which is in direct contact with the metal, the magnetite 
crystals develop at oxide/metal interface, simultaneous with his development at oxide/solution 
interface, forming a film with a bigger granulation.  Thus the corroded iron that cannot precipitate 
as the inner layer diffuses through it as Fe2+ ions to the oxide-coolant interface.  There, if the 
coolant already is saturated in dissolved iron, the emerging Fe2+ will tend to supersaturate the 
fluid boundary layer and provoke the precipitation of the outer oxide layer. 
The magnetite of the outer layer forms coarser crystals, usually octahedral or tetrahedral habit 
with sizes of the order of a few micrometers (0.05÷2µm). 
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Therefore, the exterior oxide layer is formed by re-deposition of iron ions from solution.  He is no 
continuous, no uniform and no adherent, but his growth is controlled by iron solubility and 
concentration in solution.   
The interior oxide layer being microcrystalline and containing alloying elements as Cr, from the 
ground metal, can form complex oxides with low solubility, but the exterior oxide layer from big 
magnetite crystals (about 1µm) can contain Mn or Ni. 
The proportions of internal and exterior layers are roughly 50-50 [A2.4]. 
The kinetics of the formation and the growth of the magnetite protective oxide layer was 
considered initially as a parabolic law, followed by a cubic or logarithmic law.  But, because the 
fortuitous character of the second magnetite layer, the steel corrosion in aqueous environment 
can be under a mixed control, thus that the kinetics of oxide film growth is of parabolic form 
(y=kxn) and logarithmic form (y=k lnx-C) in the first period, after that it is considered probable that 
a linear growth law (y=Ax+B) follows. 
The corrosion rate decreases with the growth of the oxide thickness, being in correlation with the 
magnetite solubility, which depends strongly on water chemistry.   
Thus, the isothermal laboratory corrosion experiments have shown that, in contaminated 
environment with Cl- (>0.5ppm) and high concentration of O2 (100÷500ppm), the corrosion rate 
increases and duplex, porous and no adherent magnetite films are formed. 
When the concentration of these anions exceeds the permissible limits the magnetite (Fe3O4) will 
transform into hematite (Fe2O3) that, being easily detachable, will allow the exposure of metallic 
under layer at very high subsequent corrosion. 
In water with oxygen, the corrosion potential of carbon and martensitic steel is controlled by 
cathodic reaction of oxygen reduction, and it is in the range of stability of Fe2O3: 
O2+2H2O + 4e- →4OH 
and  
4/3Fe + 4OH- →2/3Fe2O3 +2H2O+4e- 
The morphology and the protective properties of the oxide film depends on the oxygen and Cl- 
concentration, but the parameter, which controls the corrosion, is oxygen diffusion. 
The corrosion process is characterized by the formation of some inhomogeneous corrosion 
product layers at the corroding surface, presenting active pits. 
A2.3 Nickel Alloys 
In the case of nickel alloys (Incoloy-800) besides Fe oxides are formed Cr and Ni oxides, as well 
as complex oxides of Fe, Cr or Ni (FeCr2O4 and NiFe2O4).   
The exterior side of the corrosive films, formed on Incoloy-800 alloy, consists from magnetite 
particles deposits and of iron oxides with a tendency for increasing in the first time of nickel 
content and then of the chromium content.   
Thus, in the beginning, an exterior layer enriched in iron and nickel oxides (FeO, FeOOH, Fe2O3, 
Fe3O4, NiO and NiFe2O4) forms.   
Formation takes place progressively.  Oxidation of the chromium, due to oxygen diffusion in the 
alloy bulk, occurs preferentially and a thin, nonporous and homogenous oxide film is uniformly 
distributed on the surface, forming a barrier to transport of other ion species at the oxide/oxidizing 
surface.  This internal oxide layer contains Cr2O3 and Fe Cr2O4. 
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The increase of the barrier oxide film takes place by oxygen diffusion to interior and chromium 








Eq.  A2.1 
where 
wp is the metal weight used in barrier oxide film formation in mg/dm2 
kp is the parabolic rate constant in mg/dm2.month 
 
The growth of the barrier non porous oxide film, described by above equation, decreases with the 
increase of the exposure time and will begin to be prevalent the increase of the exterior oxide film 
richly in Ni-Fe, which contains also, quantities relatively small of Cr, Mn and Mo.  While the 






Eq.  A2.2 
where 
w1 = metal weight implicated in non-barrier oxide film in mg/dm2,  
k1 = linear rate constant in mg/dm2.month. 
 
The stability of the barrier oxide film decreases with the increase of its thickness, caused either of 
mechanical tensions generated in oxide during of its thickening or due to transformation reaction 
at barrier/no barrier interface. 
The oxidation varies linearly with the exposure time but after long exposure times.  Because of 
the thickening of the oxide film, equilibrium is established between the increase of the interior 
nonporous oxide layer and its transformation rate in exterior porous oxide layer.   
The corrosion process is dependent on a lot of material parameters (surface state, metallurgical 
structure due to some thermal treatments, as well as existence of some mechanical tensions), 
and depends by the water chemistry (pH, chemical impurities concentration). 
In normal conditions of water chemistry (pH=10.2÷10.8 and chemical impurities concentration 
under maximum permissible values), Incoloy-800 alloy corrosion is uniformly and the double-
layers oxide films are protective and adherent. 
EIS determinations showed that these films correspond to a homogeneous model with two 
adherent oxide layers, the internal oxide layer being thinner (Cint.>Cext.) and more protective 
(Rint.>Rext.). 
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A3.1 Physical Description of Mechanism 
The time dependent mechanism, called Delayed Hydride Cracking (DHC) is a sub-critical crack 
growth mechanism occurring in zirconium alloys as well as other hydride-forming materials that 
requires the formation of brittle hydride phases at the crack tip and the sequent failure of that 
hydride resulting in a crack extension.  When a tensile stress is applied, hydrogen accumulates 
by diffusing up the stress gradient at the flaw tip where a hydride forms.  The hydride grows as 
more hydrogen accumulates and, if the critical conditions of hydride size, maximum stress and 
critical strain are reached, the hydride cracks, and the flaw extends by the length of the hydride.  
The process is then repeated, Figure A3.1. 
 
 
Figure A3.1 A schematic illustration of a single step in DHC starting with a notch under 
stress, (top), hydride precipitation at the notch (middle) and fracture of 
hydride and crack extension from the notch (bottom). 
 
A3.2 Service Conditions / Environment  
The conditions responsible of DHC involve: mechanical state of stress, temperature, hydrogen 
concentration exceeding the limit of solubility.   
The phenomenon of cracking can be generally described by the dependence of the crack growth 
rate or crack velocity on the applied stress intensity factor.  The general shape of such a 
relationship has been shown to be similar to that demonstrated in many forms of environmentally 
assisted cracking [A3.1], [A3.2].   
At stress intensities below a threshold, KIH, cracks do not grow even though a quantity of hydride 
may accumulate at a crack tip under stress.  In DHC, the transition to the plateau velocity portion 
of the velocity vs. KI curve is quite abrupt [A3.3] and then the velocity does not change 
significantly increasing KI until the applied KI approaches the fracture toughness corresponding to 
the initiation of unstable fracture for the material under test, Figure A3.2. 
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Figure A3.2 A schematic representation of the relationship between crack velocity and 
stress intensity factor exhibited by the DHC phenomenon. 
 
A3.3 Materials 
Zirconium Alloys (Zy-4, Zr-2.5%Nb) 
A3.4 Susceptible Components 
• CANDU, RMBK Pressure tubes 
• PWR, BWR, CANDU Zircaloy-4 fuel claddings 
DHC was the cause of leakage of twenty tubes out of 780 Zr-2.5Nb pressure tubes of CANDU 
plants at Pickering Unit 3 and 4, [A3.4], the main cause being the high residual stresses (up to 
700MPa) in the rolled-joint areas.  The cracks initiated on the inner surface and grew radially and 
axially in a series of bands. 
The Zr-2.5Nb partly re-crystallized pressure tube of a RMBK reactor cracked in a similar way, but 
DHC initiated on the outside surface.  Twenty tubes out of 20000 tubes leaked due to DHC 
phenomenon in the first years of operation at Kursk and Chernobyl reactors, [A3.5]. 
This step-wise progression may leave striations on the fracture surface corresponding to each 
step of crack propagation that can often be observed with a low power light microscope, Figure 
A3.3. 
 
NULIFE (07) 25   Page 117 of 230 
 
 
Figure A3.3 Through-wall crack in a CANDU Zr-2.5 Nb pressure tube, showing oxidized 
crack growth bands.  The crack initiated at the inside surface just inboard of 
the rolled joint. 
 
In some Zircalloy nuclear fuel cladding used in BWR reactors, hydride cracking is strongly 
implicated in long splits that allowed substantial leakage of fission products [A3.6].  The cracks 
grow through-wall and may be over 1 m long.  The fractures are characterized by brittle regions in 
“striations” or “chevrons”, with the crack front often leading towards the outside surface of the 
cladding [A3.7].   
A3.5 Applicable Testing Standard(s) for Characterising Mechanism 
ASTM E 399-90–“Standard Test Method for Plane-Strain Fracture Toughness of Metallic 
Materials” (for CT specimen preparation) 
A3.6 Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures for NPP Integrity and 
Lifetime Assessment 
• R.Choubey – DHC Axial Velocity Test Procedure for IAEA Round-Robin Test Program, 
AECL, Report No.  FC-IAEA-02, T1.20.13-CAN-27363-20, Nov.  1998; 
• V.Grigoriev, R.Jakobsson – DHC Axial Crack Velocity Measurements in Zirconium alloy 
Fuel Cladding.  Pin-Loading Tension (PLT) Test Procedure for IEAEA Round Robin Test 
Program, Studsvik/N-05/281, 2005 
A3.7 Current Research Programmes 
• AIEA Vienna CRP - on “Hydrogen and Hydride Induced Degradation of the Mechanical 
and Physical Properties of Zirconium-based Alloys” [A3.8] 
• IAEA-CRP on “Delayed Hydride Cracking (DHC) of Zirconium Alloy Fuel Cladding”; 
• Romanian National Fuel Channel R-D Programme 
A3.8 Knowledge Gaps 
• establishment of DHC temperature limit 
A3.9 Future Research Requirements 
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Corrosion or FAC) is an increase in corrosion brought about by a high relative velocity between the corrosive environment and the surface.  Removal of the metal may be: • as corrosion product which “spalls off” the surface because of the high fluid shear and bares the metal beneath; 
• as metal ions, which are swept away by the fluid flow before they can deposit as corrosion product.  Figure A4.1 illustrates erosion-corrosion of a condenser tube wall.    
 Figure A4.1 Erosion-corrosion of condenser tube wall  Erosion corrosion is the acceleration or increase in rate of deterioration or attack on a metal 
because of relative movement between a corrosive environment and the metal surface.  Generally the movement is rapid and the effects of mechanical wear or abrasion are involved.  Metal is removed from the surface as dissolved ions or corrosion products are mechanically swept away from the metal surface. FAC is a mechanism in which the normally protective oxide layers on carbon and low-alloy steel 
dissolve into a stream of flowing water or water-steam mixture.  As the oxide layer thins, the metal corrosion rate increases, often to very high rates.  Catastrophic failure of power piping due to FAC has been responsible for numerous fatalities at both nuclear and fossil-fuel power plants. FAC of large areas of carbon steel in various circuits of CANDU plants generates significant quantities of corrosion products.  As well, the relatively rapid corrosion rate can lead to operating 
difficulties with some components.  Three areas in the plant are identified and a simple model of mass-transfer controlled corrosion of the carbon steel is derived and applied to these areas.  The areas and the significant finding for each are given below: • A number of lines in the feedwater system generate sludge by FAC, which causes steam generator fouling.  Prediction of the steady-state iron concentration at the feed train outlet 
compares well with measured values. • Carbon steel outlet feeders connect the reactor core with the steam generators.  The feeder surface provides the dissolved iron through FAC, which fouls the primary side of the steam generator tubes, can lead to de-rating of the plant and difficulty in tube inspection. 
• Segmented carbon steel divider plates in the steam generator primary head leak at an increasing rate with time.  The leakage rate is strongly dependent on the tightness of the overlapping joints, which undergo FAC at an increasing rate with time. 
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Erosion-corrosion is a well-understood cause of degradation in pipes.  It causes loss of thickness 
in pipe walls, resulting in degradation of pipe components in carbon and low alloy steel lines until 
they no longer operate safely.  For this reason there is widespread concern that erosion-corrosion 
should be monitored.  It has become clear that erosion-corrosion occurs when a flow of water or 
wet steam erodes or destroys the oxide layer that protects the surface of the pipe.  This leads to 
the formation of new oxide and dissolution of metal.  The following parameters govern the 
erosion-corrosion process:  
• thermo-hydraulic conditions in the fluid,  
• water chemistry,  
• chemistry of the pipe material,  
• geometry of the component,  
• exposure time. 
Figure A4.2 illustrates Schematic the effect of flow velocity on erosion-corrosion rate: 
 
 
Figure A4.2 Schematic showing the effect of flow velocity on 
erosion-corrosion rate 
 
Relationship between flow velocity, v, and erosion-corrosion rate, w, may be written as:   
w = kva  Eq.  A4.1 
where ‘k’ and ‘a’ are constants that depend on the system.   
The exponent ‘a’ varies between 0.3 (laminar flow) and 0.5 (turbulent flow) occasionally reaching 
> 1.0 for mass transfer and fluid shear effects.  For mechanical removal of oxide films (spalling), 
the fluid shear stress at the surface is important, and a > 1.0 (may reach 2 - 4).  Turbulent flow 
regime for V < Vc is sometimes called Flow-Assisted Corrosion regime.   
A4.2 Service Conditions / Environment 
Erosion/Corrosion found in aqueous solutions.  If fluid contains suspended solids, erosion-
corrosion may be aggravated.  Vulnerable equipment is that subjected to high-velocity fluid, to 
rapid change in direction of fluid, to excessive turbulence and when the contacting fluid has a 
very thin boundary layer and high mass transfer rates. 
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A4.3 Materials 
Most metals/alloys are susceptible to erosion e.g.: Stainless steels, Carbon Steels. 
Attack occurs when film cannot form because of erosion caused by suspended particles (for 
example), or when rate of film formation is less than rate of dissolution and transfer to bulk fluid. 
A4.4 Susceptible Components 
Single-phase erosion/corrosion: seen in high pressure feedwater heaters, steam generator inlets, 
feedwater pumps, and CANDU feeders. 
Two-phase erosion/corrosion: more widespread in steam extraction piping, cross-over piping 
(high pressure turbine to moisture separator), the steam side of feedwater heaters, and CANDU 
feeders. 
A4.5 Applicable Testing Standard(s) for Characterising Mechanism 
G 40-02 Standard Terminology Relating to Wear and Erosion ASTM 
A4.6 Current Research Programmes 
Theoretical knowledge of EROSION/CORROSION mechanism 
A4.7 Knowledge Gaps 
Understanding of the feeder erosion/corrosion mechanism 
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A5.1 Introduction 
This appendix addresses an evaluation of the flaws (weld indication) at PZX found during the 
inaugural inspection of the Cernavoda NPP#2 Pressurizer.  All the indications have been 
evaluated based on the procedure in ASME Code Section XI.  From the analysis, it has been that 
all the flaw is stable and grows of the flaw over the service transients is small.  It is concluded that 
these indications are acceptable for service. 
A5.2 Purpose and Scope  
A 3D finite element model was generated for the lower head/heater nozzle/shell assembly and 
used for Stress Analysis under the Level A to D and Hydro test.  Stress data obtained from 
analysis were used for crack growth analysis and calculation of maximum stress intensity factors 
for the weld indications at “PZX”. 
Based on the UT reports for PZX, all the indications were assessed using the acceptance 
standards stipulated in ASME Code Section XI (IWB-3500).  For the indications exceeding the 
ASME Code acceptance standards, analytical evaluations were performed based on the 
procedure in ASME Code Section XI (IWB-3600) [A5.1] 
End-of- life size of these indications were determined based on crack growth analyses.  Maximum 
S.I Factors for these indications with end-of-service sizes were calculated and compared with 
ASME Code Compliance. 
A5.3 Analytical Approach 
Level A to D transient conditions for the pressurizer were specified in the Cernavoda U#2 NPP 
PHT Design Manual [A5.2].  Surface heat transfer coefficients for these transients were 
determined for subsequent Thermal and Structural Analyses. 
A 3D finite element model was generated for the Lower Head/Heater Nozzle/Shell Assembly and 
is shown in Figure A5.1.   
Thermal, Structural & Fatigue and Crack Growth Evaluation Analyses have been finalized using 
Ansys-CFX Program, [A5.3] and FlawEvo Program (an Ansys Macro), [A5.4]. 
 
 
Figure A5.1 The simplified geometric model 
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For the Lower Head/Heater Nozzle/Shell Assembly Model, Stress Analysis was performed based 
on the transients conditions provided in the Design Manual [A5.2].  Thermal Transients Analysis 
was used to obtain temperature distributions for the model under different Level A, B, C & D 
Transients. 
All transients and tests considered in Level A & B analysis are listed in Table A5.1.  In addition to 
of Level A & B transients listed, hydro test (it bounds leak teat) should be considered for flaw 
growth calculation. 
Level D Condition is bounded by Level C Condition. 
Table A5.1 Transients and Tests considered 
Item Name No.  cycles 
1. Heatup & Cooldown 250 Level A & B 
2. Startup & Shutdown 1000 
3. Power Manoeuvring 10000 
4. Loss of Feedwater from 100% Power 100 
5. Reactor Trip from 100% Power 500 
6. Loss of Class IV Power from 100% Power 50 
7. Loss of Regulation (Reactor Overpower) 200 
8. Turbine Trip 100 
9. Stepback 500 
10. Pressurizer Startup During Commissioning 50 
11. Emergency Over pressurization 1  Level C 
12. Crash Cooldown 15 Level C 
13. Loss of Coolant 1  Level D 
14. Steam Line Failure 1  Level D 
15. System Hydro test 20 
 
A5.4 Analysis and Results 
A5.4.1  Analysis 
The analysis is carried out by creating a table from the UT inspection report that determines 
indications aspects ratios and compares them to the allowable parameters [A5.1] 
A5.4.2  Flaws 
There are 17 planar indications reported in [A5.5], as illustrated in Figure A5.2.  All of the 
indications are in the weld material.   
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Figure A5.2 Orientation of Indications 
 
Two of these indications have an amplitude result that exceed -6 dB, for which vertical extent 
data of the indications is given.  The 2 indications are compared to the allowable planar flaws of 
Table IWB-3512 [A5.1]), and presented in Table A5.2.  The second combination of indications is 
not acceptable. 
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a/l a/t % Limit of a/t % Comments 
 all flaws are subsurface flaws (Table IWB-3512-1 of [A5.2] is used)  
6 -2 63.0 57.0 6.0 1.5 19.5 74.0 0.8 6.0 0.125 1.014 2.7 4’ allowable ratio 
of a/t is used 14 1 65.0 57.0 8.0 1.0 8.0 75.1 0.5 8.0 0.063 0.7 2.3 
Multiple flaws             
4,7,12,14 1 45 92 47.0 2.5 7.25 75.1 1.25 47.0 0.027 1.7 2.1 1.0 mm for #12 
vertical extent 
3,5,6,13,15 -2 56 84 28.0 4.25 20.875 74.0 2.125 28.0 0.076 2.9 2.3 1.0 mm for #13 
vertical extent 
Parameters for finding Mm and Mb, Figs.  A-3310-1 & A-3310-2, Ref.2 
e (mm) 16.1 2a/t 0.1 2e/t 0.44 Mm 1.05 Mb 0.6 
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A5.4.3 Stress Data 
Structural Analyses were carried out with pressures and temperature distributions applied (see 
Figure A5.3).   
 
 
Figure A5.3 Stresses map for R4 Nozzle 
 
Stress class lines across different weld sections were defined for the model and fatigue usage 
factors for these stress class lines were calculated (see Figure A5.4).   
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Figure A5.4 Path definition for R4 Nozzle 
 
Stress data for the locations with the highest fatigue usage factors were summarized for 
subsequent assessment of the indications.  Details of the analysis for the Lower Head/Heater 
Nozzle/Shell Assembly are documented in [A5.6].Table A5.3 provides a summary of stresses 
required for analyses. 
Table A5.3 Normal Conditions Stress Data(Summary) 
INSIDE NODE = 14619   OUTSIDE NODE = 14722 
        ** MEMBRANE ** 
SX SY SZ SXY SYZ SXZ 
1.907 57.99 104.3 -12.1 9.56E-02 7.70E-02 
S1 S2 S3 SINT SEQV  
104.3 60.49 -0.592 104.9 91.22  
       ** BENDING ** I=INSIDEC=CENTRE, O=OUTSIDE 
 SX SY SZ SXY SYZ SXZ 
I -3.917 -82.61 -74.9 14.96 -0.1226 7.66E-2 
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 
O 3.917 82.61 74.9 -14.96 0.1226 -7.66E-2 
 S1 S2 S3 SINT SEQV  
I -1.17 -74.9 -85.36 84.19 79.48  
C 0 0 0 0 0  
O 85.36 74.9 1.17 84.19 79.48  
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A5.4.4 Stress Intensity Factory, KI 
Based on A-3200(b) in Appendix A of Section XI [A5.1]], KI is calculated using linearised stresses.  
For a subsurface flaw, stress intensity factor can be calculated using Eq.(2) in A-3300, [A5.1] 
A5.4.5 Flaw Growth Calculation 
Flaw growth rate can be described using Eq.(1) in A-4300, [A5.1].  Results from the Flaw Growth 
Rate Analyses, using [A5.4] are given in the following Table A5.4. 





Acceptance Criteria KI < KI_200F 




Acceptance Criteria KI < KI_100F 
 11.0  21.0 
Level C 
KIc Fig A-4200-1 200 
Kic_100F 141.40 
Acceptance Criteria KI < KI_100F 
 11.0  141.4 
Conclusion: 
The combined flaw meets the req.  stipulated in IWB-3600 
 
A5.4.6 Material Fracture Toughness 
KIa and KIc given in A-4200, [A5.1] are lower bound from tests of SA-533 Gr.  B/Class1,SA-508 
Class 2, and SA-508 Class 3 steel provided in Figure A-4200-1, [A5.1].  RTNDT = 20 0F, [A5.6] 
A5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
Table A5.5 provides a summary of the flaw assessment results. 
Table A5.5  Summary of Results for Flaw Assessments 











Level A&B 13.43 62 200 0F(93 0C) 
Level C&D 11 141 200 0F(93 0C) 
Hydro test 12 21 158 0F(70 0C) 
From the analyses, it has been shown that all the flaws are stable and growths of the flaws over 
the specified service cycles and transients are small.  It is concluded that the indications found at 
these weld locations during the inaugural inspection are acceptable for service without repair with 
the following restrictions. 
• The minimum temperature required for hydro test under a pressure of 2030 psi (14.MPa) 
for the Pressurizer is 158 0F(70 0C) 
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A6.1 Physical Description of Mechanism 
The films formed by corrosion of the structural materials contain a variety of oxides and 
hydroxides as a function of chemical composition of the materials, having different thicknesses 
and porosities depending on coolant oxidation conditions.  In formation process of the corrosive 
layers on surface two mechanisms exists: one as result of physic-chemical reaction between fluid 
and metallic ions and other of the corrosion products deposition, the both depending on alloys 
nature and chemical composition of the environment. 
Carbon and martensitic steels Under highly reducing (O2<0,1ppm) and alkaline (pH=10.2x108) 
conditions and at temperatures more than 180oC, the magnetite film (Fe3O4) is the major 
corrosion product formed on carbon and martensitic steel, by Schikorr’s reaction [A6.1]: 
 
Fe + 2D2O → Fe2+ + D2 + 2OD-  
and  
3F2+ + 6OD-⇔Fe3O4 ↓ + 2D2O + D2  
 
The magnetite solubility has an important role in formation mechanism of the oxide layers.  It 
depends on electrochemical potential of the solution, which depends on the solution pH, the 
concentration of H2 (D2), O2, Cl- and temperature [A6.2].  By analysis complementary methods 
was evidenced that the magnetite, formed into composition very close by stoichiometric report, 
ensures from beginning an adherent and protective oxide film.  The protective oxide film confers 
of the metallic interface the resistance at oxidation and hydration, phenomena, which appear at 
fluid/metal, interface and generate corrosion products as different oxides, hydroxides and oxi-
hydroxides of iron and alloying elements from steels. 
The corrosion mechanism of materials in alkaline environment at high temperature consists of the 
formation of two overlapping layers of iron oxide compounds and was assumed to conform to the 
Potter and Mann model [A6.3].   
Initially, an amorphous oxide film forms, but magnetite nuclei develop on this film and increase 
without a preferential orientation, conducting after certain time to formation of thin film with fine 
granulation.  This inner oxide layer is a compact, continuous, adherent and fine-grained (granule 
dimension being 0.05÷2µm) oxide.  In the second stage, over this internal film, which is in direct 
contact with the metal, the magnetite crystals develop at oxide/metal interface, simultaneous with 
his development at oxide/solution interface, forming a film with a bigger granulation.  Thus the 
corroded iron that cannot precipitate as the inner layer diffuses through it as Fe2+ ions to the 
oxide-coolant interface.  There, if the coolant already is saturated in dissolved iron, the emerging 
Fe2+ will tend to supersaturate the fluid boundary layer and provoke the precipitation of the outer 
oxide layer. 
The magnetite of the outer layer forms coarser crystals, usually octahedral or tetrahedral habit 
with sizes of the order of a few micrometers (0.5÷5µm).  Therefore, the exterior oxide layer is 
formed by re-deposition of iron ions from solution.  He is no continuous, no uniform and no 
adherent, but his growth is controlled by iron solubility and concentration in solution.   
The interior oxide layer being microcrystalline and containing alloying elements as Cr, from the 
ground metal, can form complex oxides with low solubility, but the exterior oxide layer from big 
magnetite crystals (about 1µm) can contain Mn or Ni.  The proportions of internal and exterior 
layers are roughly 50-50 [A6.4]. 
The kinetics of the formation and the growth of the magnetite protective oxide layer was 
considered that initially a parabolic law, but then a cubic or logarithmic low follows.  But, because 
 
NULIFE (07) 25   Page 139 of 230 
 
the fortuitous character of the second magnetite layer, the steel corrosion in aqueous 
environment can be under a mixed control, thus that the kinetics of oxide film growth is of 
parabolic form (y=kxn) and logarithmic form (y=k lnx-C) in the first period, after that probably, a 
linear law (y=Ax+B) follows.  The corrosion rate decreases with the growth of the oxide thickness, 
being in correlation with the magnetite solubility, which depends strongly on water chemistry.   
Nickel alloys  
In the case of nickel alloys (Incoloy-800) besides Fe oxides are formed Cr and Ni oxides, as well 
as complex oxides of Fe, Cr or Ni (FeCr2O4 and NiFe2O4).  The exterior side of the corrosive 
films, formed on Incoloy-800 alloy, consists from magnetite particles deposits and of iron oxides 
with a tendency for increasing in the first time of nickel content and then of the chromium content.  
Thus, in the beginning, an exterior layer enriched in iron and nickel oxides (FeO, FeOOH, Fe2O3, 
Fe3O4, NiO and NiFe2O4) forms.  Progressively, takes place and the oxidation of the chromium, 
due to oxygen diffusion in alloy bulk, which oxidizes preferably the chromium forming a thin, 
nonporous and homogenous oxide film, uniformly distributed on surface, being a barrier for 
transport of another ions at oxide/oxidizing surface.  This internal oxide layer contains Cr2O3 and 
FeCr2O4. 
The increase of the barrier oxide film takes place by oxygen diffusion to interior and chromium 









Eq.  A6.1 
where 
wp  is the metal weight used in barrier oxide film formation in mg/dm2 
kp is the parabolic rate constant in mg/dm2.month. 
 
The growth of the barrier non porous oxide film, described by above equation, decreases with the 
increase of the exposure time and will begin to be prevalent the increase of the exterior oxide film 
richly in Ni-Fe, which contains also, quantities relatively small of Cr, Mn and Mo.  While the 







Eq.  A6.2 
where 
w1 is the metal weight implicated in non-barrier oxide film in mg/dm2 
k1 is the linear rate constant in mg/dm2.month. 
 
The stability of the barrier oxide film decreases with the increase of its thickness, caused either of 
mechanical tensions generated in oxide during of its thickening or due to transformation reaction 
at barrier/no barrier interface. 
The oxidation varies straight with the exposure time but after long exposure times, because the 
thickening of the oxide film, reaches a stationary value, resulting an equilibrium between the 
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increase of the interior nonporous oxide layer and its transformation rate in exterior porous oxide 
layer.  The oxidation rate tends to a constant variation with exposure time until a certain moment. 
The corrosion process is dependent on a lot of material parameters (surface state, metallurgical 
structure due to some thermal treatments, as well as existence of some mechanical tensions), 
and depends by the water chemistry (pH, chemical impurities concentration).  For water with 
pH=10.2÷10.8 and without impurities Incoloy-800 alloy corrosion is uniformly and the double-
layers oxide films are protective and adherent. 
 
A6.2 Service Conditions/Environment 
Demineralised water pH=9.5 ÷ 9.7 (AVT) 260º C, 5.1 MPa (CANDU secondary circuit); 
Demineralised water pH=10.2 ÷ 10.8 (LiOH) 310º C, 10.0 MPa (CANDU primary circuit). 
A6.3 Materials 
Carbon steel (SA 508, SA 106); Incalloy 800. 
A6.4 Susceptible Components 
Piping; ; SG Tubesheet; SG tubing. 
A6.5 Applicable Testing Standard(s) for Characterising Mechanism 
• Gravimetric analysis; Electrochemical measurements; Metallographic microscopy 
• Scanning Electronic Microscopy. 
A6.6 Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures for NPP Integrity and 
Lifetime Assessment 
Internal Procedures INR 
A6.7 Current Research Programmes 
Corrosion of the above mentioned materials at normal parameters specific of CANDU primary 
and secondary circuits. 
A6.8 Knowledge Gaps 
• Corrosion kinetics 
• Influence of pH values on the corrosion processes. 
A6.9 Future Research Requirements 
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A7.1 Physical Description of Mechanism 
A small cold mass flow in a Tee-branch (e.g. caused by a valve leakage) merging with a hot mass 
flow in the Tee-run will cause turbulent temperature mixing effects in the branch region next to the 
Tee-connection and in the pipe run downstream from the Tee (see Figure A7.1).   
 
 
Figure A7.1 Turbulent temperature mixing in Tee-Connections 
 
The effect is caused by differences in fluid velocity as well as in fluid density.  The thermal loads 
occur as “down” and “up” (or “up” and “down“) thermal shock loads.  The locations of the high 
stressed regions in the branch depend on the mass flow ratio, the diameter ratio and the position 
of the Tee (vertical run, horizontal run etc.).  A small mass flow in the branch (valve leakage) 
leads to relevant temperature loads in the branch itself.  With increasing branch mass flow the 
highly loaded locations are situated in the run region downstream from the Tee.  The relevant 
degradation mechanism is thermal fatigue.  The leading load value is the “driving temperature 
difference” between run and branch fluids. 
 
A7.2 Service Conditions/Environment 
• Temperature dependent on power plant system (< 350 °C) 
• Temperature difference between run and branch fluids in NPP (< 250 K in normal 
operation) 
• Mass flow ratio between run and branch fluids depending on system parameters  
 
A7.3 Materials 
Steels used for piping tees  
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A7.4 Susceptible Components 
Piping Tees with relevant temperature differences between run and branch fluid, especially with a 
“dead end” and possibly valve leakage. 
A7.5 Applicable Testing Standard(s) for Characterising Mechanism 
• Fatigue tests (e.g. ASTM E 606) to characterise fatigue behaviour of pipe material. 
• Thermal hydraulic component tests to characterise load spectra at specific conditions as 
“driving temperature difference” between run and branch fluids, mass flow ratio, diameter 
ratio and position of the Tee (vertical run, horizontal run etc.) if detailed information 
required. 
A7.6  Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures for NPP Integrity and 
Lifetime Assessment 
• European Procedure for Low and High Cycle Thermal Fatigue Analysis (in progress with 
NULIFE RA-4) 
• Detection of pipe tees with potential valve leakage load on the basis of plant 
instrumentation systems, particularly by thermocouple installations and following 
proactive measures such as changing the system operation procedures or maintenance 
measures, e.g. stopping potential valve leakages 
A7.7 Current Research Programmes 
NULIFE RA-4 
A7.8 Knowledge Gaps 
So far there is an existing database from the THERFAT tests with a limited transferability to pipe 
wall thickness of any size.   
The current knowledge about the real heat transfer coefficient range should be improved. 
A7.9 Future Research Requirements  
Additional tests at tees with increased wall thickness are recommended to improve the 
THERFAT-database. 
Further research emphasis should be focused on fluid temperature measurements in the very thin 
boundary layer zone (transition from fluid to wall) to be able to determine a realistic heat transfer 
coefficient range more accurately. 
A7.10 Useful Resource Documents 
[A7.1] Metzner K, Wilke U, Fifth Framework of the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) Thermal Fatigue Evaluation of Piping System Tee-Connections (THERFAT) 
Final Synthesis Report, Final Issue, Revision 1, July 2007 
[A7.2] Development of a European Procedure for Assessment of High Cycle Thermal Fatigue in 
Light Water Reactors: Final Report of the NESC-Thermal Fatigue Project, Network for 
Evaluating Structural Components (NESC), EUR 22763 EN, 2007 
[A7.3] European Procedure for Low and High Cycle Thermal Fatigue Analysis, C. Faidy, Draft 
February 2007 
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A8.1 Introduction 
The code [A8.1] is available in Russian.  It was developed for WWER type reactors and provides 
a method for evaluation of the integrity of the RPV during a pressurized thermal shock scenario.  
An IAEA guideline [A8.2] was developed based on this code.  The VERLIFE code [A8.3] is a 
comparable but more detailed European code for WWER type reactors.   
A8.2 Scope 
The code aims at fracture mechanical evaluation of the RPV of WWER type reactors during a 
pressurised thermal shock.  It includes the aspects of the thermal hydraulic analyses, mechanical 
and the fracture mechanical calculations, and of the neutron irradiation induced shift of ductile to 
brittle transition temperature of the RPV steel (material properties). 
A8.3 Methodology 
The guideline [A8.2] covers the following main topics: 
A8.3.1 Sequences To Be Considered 
• General considerations 
• Initiating events groups 
• Initiating events categorization 
A8.3.2 Acceptance Criteria  
The RPV Pressurised Thermal Shock (PTS) analysis is to demonstrate by a conservative 
deterministic analysis that there will be no initiation of a brittle fracture from the postulated defect 
during the plant design life for the whole set of anticipated transients and postulated accidents. 
A8.3.3 Assumptions For Pts Analysis  
• Plant data to be taken into account for PTS analyses: relevant systems pertinent to PTS, 
characterisation of the RPV in terms of geometry, material, weldments etc., fluence data, 
in-service inspection results 
• Assumptions for thermal hydraulic analysis: system operation, available emergency 
systems, operator actions 
• Assumptions for structural analysis: material properties for base material and cladding 
(elasticity modulus, heat conduction coefficient, thermal expansion coefficient, heat 
capacity etc), simplified vs.  detailed mechanical analysis (FEM is recommended) 
 
 A8.3.4 Thermal Hydraulic Analysis  
• Objectives: to determine downcomer temperature field, local coolant-to-wall heat transfer 
coefficients in the downcomer, and primary circuit pressure. 
• Thermal hydraulic analysis to support transient selection (find conservative or limiting 
conditions for the PTS scenario) 
• Sequence analysis plan (calculation of the overall progression of accidents with 
advanced thermal-hydraulic system codes; separate methods to account for the thermal 
stratification and mixing effects) 
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A8.3.5 Structural Analysis  
• Temperature and stress field calculations for the RPV wall based on the thermal and the 
pressure loading; consideration of residual stresses 
• Fracture mechanics analysis (calculation of stress intensity factors based on simplified 
engineering equation or on FEM analysis) 
• Postulation of defects and NDT requirements (surface crack, underclad crack, crack size 
to be postulated) 
A8.3.6 Integrity Assessment  
• Evaluation of results and safety factors (comparison of the calculated stress intensity 
factor vs.  fracture toughness of the material) 
• Allowable critical temperature of embrittlement  
• Assessment and uncertainty of results 
A8.3.7 Material Properties 
• General information (phenomena contributing to aging, i.e. to the shift of the critical brittle 
fracture temperature 
• Determination of the initial critical brittle fracture temperature (unirradiated) by 
acceptance test data 
• Irradiation embrittlement: Empirical formulas for the critical brittle fracture temperature in 
dependence on fluence, irradiation temperature and chemical composition (P, Cu) 
• Fatigue and thermal aging: it is assumed that there is no shift of critical brittle fracture 
temperature due to thermal aging for WWER-440, in case of WWER-1000 there could be 
a shift; fatigue does not cause any shift of critical brittle fracture temperature 
A8.3.8 Corrective Actions  
Neutron flux and material properties, Loads 
A8.3.9 Computer Codes  
General requirements and code validation for Fluence calculations, Thermal hydraulic 
calculations and Structural calculations 
A8.3.10 Quality Assurance  
General and specific requirements 
A8.4 Details of the PTS analysis 
This section provides details of the PTS analysis in [A8.1], [A8.2] and [A8.3]. 
A8.4.1 Irradiation effects to material properties 
Russian Assessment Code - PNAE G 7 002 86 [A8.1],[A8.2] 
Critical brittle fracture temperature Tk is evaluated by: 
 
k0kFNT0kk TTTTTTT ∆+=∆+∆+∆+=  Eq.  A8.1 
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with Tk0 - initial critical brittle fracture temperature, ΔTT - shift in Tk due to thermal aging, 
ΔTN - shift in Tk due to fatigue damage, ΔTF - shift in Tk due to neutron irradiation.  The main 
contribution of the shift in the cylindrical part of the vessel is caused by neutron irradiation: 
Fk TT ∆≈∆   
The initial critical fracture temperature Tk0 is determined from Charpy V-notch impact tests and 
tensile tests of unirradiated material: 
   Tk0 = f (TunirrDB ; Rpunirr) Eq.  A8.2 
with unirrDBT  - Charpy transition temperature,  Rp
unirr - yield strength of the unirradiated material.  
The neutron irradiation induced critical brittle fracture temperature, shift ΔTk is determined in a 
procedure based on Charpy V-notch impact tests and tensile tests of irradiated material in a 
similar way as in an unirradiated condition: 
Δ Tk = T
iir
k – Tk0  with  T
iir
k = f(TDB; Rp
irr)  Eq. A8.3 
The following temperature dependence of the fracture toughness, KIC is used for RPV PTS 
analyses: 
( )[ ] mMPa200,TT02.0exp3626K KIC ≤−⋅⋅+=  Eq.  A8.4 
This dependence corresponds to specimen thickness of 150 mm and fracture probability of Pf = 





FAT ⋅=∆  
Eq.  A8.5 
with AF - irradiation embrittlement coefficient of the RPV steel for irradiation at temperature T(°C).  
, Fn - neutron fluence in m-2 (En>0.5 MeV), F0 = 1022 m-2. 
AF is determined from:  
For WWER-440 RPV  at irradiation temperature 270°C: 
15Kh2MFA weld material  
( )CuPF C07.0C800A ⋅+=  Eq.  A8.6 
 
with CP - phosphorous content in mass %, CCu - copper content in mass %. 
• AF = 15 for 15Kh2MFAA weld  
 
For WWER-440 base metal AF is constant:  
• AF = 18 for 15Kh2MFA 
• AF = 12 for 15Kh2MFAA 
For WWER-1000 RPV materials irradiated at temperature 290°C the AF values are as follows: 
• AF = 20 for weld material 
• AF = 29 for 15Kh2NMFA 
• AF = 23 for 15Kh2NMFAA 
However, recent experiment of the Kurchatov Institute have shown that the AF value for WWER-
1000 materials are not conservative for nickel content higher than 1.5 %.  There is clearly a need 
for revision of the prediction of ∆Tk. 
 




For WWER reactors the “Unified Procedure for Lifetime Assessment of Components and Piping 
in WWER NPPs - VERLIFE” [A8.3] defines a reference temperature, RT0, used in integrity 
assessment of WWER reactors as: 
σ+= 00 TRT  Eq.  A8.7 
with T0 - reference temperature of the irradiated material according to ASTM E1921-05 (Master  




1 Tδ+σ=σ  
Eq.  A8.8 
with σ1 - standard deviation according to ASTM E1921-05.  δTM considers the scatter in the 
materials.  If this value is not available the application of the following values is suggested:  
δTM = 10°C for the base material, 
δTM = 16°C for weld metals. 
The VERLIFE procedure suggests the following RT0 indexed lower bound curve for WWER base 
and weld metal: 
[ ]{ } mMPain;)RTT(.exp..Min)T(K %JC 2000190636225 05 −⋅⋅+=  Eq.  A8.9 
that agrees with the standard MC for 5% fracture probability in ASTM E1921-08. 
A8.4.2 PTS Analysis for WWER reactors 
The initiating events and the thermal hydraulic calculations are described in [A8.2].  According to 
the VERLIFE code [A8.3] the KI calculation within the PTS analyses can either be done by Finite 
element method (FEM) or by using analytical formulae.  FEM is generally recommended.  The 









Eq.  A8.10 
with x – through wall thickness coordinate starting at the cladding/base material interface, s – wall 
thickness.  Based on the thermal hydraulic calculations, the temperature and pressure in the 
reactor downcomer are determined and subsequently also temperature and stress fields in RPV 
wall are determined by FEM analyses.  The fracture mechanical evaluation is based on the 
following postulated cracks: 
• semi-elliptical sub cladding crack with a/s=0.1 if advanced qualified NDT is applied 
(generally recommended value, detailed procedure based on NDE qualification criteria 
for postulated crack depth is presented) 
• semi-elliptical sub cladding crack with a/W=0.25 if  qualified NDE is not applied 
• 2 aspect ratios: a/c=0.3 and a/c=0.7 
• 2 crack orientations: perpendicular to circumferential direction and perpendicular to the 
axial direction 
• crack front is assumed to be located in the weldment or base material 
• the cladding is assumed to be intact if its integrity is assured by qualified NDE and its 
material properties are known (in a new revision of the VERLIFE 2008 [A8.5] code the 
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crack is assumed to penetrate 1 mm into the cladding and more detailed procedure of 
cladding assessment is presented) 
In case of FEM analyses with crack included in the mesh the KI value is calculated via the J-
integral.  In case of the analytical approach the formulas in Appendix IV of [A8.3] may be used.   
As an alternative to Master curve approach (Eq.  A8.9), also the KIC curve based on Tk for PTS 
scenarios may be used : 
[ ] [ ]{ } mMPain200;)TT(02.0exp3626Min)T(K k3IC −⋅⋅+=  Eq.  A8.11 
T is the temperature at the crack tip.    


























Eq.  A8.12 
where minimum is calculated for all pairs of KI and T during the PTS transient.  This value must 
be higher than end-of-life prediction of Tk. 
A8.5 Current R&D Activity 
Within the EU projects NURESIM/NURESP (6th / 7th FP) the thermal hydraulic models for PTS 
scenarios are improved.  CFD models are used to describe the 3D mixing phenomena in the 
downcomer considering two phase flow.  These activities aim at a more realistic (less 
conservative) evaluation of the thermal load of the RPV wall during PTS scenarios.  These 
research activities are not related to a specific reactor type [A8.4].   
A8.6 Knowledge Gaps 
• Material behaviour after extended time of operation (> 30 years) 
• Thermal loads of the RPV in case of two phase flow phenomena 
A8.7 Future Research Requirements  
• More precise description of the material degradation by neutron irradiation (Evaluation of 
the flux effect and late blooming phases), development of multi scale models 
• Further improvement of thermal hydraulic models 
A8.8 References 
[A8.1] Guide for strength analysis of the equipment and piping of nuclear power units, PNAE G 
7 002 86, Energomashizdat, Moscow, 1989, in Russian. 
[A8.2] Guidelines on Pressurized Thermal Shock Analysis for WWER Power Plants ; A 
Publication of the Extra budgetary Programme on Safety of WWER and RBMK Nuclear 
Power Plants, IAEA Publication IAEA-EBP-WWER-08, Rev. 1, January 2006 
[A8.3] Unified Procedure for Lifetime Assessment of Components and Piping in WWER NPPs – 
VERLIFE, European Commission, Final Report, Contract N° FIKS-CT-2001-20198, 
September 2003. 
 
NULIFE (07) 25   Page 154 of 230 
 
[A8.4] D. G. Cacuci, J. M. Aragones, D. Bestion, P. Coddington, L. Dada, and C. Chauliac: 
NURESIM - A European Platform for Nuclear Reactor Simulation. FISA 2006 - 
Conference on EU Research and Training in Reactor Systems, 13-16 March 2006 
(ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp6-euratom/docs/fisa2006_sei_nuresim_en.pdf) 
[A8.5] Unified Procedure for Lifetime Assessment of Components and Piping in WWER NPPs – 
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A9.1 Physical Description of Mechanism 
Zirconium and its alloys have a low absorption of heat neutrons and keeps good mechanical 
properties at temperatures up to 390-400oC.  However, zirconium alloys can pick up hydrogen 
during operation as a consequence of corrosion reaction with water.  Hydrogen redistributes 
easily at elevated temperatures migrating down a temperature or concentration gradient and up a 
stress gradient.  Hydrogen has very limited solubility in zirconium alloys, this being less than 1 
ppm at room temperature and about 80 ppm at 300oC.  Whenever the solubility is exceeded a 
zirconium hydride phase will be precipitated and as this phase is brittle it can have an impact on 
the mechanical properties of the alloy.  The worst embrittlement occurs when hydrides are 
oriented normal to the principal stress.  When the terminal solid solubility is exceeded in a 
component such as a FC that is highly stressed for long periods of time, delayed hydride cracking 
(DHC) failures may occur (Figure A9.1).   
 
Figure A9.1 Orientation of Hydrides & Formation of The Hydride Cluster Near Crack 
DHC is a phenomenon where a crack can propagate in stepwise fashion as a result of hydrogen 
redistribution ahead of the crack tip under a stress level below the yield stress [A9.1], [A9.2].  The 
high mobility of hydrogen enables hydride to redistribute.  If stress levels are sufficiently high the 
local hydrogen concentration can exceed the TSS, and the hydride platelets precipitate in the 
primary cracking direction. 
A9.2 Service Conditions/Environment 
Water inside of the fuel channel, irradiation, temperature – 300oC, pressure – 7 - 8 MPa. 
A9.3 Materials 
Zirconium-niobium alloy (Zr + 2.5 % Nb) 
A9.4 Susceptible Components 
The RBMK-1500 nuclear power plant reactor fuel channels 
A9.5 Applicable Testing Standard(s) for Characterising Mechanism 
• Regulations for in-service inspection of fuel channels, reactor control and protection 
system channels, and graphite stack of INPP, PTOed-1125-2. 
• Regulations for Arrangement and Safe Operation of the Equipment and Piping of Nuclear 
Power Plants, PNAE G-7-008-89, Moscow, ENERGOATOMIZDAT Publishers, 1990. 
• Procedures for In-Service Inspection of Fuel Channels, CPS Channels and Graphite 
Stack at Ignalina NPP.  RBM-K15.  Sb.01 D3.  No 449, INPP, 1993. 
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• Standard Regulations for the In-Service Inspection of Fuel and CPS Channels at RBMK-
1000 and RBMK-1500.  1985. 
A9.6  Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures for NPP integrity and 
lifetime assessment 
• The norms of the calculation on Strength of the equipment and pipelines of the nuclear 
power installations (PNAE G-7-002-86) / Gosatomenergonadzor USSR.-Moskow: 
Energoatomizdat, 1989.  (In Russian) 
• Assessment of the Integrity of Structures Containing Defects.  Nuclear Electric, R/H/R6 – 
Revision 3.  – Gloucester: Nuclear Electric Ltd.,1996.  – 318p. 
• Guidance for application of the Leak Before Break concept at Ignalina NPP RBMK-1500 
reactors.  VD-E-03-98.-Vilnius, 1998. 
A9.7 Current Research Programmes 
Delayed hydride cracking (DHC) of zirconium alloy fuel cladding.  Investigation of hydrogen 
induced degradation of zirconium cladding tubes (IAEA coordinated research project CRP No.  
T12017) 
A9.8 Knowledge Gaps 
Influence of Zr-2.5Nb structure and properties on the threshold stress intensity factor (KIH) values 
for hydride crack propagation.   
Influence of loading type (constant and low cyclic) on DHC and KIH 
A9.9 Future Research Requirements  
The study of influence of Zr-2.5Nb structure, properties and loading type on the threshold stress 
intensity factor (KIH) values for hydride crack propagation 
A9.10 References 
[A9.1] Delayed hydride cracking in zirconium alloys in pressure tube nuclear reactors. Final 
report of coordinated research project. 1996-2002. IAEA-TECDOC-1410. October 2004, 
Vienna. 
[A9.2] Investigation of RBMK fuel channel aging process and determination of safe operation 
criteria. Final report, LEI, 2006, Kaunas. This project was supported by Lithuanian 
Science Foundation. 
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A10.1 Physical Description of Mechanism 
Inter Granular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) is a dominant damage mechanism in RBMK 
Reactor Cooling System piping [A10.1], [A10.2]. 
The IGSCC cracks in MCC austenitic piping of Ignalina NPP appear at the inner surface in HAZ 
near to weld root and grow to outside close to fusion line (Figure A10.1).  The HAZ material is 
susceptible to IGSCC and sensitised in most cases.  The sensitisation occur due to overheating 
during welding and is an important factor in the cracking behaviour.   
 
Figure A10.1 IGSCC of piping welded joints heat affected zones (HAZ) 
 
A10.2 Service Conditions/Environment 
Water, temperature – 300oC, pressure – 7 – 8.5 MPa. 
A10.3 Materials 
Austenitic stainless steel 08X18H10T 
A10.4 Susceptible Components 
The RBMK-1500 nuclear power plant reactor cooling system piping components 
A10.5 Applicable Testing Standard(s) for Characterising Mechanism 
• Rules for Construction and Safe Operation of Equipment and Pipelines of NPP, PNAE-G- 
7-008-89,Gosatomenergonadzor USSR, Moscow, Energoatomizdat, 1990. 
• The equipment and pipelines of nuclear power installations.  Welding (PNAE G-7-009-
89),  
• The equipment and pipelines of nuclear power installations.  Welding.  Rules for testing 
(PNAE G-7-010-89,  
• Welding of the main material of the equipment and pipelines of nuclear power 
installations.  Testing using ultrasonic method.  Testing of main material (PNAE G-7-014-
89) 
A10.6  Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures for NPP Integrity and 
Lifetime Assessment 
• Requirements for Assessment of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking Damages in 
RBMK-1500 Reactors’, P-2004-01 
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A10.7 Future Research Requirements  
Leak-Before-Break analysis of austenitic piping systems welds 
A10.8 References 
[A10.1] IAEA extra-budgetary programme on mitigation of intergranular stress corrosion cracking 
in RBMK reactors. Working group 2 on comprehensive assessment techniques. Final 
report, IAEA (2002). 
[A10.2] Technical Report No. 66173 “Determination of Downcomer Piping Joints Damage 
Reasons, Development of Technological Measures and Experimental Evaluation of 
Damaged Joints Manufactured of 08Ch18N10T Steel Durability After Definite Operation 
and Repair Period”, PROMETEY, Sankt-Peterburg 1997. 
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A11.1 Physical Description of Mechanism 
During the operation of a graphite-moderated reactor, the irradiation dose causes dimensional 
and material property changes to the graphite (Figure A11.1).   
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Figure A11.1 Illustration of the probabilistic gas gap closure model 
During the first half of the reactor life, the graphite shrinks due to dimensional changes so that, if 
the process continued the gap between the graphite moderator brick and the graphite rings would 
be taken up.  The diameter of the bore in the graphite block then reaches a minimum value (“turn- 
around”, see Figure A11.2) and starts to expand in the second half of reactor life [A11.1], [A11.2], 
























ABAQUS brick 10 results
Linear (measurements)
 
Figure A11.2 Comparison of brick calculations with measurements 
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This is normal graphite behaviour under irradiation.  In addition, the zirconium pressure tube 
expands due to irradiation creep.  To allow for irradiation induced graphite shrinkage and fuel 
channel tube expansion there is a gap between the fuel channel tube and the graphite moderator 
bricks.  As the reactors operate this gap reduces.  Operation of these reactors with a closed gas-
gap is a non-design condition and continued operation of with closed gas-gaps has been shown 
to lead to damage to the graphite bricks and pressure tube welds.  Closure of this gap has 
therefore been identified as a safety case issue by reactor designers and independent reviews as 
it could cause the pressure tube to be tightly gripped by the bricks. 
A11.2 Service Conditions/Environment 
Water inside of he fuel channel, irradiation, temperature - 3000C, pressure – 7 - 8 MPa. 
The reactor cavity is filled with a helium-nitrogen mixture. 
A11.3 Materials 
Zirconium-niobium alloy (Zr + 2.5 % Nb) 
Graphite GR-280 and GRP-2-125 
A11.4 Susceptible Components 
The RBMK-1500 nuclear power plant reactor fuel channels and the graphite moderator bricks 
A11.5 Applicable Testing Standard(s) for Characterising Mechanism 
• Regulations for Layout and Safe Operation of Components and Pipelines of Nuclear 
Power Plants, PN AE G-7-008-89, 1989. 
• Procedures for In-Service Inspection of Fuel Channels, CPS Channels and Graphite 
Stack at Ignalina NPP.  RBM-K15.  Sb.01 D3.  No 449, INPP, 1993. 
• Regulations for the In-Service Inspection of Fuel, CPS Channels and Graphite Stack of 
Ignalina NPP, code ПТОэд-1125-2В1. 
• Standard Regulations for the In-Service Inspection of Fuel and CPS Channels at 
• RBMK-1000 and RBMK-1500.  1985. 
A11.6  Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures for NPP integrity and 
Lifetime Assessment 
• Standards for Strength Analysis of Typical Graphite Components and Parts of Channel-
type Uranium-fuelled Graphite-moderated Reactors.  RDIPE, Ref.  No E230-2536, 1991. 
• Technical Regulations for Operation of the INPP RBMK-1500 Reactors, code ПТОэд-
0905-1. 
A11.8 Knowledge Gaps 
Interaction of the graphite bricks and fuel channel in case closure gap 
A11.11 Future Research Requirements  
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A11.10 References 
[A11.1] Bouganenko S.E., Baldin V.D., Rodchenkov B.S., Sinitsyn E.N., Marsden B.J., Blackburn 
N., Davies M.A., Introduction to the safety assessments related to RBMK graphite 
reactors. BNES Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety Assessment, Manchester, May 
1994. 
[A11.2] Marsden B.J., Review of Russian Graphite Data and Assessment Methods for the Safety 
of Operation and Life Limiting Features of Nuclear Power Plant. AEA-RS-5415, 
GNSR(DTI)/P(92)114, December 1992. 
[A11.3] Hopkinson K.I., Marsden B.J., Dundulis G., Kopustinskas V., Liaukonis M., Augutis J., 
Uspuras E., Prediction of fuel channel-graphite gas-gap behaviour in RBMK reactors. 
Nuclear Engineering and Design, ISSN 0029-5493. - 2003. - Vol. 223. - P. 117-132. 
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A12.1 Physical Description of Mechanism 
During the operation the length of the PT increase a case of thermal and radiation creep (Figure 
A12.1).  This is important in terms of the inadmissibility of reaching the limit of bellows movement 
[A12.1]. 
 
Figure A12.1 Increase in FC Lengths with Power Production at INPP-2 
 
A12.2 Service Conditions/Environment 
Water inside of the fuel channel, irradiation, temperature – 300oC, pressure – 7 - 8 MPa.   
The reactor cavity is filled with a helium-nitrogen mixture. 
A12.3 Materials 
Zirconium-niobium alloy (Zr + 2.5 % Nb) 
A12.4 Susceptible Components 
The RBMK-1500 nuclear power plant reactor fuel channels 
A12.5 Applicable Testing Standard(s) for Characterising Mechanism 
• Regulations for the In-Service Inspection of Fuel, CPS Channels and Graphite Stack of 
Ignalina NPP, code ПТОэд-1125-2В1. 
• Procedures for In-Service Inspection of Fuel Channels, CPS Channels and Graphite 
Stack at Ignalina NPP.  RBM-K15.  Sb.01 D3.  No 449, INPP, 1993. 
• Standard Regulations for the In-Service Inspection of Fuel and CPS Channels at RBMK-
1000 and RBMK-1500.  1985. 
A12.6  Governing Codes and Assessment Procedures for NPP integrity and 
Lifetime Assessment 
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A12.7 References 
[A12.1] Safety Analysis Report for Ignalina NPP, Task group 7 Report “Prediction of Fuel 
Channel Lifetime at Ignalina NPP” July, 1995. 
 
 
NULIFE (07) 25   Page 173 of 230 
 
 
APPENDIX 13 GUIDANCE FOR APPLICATION OF THE 
LEAK BEFORE BREAK CONCEPT AT  









A13.4 Applications to lifetime assessment of degraded materials & 
components 




















NULIFE (07) 25   Page 175 of 230 
 
A13.1 Introduction 
The regulatory Guidance for Application of the Leak Before Break  Concept at Ignalina NPP 
RBMK-1500 Reactors developed by Lithuanian Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate in 1998 is 
based on International IEC Standard 1250 [A13.1], IAEA-TECDOC-710 [A13.2]] and US NRC 
Standard Review Plan, 3.6.3 [A13.3]. 
The implementation of Leak-Before-Break (LBB) concept for primary circuit piping is important 
question for nuclear reactors safety. Especially it is important for RBMK-1500 with large number 
of Main Circulation Circuit piping some of that are located outside the Accident Localization 
System. The consequences of guillotine rupture could be tremendous and are difficult 
predictable. One of the means to avoid undesirable guillotine ruptures of pipes is implementation 
of LBB concept. The application of LBB concept criteria’s and installation of leak monitoring 
systems is accepted by Lithuanian Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate. 
A13.2 Scope 
The technical requirements, which should be fulfilled in case application of the leak before break, 
are described in this document. The general requirements are presented in this guidance only. 
This document contains the requirements for leak detection system; requirements for initial 
conditions in case application LBB; requirements for deterministic LBB analysis.   
The basic requirement of the given document is that the flow of coolant through through-wall 
crack must be detected before crack will reach the critical sizes. 
A13.3 Methodology 
The general points for LBB analysis and application are the following: 
1) Should be determined that is not possible fast piping degradation mechanisms due to 
fatigue, corrosion or erosion.  
2) The postulated through wall crack length should be two times less then critical size 
calculated using most hazardous loads combination. 
3) The postulated crack should remains stable at the most dangerous loading increased by 
safety factor (1.4). 
4) The calculated leak rate through postulated crack should be enough to be detected by 
leak monitoring systems during 1 hour of normal operation. 10 times less then calculated 
leak rate should be used for analysis of leak monitoring system capability analysis. 
The deterministic analysis should be performed using actual material properties data. The 
fracture toughness should be taken in conservative way selecting the minimal values of base 
metal, weld metal or heat-affected zone. The R6-method [A13.4] or other J-integral based 
methods shall be used for through-wall cracks evaluation.  
A13.4 Applications to Lifetime Assessment of Degraded Materials & 
Components 
The regulatory Guidance for Application of the Leak Before Break Concept are used for 
deterministic analysis of compliance to LBB concept of the RBMK pressure tube containing DHC 
cracks and austenitic pipes containing IGSCC cracks. 
A13.5 Associated Material Test Standards 
• Rules for Construction and Safe Operation of Equipment and Pipelines of NPP, PNAE-G- 
7-008-89,Gosatomenergonadzor USSR, Moscow, Energoatomizdat, 1990. 
• European standard 10002-1. Metallic materials. Tensile testing – Part 1. Method of test at 
ambient temperatures, 2001. 
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• European standard 10002-5. Metallic materials. Tensile testing – Part 5. Method of test at 
elevated temperatures, 1991. 
• ASTM E1152 Standard Test Method for Determining J-R Curves. American Society for 
Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, U.S.A. 
• ASTM E-399 Test method for plane-strain fracture toughness of metallic materials. 
American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, U.S.A. 
• ASTM E-813 Standard test method for JIc, a measure of fracture toughness. American 
Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, U.S.A. 
A13.6 References 
[A13.1] INTERNATIONAL IEC STANDARD 1250. First edition 1994-01 important for safety. 
Detection of leakage in coolant systems. Nuclear reactors - instrumentation and control 
systems. 
[A13.2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Applicability of the Leak Before Break 
Concept, IAEA-TECDOC-710, Vienna (1993).  
[A13.3] United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, US NRC Standard Review Plan, 3.6.3 
Leak Before Break Evaluation Procedures. US NRC, Washington, 1986. 
[A13.4] Assessment of the Integrity of Structures Containing Defects. British Energy Generation 
Ltd, R6 – Revision 4. Gloucester GL4 3RS, United Kingdom, February 2003. 
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A14.1 Introduction 
The Inter Granular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) is a dominant damage mechanism in 
RBMK Reactor Cooling System piping. The results received in the IAEA Extra budgetary Program 
on Mitigation of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking in RBMK Reactors [A14.1] was 
evaluated in the requirements for IGSCC crack evaluation.  
The regulations and acceptance criteria, given in the regulatory document, describe the general 
principles of assessment of RBMK-1500 piping containing IGSCC cracks, give the requirements 
for damage tolerance analysis, requirements for inspection extent and frequency, requirements 
for quality assurance and documentation and describe the responsibilities of the plant. 
A14.2 Scope 
This document contains the Requirements for General Principles, Damage Tolerance Analysis 
Requirements, ISI and Quality Assurance and Documentation Requirements. The regulations 
include the safety factors and list of necessary documentation which should be prepared by plant 
operator in case if detected IGSCC defect is going to be left to further operation.  
A14.3 Methodology 
The procedures for evaluation of cracks consist of two parts. The first part is determination of the 
acceptable crack size for the component with crack, and the second part is the crack growth 
calculation. The acceptable flaw size provides information about the largest flaw size which 
component can tolerate without failure with accepted safety factors. The crack growth calculation 
determines how long does it take for the existing crack to reach the acceptable size. The results 
of these calculations (acceptable crack size and crack growth) determine the further inspection 
schedule of the components with crack. 
The following fracture assessment methods shall be used for IGSCC crack evaluation: 
• For postulated surface cracks the limit load analysis as ASME XI App. C [A14.2], 
• For detected as well as postulated surface cracks the R6-method [A14.3] or other 
established methods, which employ the J-integral as a fracture parameter; 
• For through-wall cracks the R6-method [A14.3] or other J-integral based methods. 
A14.4 Applications to Lifetime Assessment of Degraded Materials & 
Components 
The requirements include the procedures for safety assessment of RBMK-1500 piping 
components containing IGSCC cracks. 
A14.5 Associated Material Test Standards 
• Rules for Construction and Safe Operation of Equipment and Pipelines of NPP, PNAE-G- 
7-008-89,Gosatomenergonadzor USSR, Moscow, Energoatomizdat, 1990. 
• European standard 10002-1. Metallic materials. Tensile testing – Part 1. Method of test at 
ambient temperatures, 2001. 
• European standard 10002-5. Metallic materials. Tensile testing – Part 5. Method of test at 
elevated temperatures, 1991. 
• ASTM E1152 Standard Test Method for Determining J-R Curves. American Society for 
Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, U.S.A. 
• ASTM E-399 Test method for plane-strain fracture toughness of metallic materials. 
American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, U.S.A. 
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• ASTM E-813 Standard test method for JIc, a measure of fracture toughness. American 
Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, U.S.A. 
A14.6  References 
[A14.1] AEA extra-budgetary programme on mitigation of intergranular stress corrosion cracking 
in RBMK reactors. Working group 2 on comprehensive assessment techniques. Final 
report, IAEA (2002). 
[A14.2] American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) 
Code, Section XI, IWB=3640 and Appendix C “Evaluation of flaws in Austenitic Piping.” 
Edition 1995. 
[A14.3] Assessment of the Integrity of Structures Containing Defects. British Energy Generation 
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APPENDIX 15 RPV CLADDING – Overview of results 




Summary of relevant reports 
More details are given in ANNEX 1 
A15.1 Study to generate Information on RPV Cladding Materials Data 
Including Aspects and Provide State-of-the-Art Report on the role 
of Cladding in RPV Safety Analysis 
WGCS DGXI Contract B7-5340/96/000716/MAR/C2, 1996-2000 
A15.2 NESC IV Project: An investigation of the transferability of Master 
Curve technology to shallow flaws in reactor pressure vessel 
applications, Final Report June 2005 
A15.3 VVER Cladded Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity Evaluation with 
Respect to PTS Events 
Pistora, V.,  Brumovsky, M., Kohopaa, J., Lauerova, D., Wallin, K.: 
Semi-Large Scale Experiments Performed on Specimens with 
Underclad Cracks. SMIRT 19 Conference, Toronto, 2007. 
  
A15.4 References 
E. Keim, E. Capurro, A. Popov 
Evaluation of Manufacturing and Inspection Program on RPV Cladding 
Proceedings of PVP 2000, 2000 ASME PRESSURE VESSELS AND PIPING 
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A16.1 Reactor Pressure Vessel 
A16.1.1 Pressurised thermal shock (PTS) 
PTS analysis is a part of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) structural integrity assessment. PTS 
is a reactor transient that subjects the vessel to severe thermal shock starting at normal operating 
loading. Initial sharp cracks are typically postulated to be located at the weld seam area. see 
Figure A16.1. Safety margins against brittle fracture have to be justified in an appropriate manner.  
 
Figure A16.1.  Pressurized thermal shock. 
Firstly, the most significant transients are selected. Thermal hydraulic analyses are used for 
calculating the thermal loading transients. The fluid temperature distribution and the 
corresponding heat transfer coefficients are needed for the thermal conductivity analyses.   
Secondly, pressure and thermal stresses through the wall are calculated in selected transient 
cases. Also the effect of residual stresses in the cladding, under the cladding and in the welds 
may be considered in stress analysis. The location, size and shape of the postulated crack is 
assumed based on the fabrication, NDE (non destructive evaluation), previous ISI (in-service 
inspection) or conventional values. Fracture mechanics analyses are applied for assessing the 
crack initiation. The stress intensity factor K can b e used as a crack initiation criteria; 
KI< KIC/SF, E. A16.1 
where KI is the calculated stress intensity factor, KIC is the crack initiation value, material 
toughness,  and SF is the safety factor. 
A16.2 Example of PTS Analysis 
The example structure is the pressure vessel shell ring of the N4 type (1500 MWe). The inside 
diameter of the considered pressure vessel is 4500 mm at base metal/cladding interface. The 
total wall thickness is 232 mm including a 7 mm thick cladding. 
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The base material is a low alloy steel type SA 508 Class 3 and the stainless steel cladding is of 
grade 309L/308L. Thermal conductivity, specific heat, modulus of elasticity and thermal 
expansion coefficient for both base and cladding materials are shown in Table A16.1. The 
Poisson ratio was taken as 0.3 for both materials. 





(J/(smm°C))          
SA508           309L 
Specific heat 
(J/(kg°C)) 
SA508       309L 
Modulus of elasticity 
(MPa) 
 




SA508             309L 
20 0,0377 0,0147 447,2 461,9 209000 197000 0,0000112 0,0000164 
50 0,0386 0,0152 460,4 480,0 207500 195000 0,0000115 0,0000165 
100 0,0399 0,0158 484,0 500,1 205000 191500 0,0000118 0,0000168 
150 0,0405 0,0167 503,6 526,0 202000 187500 0,0000121 0,0000170 
200 0,0405 0,0172 524,0 534,0 199000 184000 0,0000125 0,0000172 
250 0,0402 0,0180 547,2 546,8 195500 180000 0,0000128 0,0000175 
275 0,0399 0,0183 557,1 548,8 193500 178250 0,0000129 0,0000176 
300 0,0395 0,0186 567,1 550,8 191500 176500 0,0000131 0,0000177 
343 0,0388 0,0192 586,8 556,4 188060 172630 0,0000134 0,0000179 
370 0,0383 0,0196 599,9 559,3 185700 170400 0,0000135 0,0000180 
 
RTNDT was 35°C for the base material. The fracture initiation and arrest toughness as a function 






The stress strain curves are shown in Fig. A16.2. These curves were approximated using the 































Approximated true stress versus plastic strain curves for base material 
and cladding material. 
 
The crack depth used in the assessment of the cooldown and refuelling and pressure test was 
56.25 mm (¼ of the wall thickness) and length 337.5 mm. This crack size was taken from ASME 
XI. 
An axial surface crack 15 x 30 mm2 (total depth x total length) was assumed in the category III 
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Figure A16.3  
 
The elliptical 15 x 30 mm2 crack shape in the computation of category III 
and IV transients. 
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For the III category transient (2 inch small break) the pressure and temperature are shown in 
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A16.2.1Computational models 
Abaqus 5.8 [A16.1] finite element code was used for the computation.  
The stainless steel cladding was included both in the thermal and mechanical analyses. The 
stress free temperature was assumed to be 292°C. 
All thermal analyses were performed with the axisymmetric model, which is shown in Figure 
A16.6. The stresses for the crack assessment utilising ASME XI formulas (cooldown & refuelling 
and pressure test) were produced with the axisymmetric model and a linear elastic analysis. 
 
Figure A16.6  The axisymmetric finite element model 
The stresses were resolved into membrane and bending components (linearisation method), as is 
specified in ASME XI (A-3200). The linearisation was performed using the stress at the base 
metal/cladding- interface (at the base metal side) and at the deepest point of the crack (in the 
base metal). Thus the stress distribution in the cladding was ignored in the linearisation. The 
stress distribution was extrapolated to the inside surface and the surface flaw equation of ASME 
XI (A-3310) was used for stress intensity factor calculation. The calculation procedure was 
performed using a FORTRAN code.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
In the case of the axisymmetric model appropriate symmetry boundary conditions were modelled. 
Thus the axial displacement of the lower edge was fixed and the upper edge was constrained to 
remain as plane. 
Three dimensional mechanical analyses were performed corresponding to the 2 inch small break 
and LOCA transients assuming thermo-elastic-plastic material behaviour and small strains and 
displacements. The three dimensional model of the cylinder with crack is shown in Figure A16.7. 
Symmetry boundary conditions were modelled in the crack plane (except crack surface), in the 
middle plane of the vessel length and in the 90° plane. 
 
The crack loading was determined by the J-integral computed by the domain integration 
technique in the Abaqus code [16.1]. The J-integral was computed as mean value from second 
and third integration paths. The well known plane strain relation was used to determine the stress 
intensity factor K from J-integral. 
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Figure A16.7 Three dimensional finite element model of the cylinder with crack. The 
displacement boundary conditions are shown in the figure. 
A16 2.2 Results 
Figures A16.8 and A16.9 show computed temperature profiles through the vessel wall in the case 
of LOCA and small break transient. Figures A16.10 and A16.11 compare the hoop stress 
distributions computed with the axisymmetric and three dimensional models. Figures A16.12 and 
A16.13 show the hoop stress distributions from the three dimensional model in a location far from 
the crack. Figure A16.14 shows the computed stress intensity factor from the analysis according 
to ASME XI as a function of time for cooldown and refuelling transients. 
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Figure A16.8  Computed temperature through the vessel wall for different time values in 
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Figure A16.9 Computed temperature through the vessel wall for different time values in 
the case of small break transient. 
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Figure A16.10 Comparison of hoop stress distribution through the wall by axisymmetric and 
three dimensional model (without influence of the crack) for different time 
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Figure A16.11 Comparison of hoop stress distribution through the wall by axisymmetric 
and three dimensional model (without influence of the crack) for different 
time values, small break transient 
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Figure A16.12 Hoop stresses computed for different time values by the three 
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Figure A16.13 Hoop stresses computed for different time values by the three 




























Figure A16.14 Computed stress intensity factor as function of time, cooldown and 
refuelling transient. Results from the analysis according to ASME XI. 
The computed stress intensity factor during cooldown and refuelling transient and pressure test is 
shown in Figure A16.15 together with the arrest toughness curve of ASME XI [16.3]. The stress 
intensity factor KI is assessed in two points: at the deepest point of the crack front and near the 
cladding/base material interface on the base material side. A safety factor of 2 has been applied 
to the stress intensity factor values caused by pressure in the case of cooldown and refuelling 
transient. The stress intensity factor due to pressure test has been multiplied by 1.5. 
The situation in the cooldown and refuelling transient is far from critical. The crack loading due to 
pressure test is not acceptable despite of the safety factor 1.5. A safety factor of √10 for pressure 
is used in the assessment of allowable p-T limits in Finland [16.2]. 
The computed stress intensity factors by the three dimensional finite element model during LOCA 
and small break transients are shown in Figures A16.16 and A16.17 together with the initiation 
toughness curve of ASME XI [16.3]. The stress intensity factor KI is assessed again in two points: 
at the deepest point of the crack front and near the cladding/base material interface on the base 
material side.  The safety factor (KIC/KI) during small break transient (most critical case) is 1.3, 
and even in this case warm pre-stressing (WPS) occurs, Figure A16.18. 
 






















Figure A16.15  
 
Fracture assessment by the computation according to ASME XI in the case 
of pressure test and cooldown and refuelling transient in the deepest point 
of the crack and in the base metal at the clad/base- interface. The fracture 




















Figure A16.16 Fracture assessment (3D FE) in the deepest point of the crack (K19) and in 
the base metal at the clad/base- interface (K7 )in the case of LOCA 
transient. The fracture initiation toughness curve according to ASME XI 
[16.4] is shown (RTNDT = 35°C) 
 




















ASME XI KIc (35 C)
 
Figure A16.17 Fracture assessment (3D FE) in the deepest point of the crack (K19) and in the 
base metal at the clad/base- interface (K7) in the case of small break transient. 
The fracture initiation toughness curve according to ASME XI [164] is shown 
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Figure A16.18 Fracture assessment (3D FE) the base metal at the clad/base- interface (K7) in 
the case of small break transient. The computed stress intensity factor has 
been multiplied by 1.3.  The fracture initiation toughness curve according to 
ASME XI [16.4] is shown (RTNDT = 35°C). 
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A17.1 Degradation Mechanisms 
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A17.1 Degradation Mechanisms 
CANDU 6 reactors have experienced two types of feeder degradation: 
• Pipe wall thinning due to Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)  
• Cracking. 
FAC wall thinning has been seen at most stations while cracking has only been observed in a few 
situations.  The thinning rate of the feeder pipes has been shown to be dependent on water 
chemistry, particularly the pH and the electrochemical potential.  The mechanistic understanding 
of feeder cracking is still limited.  To date, inter-granular cracks have been observed on both the 
inner and outer surface of the first and second bends on the outlet feeder and on one repaired 
weld.  Inner surface cracks are postulated to be caused by stress corrosion cracking.  Figure 
A17.1 shows a schematic diagram of feeder pipe. 
 
Figure A17.1 Schematic diagram of feed pipe. 
 
Outer surface cracks are currently believed to be caused by low temperature creep cracking, 
assisted by hydrogen ingress due to feeder thinning.  The single crack on the repaired weld is 
currently believed to be an interrelation of both mechanisms.  It is believed that all cracks are 
caused by unrelieved residual stresses induced during manufacturing or welding, plus other 
factors such as material susceptibility and chemical environment. 
Feeder Ageing Management Programs have been developed and are updated periodically to 
account for inspection findings and subsequent assessments.  This program includes inspection 
plans at each planned outage and R&D plans.  In addition, improved feeder inspection tools have 
been developed to inspect inaccessible sites.  More reliable leak detection systems are also 
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Table A17.1 Major Degradation Mechanisms. 
Degradation Mechanisms Location 
FAC Wall Thinning Global & Local Bend ID 
Highly Local (blunt flaw) Adjacent to Weld 
Cracking IGSCC Bend ID 
Repaired Weld 
Creep Cracking Bend OD 
 
Feeder pipes in the Heat Transport System need to be subjected to a more rigorous assessment 
process, given the recent field experience where wall thinning of some portions of the feeders, 
and cracking of feeders at one station, has been reported.  An industry methodology and feeder-
specific fitness-for-service guidelines for the degradation types that have been experienced on 
outlet feeders are now used by all CANDU stations.  Wall thickness inspection and monitoring 
programs are underway and mitigation strategies for older plants are under development.  Most 
feeder pipes will meet their design life.  A limited number of outlet feeder bends and/or welds may 
require replacement before pressure tube replacement.  The techniques and procedures for 
feeder replacement have been developed, and have been recently used successfully at a 
CANDU 6 plant.  The feeder repair and replacement process is now a routine procedure.  
Feeders on the reactor face can be replaced with little difficulty during an outage.  It is clear that 
repair of feeders due to aging has now proven to be an effective and economical Age 
Management technique. Appendix 4 provides further details regarding degradation mechanisms 
in CANDU plant. 
A17.2 Lifetime Evaluation 
Material ageing management of carbon and austenitic steel pipes 
It is essential to define the goals for establishing the critical elements for success in all the phases 
of the assessment of material degradation of carbon and austenitic pipes.  These goals help staff 
maintain a sense of purpose and enable clear focus on areas of work.  Figure A17.2 shows 
typical goals of the material ageing management of carbon and austenitic steel pipes. 
 
 
Figure A17.2 Typical goals of the material ageing management of carbon and 
austenitic steel pipes in PLIM/PLEX programs. 
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The structural integrity of the plant is affected by corrosion degradation in percentage of 27% 
[A17.1]. Table A17.2 shows potential ageing mechanisms of carbon and austenitic steel pipes 
and resulting effects,[A17.2]. 
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AN.1.1 Introduction, Materials 
To prevent uniform corrosion and erosion and thus to minimize the radioactive contamination of 
the reactor coolant system, all ferritic parts and components wetted by the reactor coolant in 
service are lined with a corrosion-resistant cladding.  Cr-Ni steel is the clad material used for most 
of these surfaces.  As a rule, the RPV cladding is welded in at least two passes to ensure re-
crystallization of the heat affected zone in the ferritic base metal and to eliminate the potential for 
relaxation cracking.  To neutralize the dilution with the base metal, to prevent hot cracking, and to 
induce resistance to inter-granular corrosion, a highly over-alloyed clad metal is used for welding 
the first pass of the austenitic cladding and a less over-alloyed clad metal is used for the second 
pass and eventually needed further passes.  For the cladding of the Russian reactor pressure 
vessels one or two strip electrodes with the section of 0.7 x 50 mm and the distance of 10-14mm 
between them are used.   
In this review, the existing relevant information on RPV cladding properties are summarized.  The 
RPV cladding in Europe and Russia were mostly produced by submerged (under powder) arc 
strip electrode welding, while in US the submerged arc three-wire welding technology was used.  
Compared to US technology, the European technology provides very low penetration of the weld-
deposited cladding into the base metal, low specific heat input, and very different shape of weld 
beads and resultant microstructure.  Consequently, current US (mostly Heavy Section Steel 
Programme), Korean and Japanese results are collected but not included into this study. 
AN.1.2 Chemistry of RPV Cladding 
The base material of the WWER reactors is low-alloyed Cr-Mo-V or Cr-Mo-Ni steel. The cladding 
is made usually from two layers using the low penetration submerged arc strip cladding 
technology. The first layer is over-alloyed using Sv-07Ch25N13 electrode (containing 25%Cr and 
13% Ni) weld by one pass, the second made with Sv-08Ch19N10G2B electrode usually at least 
by three passes [AN1.1], [AN1.2], [AN1.3].   
The nominal thickness is 8+2-0 mm, but the welding altogether is a little more, since the vessel 
inside is machined to have smooth surface to allow proper NDT testing.  
The French RPV-s are clad with similar technology: the first layer is 309 L (24Cr – 12 Ni), and the 
second is 308 L (18 Cr - 10Ni) [AN1.4].   
Figures AN.1.1 and AN.1.2 show some results obtained by scanning electron microscope EDX 
analysis of the distribution of the main alloying elements in WWER 440 cladding. The transition 
between the base material and the first layer of cladding is sharp, the transition between the base 
and austenitic material is less than 0.5 mm, and consequently this transition zone is negligible as 
a crack initiation layer. 
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Figure AN.1.1 The distribution of Ni content in UP strip electrode cladding [AN1.1]  
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Figure AN.1.2  The distribution of Cr content in UP strip electrode cladding [AN1.1]  
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Typical chemical composition of the different WWER and French claddings are given in Table 
AN.1.1. The ferrite content of the different claddings varies between 2-7%. It can be seen that the 
WWER and French claddings are similar in chemical composition. 
Table AN.1.1 Chemical composition of different claddings [AN1.1], [AN1.4]  
Type Layer Composition m/m % 
WWER 
440 
 C Si Mn P S Cr Mo Ni Cu Nb 
 1 0,056 0,86 1,16 0,015 0,004 22,8 - 13,3 0,06 - 
 2 0,034 0,60 1,46 0,013 0,004 18,2 0,015 9,3 0,07 0,88 
French 1 0.048 0.39 1.84 0.016 - 18.08 0.21 10.45   
 1 0.065 0.66 1.50 0.012 - 19.05 0.138 9.68   
 2 0.017 0.29 1.90 0.026 - 18.72 0.07 10.49   
 2 0.030 0.71 1.53 0.014 - 19.90 0.069 10.16   
 
AN.1.3 Defects in the Cladding 
Careful UT testing has been performed by Forschungzentrum Rossendorf and AEKI on a test 
block cut from the Greifswald unit 8 WWER-440 type reactor to find the defects in the cladding.  
Two types of defects were discovered: porosity (gas bubbles) and joint defects (mainly remaining 
slag among the welding layers especially at welding over-lapping.  The diameter of the gas 
porosity was maximum 2mm-s and the largest slag inclusion area was less than 1 cm2.  Figure 
AN.1.3  shows the defect distribution in a test block. 
 
 
Figure AN.1.3  Defect distribution in cladding of steel block cut from Greifswald unit 8 [AN1.1]  
 
In a small figure the defects seems to be dense, but in reality the defect density was low.  To 
evaluate the defects size and study the grain structure of the cladding and the transition zone 
metallographic specimens were cut from the places where defects were found by the UT test.  
Figures AN.1.4, AN.1.5 and AN.1.6 show some typical defects of the cladding.  No cracks were 
found in the tested blocks in the cladding or under the cladding [AN1.1]. 
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Figure AN.1.4  Typical slag inclusion between the base material and the first 
layer of the cladding (N=100x) [AN1.1]  
 
 
Figure AN.1.5  Lack of penetration among the base material and the first layer 
of the cladding (N=100) [AN1.1]  
 
 





Small slag inclusion in the first layer of the cladding 
(N=100x) [AN1.1]  
 
Most of the defects were improper penetration of the first layer cladding into the base material, or 
slag inclusions nearly parallel with the surface or small gas or slag bubbles in the cladding.  No 
cracks were found in the cladding. 
AN.1.4 Microstructure of the Cladding 
The austenitic cladding is a welded structure, with very large grains, as illustrated in Figure 
AN.1.7.  Sometimes the grain diameter can be greater than 1 mm, with delta ferrite net around 
the grain boundaries and several precipitates (mostly carbides) inside of the grains.  The ferrite 




The grain structure of the first layer of the cladding (N= 
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AN.1.5 Mechanical Properties 
Tensile properties 
The behaviour of the cladding under loading is not similar to the stainless steel or to the ferrite-
pearlitic low-alloyed steel.  Due to the large grain sizes non-uniform deformation (necking) starts 
at many locations throughout the reduced gage length of the specimen, and the round specimen 
quickly becomes non-uniformly deformed.  Figure AN.1.8 shows an irradiated cladding specimen 
(3 mm diameter and 15 mm long) during testing.  At least two areas of necking can be seen, and 





Tensile specimen from cladding during testing [AN1.2]  
Surprisingly the tensile properties are much more affected by the testing temperature than by 
high fluence irradiation.  Figure AN.1.9 shows tensile curves obtained on the second (surface 
layer) of the cladding.   
 
Figure AN.1.9 Tensile curves obtained on unirradiated and irradiated cladding at room 
and at elevated temperature [AN1.2]  
■ unirradiated and tested at room temperature, ▲ unirradiated and tested at 300oC irradiated 
and tested at room temperature   irradiated and tested at 300°C 
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One curve has been obtained on an unirradiated specimen at room temperature, and another one 
on an unirradiated specimen at 300 °C (near to reactor operating temperature).  The yield 
strength was slightly reduced at elevated temperature testing, however, the elongation has been 
reduced to nearly half.  Generally it is expected that elongation is increases at elevated 
temperatures, as in the case of ferritic or austenitic steels.   
Irradiation has a much less remarkable effect on the cladding properties than the temperature.  
The yield and ultimate tensile strength slightly increased and the elongation was slightly reduced.  
Figures AN.1.10 and AN.1.11 show the combined effects of the irradiation ageing and the testing 












































Figure AN.1.10  Effect of irradiation on the tensile properties of the different layers of WWER-
440 cladding [AN1.1]  
 
Flow curves of as received, and irradiated cladding also have been obtained [AN1.1]  for elastic-
plastic finite element calculation. 
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Figure AN.1.11 Effect of temperature and irradiation on the elongation and 
reduction of area measured on the first (over alloyed) layer of 
WWER-440 cladding. [AN1.1]  
The early Russian literature states that the as-received cladding properties are about: 
σ0.2 ~ 320 MPa, δ ~20%, ψ ~ 35%. Eq. 1 
and 1020 n/cm2 neutron fluences increase the yield strength with 50-100% and reduce the ductility 
with 50% [AN1.2].  The French experience with 308 L type cladding shows that the ferrite content 
affects the irradiation hardening.  Figure AN.1.12 shows the irradiation hardening of 308L type 
cladding as a function of the ferrite content and Figure AN.1.13 shows the effect of testing 
temperature on the differently aged 308L cladding.  Increasing ferrite content decrease the 
irradiation effect, and increasing testing temperature sharply decreased the yield strength 
[AN1.4].  
 
Figure AN.1.12  Irradiation hardening of 308 type cladding as a function of ferrite content [AN1.4]  
 
 




Figure AN.1.13  Effect of testing temperature on the differently aged 308 L cladding [AN1.4]  
 
Charpy impact toughness 
Charpy specimens were cut from the trepans obtained from the Greifswald unit 8 and from the 
Zarnoviec reactor.  One set was tested as-received, one set was thermally aged and one set was 
irradiated in the Budapest Research Reactor.  The specimens were machined such that the notch 
was perpendicular to the interface of the base material and cladding, and started in the transition 
zone.  This resulted in the notch root residing in the first layer of the cladding and crack 
propagation into clean cladding material during the Charpy testing.  The applied thermal 
treatment was 3000 hours at 350oC, to modelling long term service ageing.  The third set of 
specimens were neutron irradiated up to 0.8*1022 n/m2 E>1 MeV.  The results, see Figure 
AN.1.14, show only a slight increase in the transition temperature, but considerable reduction in 
the upper shelf energy [AN1.1]. 
 
 





Decrease of the upper shelf energy of irradiated cladding  
[AN1.1]  
The Russian literature shows a different behaviour of the irradiated cladding [AN1.2].  It states 
that the irradiation embrittlement depends on the phosphorus and copper content of the cladding.  
They experienced considerable increase of the Charpy transition temperature and decrease of 
the upper shelf energy on commercially produced WWER cladding (see Figure AN.1.15).   
 
 
Figure AN.1.15  Effect of irradiation on the Charpy properties of WWER cladding 
[AN.1.2] 
o = as received = 5.5*1021 n/m2 
irradiation at 325 
°C 




NULIFE (07) 25   Page 219 of 230 
 
In the case of relatively high copper and phosphorus content cladding the embrittlement was 





Effect of irradiation on the Charpy properties of WWER cladding 
with increased copper and phosphorus content [AN1.2]  
O = as received  = 5.5*1021 n/m2 irradiation at 325 °C ▲= 2.1*1022 n/m2 
E>0.5MeV irradiation at 265°C [AN1.2]  
 
Further data is published in the Russian literature on the effect of sulphur and phosphorus.  
Relative small content of phosphorus and sulphur can strongly reduce the Charpy impact 
toughness of the as-received and irradiated cladding.  The data also shows that the irradiation 
embrittlement was caused by precipitations and segregations saturating in the first stage of the 
irradiation and the matrix damage caused by further irradiation only slightly affects the Charpy 
transition curve [AN1.3].  
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Figure AN.1.17  Influence of S and P content on temperature dependence of 
absorbed energy for the metal of laboratory homogeneous 
cladding (Sv-04Ch20N10G2B) in initial and irradiated conditions. 
[AN.1.2] 
Tempering at 670oС, 16 hours: (o, ∆, — initial condition •, ▲; — F=1·1020 neutron/cm2 at Тirr = 
270-290oС  
Different research heats were irradiated in the Osiris reactor [AN1.4].  The results show that 
chemical composition and ferrite content affects the irradiated properties of the cladding.  One 
cladding was also sensitive to thermal ageing, in contradiction with the results obtained on the 
WWER-440 cladding (as shown in Figure AN.1.13). 
Examples of Charpy impact properties for French cladding materials are presented in Figures 
AN.1.18 to AN.1.21. 
 
 





Charpy impact properties of French cladding type 188 in as received and after 6.5x1019 





Charpy impact properties of French cladding type 190 in as received and after 6.5x1019 
n/cm-2 (E> 1MeV) irradiation at 290°C.  The ferrite content is 5.2% [AN1.4]  
 
 





Charpy impact properties of French cladding type 189 cladding in as received and 





Charpy impact properties of French cladding type 189 cladding in as received and 
thermally aged, irradiated, and thermally aged and irradiated condition.  Irradiation 
6.5x1019 n/cm-2 (E> 1MeV) at 290°C.  The ferrite content is 5% [AN1.4]  
 
Fracture toughness 
Fracture toughness evaluation is difficult on RPV cladding due to its non-homogeneous 
behaviour.  The Russian literature shows some J1c results on as-received and tempered WWER 
cladding [AN1.4], see Figure AN.1.22.  
 





Temperature dependence of fracture toughness for the first (∆) and second layer (◄) 
of WWER as received cladding, and the same cladding after tempering at 670°C 50 
hours first (▼) and second (►) layer.  [AN.1.3] 
The open triangles characterize ductile fracture, the semi open ones characterize cleavage pop-in after 
plastic deformation and the black triangles characterize brittle fracture. 
 
J-R curves were measured at FZR in as-received condition on cladding cut from Greifswald unit 
8.  NRI and VTT studied cladding properties recently in a PHARE project in the as-received and 
thermally treated conditions.  They measured J-R curves and crack initiation and stable 
propagation on pre-cracked Charpy specimens with crack front embedded into the appropriate 
cladding layer.  The results are not published yet, but are included into the VERLIFE guide as a 
new chapter on cladding evaluation during PTS. 
AEKI irradiated a set of 10x5x55 TPB specimens from the Greifswald unit 8 cladding, but they are 
not tested yet.   
AN.1.6 Properties and Assessment Tools for Characterizing PWR Cladding 
Crack Susceptibility 
The mechanical properties of claddings are usually investigated by Charpy-V impact, tensile, 
Hardness and small punch tests.  The microstructure can be investigated by Transmission 
Electron Microscopy (TEM) or Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) [AN1.6].  
Residual stresses in RPV claddings are tensile stresses caused by the higher thermal expansion 
coefficient of the austenitic cladding compared to the ferritic base metal.  Numerical and 
experimental investigation concerning residual stresses in RPV claddings were performed in the 
PHARE 2.03/97 project “Qualification of new materials for replacements/repair of original 
materials in WWER (440/213)” and in the FP5 project ENPOWER (Management of Nuclear Plant 
Operation by Optimizing Weld Repairs). 
Cracks in or beneath the cladding may occur as so-called hot cracks (stress relief cracks SRC) or 
cold cracks (e.g. hydrogen induced cold cracks HICC).  Such under-clad cracks may occur as 
stress relief cracks in the coarse grain area of the ferritic base metal below the cladding after a 
PWHT of about 600 °C or higher indicating that they are reheat cracks caused by the plastic 
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relaxation of residual stresses from the welding.  Cold cracks differ from hot cracks arising during 
the PWHT because these cracks occur after welding if solidification is complete before PWHT.  
The formation of cold cracks can be caused by welding (residual stresses), segregations, local 
overstressing of the material or strain fatigue, and hydrogen.  Much more dangerous than normal 
cold cracks are the hydrogen induced cold cracks (also referred to as “delayed” cracking) by 
diffusible hydrogen in the critical areas.  The hydrogen induced cold cracks occur in segregated 
areas of the ferritic base metal.   
Under-clad cracks can be detected by NDE testing with ultrasonic and magnetic crack detection 
or by transverse and parallel polish sections of the HAZ of claddings. 
To assess the consequences of sub-clad defects regarding the structural integrity of the 
component it is necessary to clarify whether these defects may act as a crack starter for brittle 
fracture of the component or not and to determine the level of ductility in the HAZ around the 
crack.  To obtain more representative HAZ material available for testing a special thermal 
simulation technique was developed at MPA Stuttgart and Siemens/KWU labs in the 70’s.  
Usually tensile, drop-weight, Charpy-V and fracture mechanical tests are performed to determine 
the HAZ properties. 
The under-clad cracks have some common issues concerning their safety relevance: 
• The cracks are small, their extension and number is limited. 
• The cracks are embedded in a ductile matrix.  Therefore, no crack propagation is 
expected during normal operational conditions. 
This can be confirmed by the results of RPV inspections reported in [AN1.9] where some under 
cladding flaw indications were detected by ultrasonic measurements as planar manufacturing 
flaws that were assumed as cold cracks.  Some years later the measurements were repeated and 
no significant dimension changes were observed. 
For under-clad cracks many fracture mechanic calculations were performed and experimentally 
confirmed in different research programmes and investigations leading to the conclusion that this 
kind of crack has no safety relevance for the operation of nuclear components.  Nevertheless all 
safety relevant nuclear components including, RPVs, are subjected to a systematic NDT 
surveillance during their operation. 
AN.1.7 Characterization of Residual Stresses under Cladding 
Several investigations were performed to determine the residual stresses under the cladding.  In 
Figure AN.1.23 the results of two experimental procedures are shown in the as welded condition 
and after PWHT.  The stresses are highly relieved by a post weld heat treatment at about 600 °C, 
especially the stresses in the area of the fusion line. 
 







12h, 500°C 12h, 610°C 
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AN.1.8 Properties and Assessment Tools for Characterizing WWER 
Cladding Crack Susceptibility 
WWER (Water-Water Energy Reactor = PWR type) reactor pressure vessels have relatively thick 
cladding – nominally 8 mm – made from two layers: first layer of 25/10 type welded by one pass 
while the second layer of 18/10/Ti typed is usually welded by three passes.  The cladding in the 
main part of the vessels was produced by strip welding with strips 60 mm wide. 
A method using incremental milling of beams has been used for the measurement and 
determination of residual stresses in WWER cladding.  Tests were performed on specimens in 
the as-welded state and also after final heat treatment of the vessels, i.e. after several stress 
relief’s and including the first hydro test in the shop.  As residual stresses depend strongly on the 
direction of welding, beams were oriented in both directions; parallel and perpendicular to the 
welding direction. 
The general trend of the results for all types of specimens was the same.  Tensile stress in the 
cladding was observed to slowly increase from a level of approximately + 50 MPa on the upper 
cladding surface (corresponding to the inner surface of RPV) to a maximum of approximately 100 
MPa in the middle of cladding thickness following by a rapid decrease close to cladding / base 
material (BM) interface to a compressive stress, see Figure AN.1.24.  The minimum value of the 
stress (about –150 MPa) was reached very close to the interface.  A slow linear increase of stress 
followed along the specimen width, with a tensile stress measured near the specimen bottom 
surface.  The difference between the individual types is not large with the following trends: aged 
specimens have slightly higher tensile stress near the cladding surface than as-received 
specimens.  Similarly, specimens with circumferential orientation have slightly higher tensile 
stress near the cladding surface than axially oriented specimens. 
 
 
Figure AN.1.24 Distribution of residual stresses in 4 specimens 
 
In finite element method (FEM) calculations, the measured residual stresses were treated as 
stresses arising due to different thermal expansion coefficients of both materials (BM and 
cladding) using the so-called “stress-free-temperature” approach.  This approach represents a 
standard procedure in any calculations of stress fields in clad reactor pressure vessels that are 
used as inputs for fatigue damage calculations as well as calculations of the vessel resistance 
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against fast non-ductile failure, mainly during pressurized thermal shock events.  To confirm this 
theory, a FEM model of the specimen was created using the COSMOS/M code. 
The stress free temperature was selected as Tsf = 350 ºC.  This value of stress free temperature 
was originally defined during large-scale test, FEM evaluations, to fit the experimental data (force-
displacement curve) as well as possible.  Further support for this temperature is based on the 
behaviour of the cladding-base material stress state during operational cycles, where cyclic 
loading results in elastic-plastic behaviour of the cladding, and thus the stress field is 
redistributed. 
It can be stated that general variation of measured and calculated stresses and their magnitudes 
are in good agreement. The main difference is in more enhanced peaks (both tensile and 
compressive) close to the material interface in calculated stresses.  This fact can be explained by 
the more gradual change of material properties in real specimen near the interface.  Moreover, in 
formula used for calculation of residual stresses based on measured strains, there was no 
distinguishable difference between Young modulus for both materials. 
It must be said that residual stresses in this type of bimetallic material strongly depend on the 
geometry.  In the RPV itself, the residual stresses are different from those present in a block cut 
from the RPV, and these are in turn different from the residual stresses in the specimens.  The 
thinner the specimen, the smaller the tensile stresses present in the cladding and the higher the 
tensile stresses in bottom specimen surface (opposite to cladding).  This is due to the lower 
constraint, and thus higher bending, of thinner specimens.  In the whole cylindrical part of RPV, 
practically no bending occurs and small compressive stresses are throughout the BM thickness.   
Results of FEM analysis of large-scale beam specimen used for fracture tests (690x40x85 mm) 
loaded only by residual stress due to cladding, using the same material properties and Tsf as 
above, are presented in Figure AN.1.25.  In this Figure, longitudinal and transversal stresses 
variations through the specimen width are presented.  The results confirm the statement of the 
previous paragraph (higher stress in cladding, lower bending in BM). 
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AN.1.9 Lifetime Evaluation Considering Cladding Properties 
License extension of NPPs requires a new safety analysis of the plant covering the extended 
operating life.  One of the most important safety considerations is the integrity of the RPV 
(Reactor Pressure Vessels).  The RPV material suffers several ageing-related effects during 
operating service: neutron (and gamma) irradiation embitterment, thermal ageing, low cycle 
fatigue, thermal fatigue, and corrosion.  Generally the most severe effect is irradiation and 
thermal embitterment of the RPV belt near to the fuel core zone, which is often referred to as the 
beltline. 
The life limiting components for LWR (Light Water Reactor) plants are generally the steam 
generators, but steam generators can be replaced, if it is economically acceptable.  In terms of 
safety considerations, the life limiting component is the RPV, and the most important degradation 
mechanism is radiation embrittlement.  The RPV must maintain its structural integrity during any 
operational or accidental event.  One of the most severe hypothetical accidents is PTS 
(pressurized thermal shock), in which cold cooling water flows into the hot pressurized vessel 
along the wall of the embrittled beltline region, and operational and thermal stresses are added. 
Most of the European regulatory rules and the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) PTS 
Guide [AN1.8] require deterministic PTS analyses of the RPVs.  They do not accept the 
probabilistic approach used in the US and in some other countries.  The IAEA PTS guide for 
WWER-440 Reactors allows using only hypothetical under clad cracks if the cladding is ductile 
and free from cracks.  Calculating surface cracks running through a brittle cladding into the base 
material is over conservative and results in short operating lifetime of the RPVs [AN1.7], [AN1.8]. 
The IAEA PTS guide [AN1.8] recommendation is as follows: 
” For cladded vessels, cladding integrity of which is verified by redundant non-destructive 
testing and its mechanical properties are known, the postulated defects are underclad 
semi-elliptical or, if applicable, elliptical cracks with depth up to ¼ of the RPV wall 
thickness, and with aspect ratio a/c respectively.  2a/c of 0.3 and 0.7.” 
The European WWER users elaborated the lifetime evaluation guide “VERLIFE” [AN1.7] in the 
frame of FP5 (5th EU Framework project).  This guide is fully or partly accepted by the national 
regulatory body of several EU countries and in Ukraine, Russia, and China.  It recommends:  
“Evaluation of emergency conditions (EC) and anticipated operating transients (AOT) 
Cladded component, provided that its integrity is assured by qualified non-destructive 
inspection: 
Assessment of effect of cladding is based on the use of its J-R curve (in the case of multi-
layer cladding, J-R curve for the 1st layer).  Generic J1mm values of the cladding are 
recommended, if no real component specific values are available. 
The postulated underclad crack is conservatively defined as partially penetrating 1 mm 
into the cladding.  The extension of the crack to the cladding is supposed with the same 
length as the length of original major axis of the underclad postulated crack (i.e. the major 
axis of the semi-ellipse remains on the interface between cladding and base or weld 
material). 
Instead of this conservative approach for postulating the crack, a more detailed 
calculation of crack penetration into the cladding during the regime, based on J R curve, 
is allowed, if properly validated. 
In this case, at least the deepest and near interface points of the postulated defect must 
be assessed with respect to the resistance of base or weld material against fast fracture.  
In this case, the integrity of cladding above the postulated defect during the whole AOT or 
EC regimes has to be verified.  Assessment of ductile tearing for the part of the 
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postulated crack front lying in the cladding shall be based on J-R curve approach.  J-
values for all time steps of the regime shall be calculated (it is sufficient to calculate J-
values only for the middle point of crack front in cladding).  These J-values have to be (for 
all assessed time steps) smaller than the end-of-life values of J-R curve corresponding to 
1 mm crack extension (i.e. J1mm values).  The J1mm values are specified as follows: 
a) If no RPV specific data are available, generic values of J1mm are: 100 kJ/m2 for 
WWER 440 RPV and 150 kJ/m2 for WWER 1000 RPV. 
b) If component specific data are available, then experimentally determined J1mm 
divided by safety factor 2 shall be used. 
c) In the case of other components than WWER 440 or WWER 1000 reactor 
pressure vessels for which no component specific J-R data are available, surface 
crack as in par.  5.10.3.2 has to be postulated. 
If the condition on J is not fulfilled, surface crack has to be postulated.” 
Both guides are published recently, and the use of the underclad cracks instead of surface cracks 
requires proper knowledge of the RPV cladding properties.   
Practically most of the WWER-440 V-213 type and many other PWR reactors lifetime extension 
depend on the consideration of RPV cladding integrity.  Since the RPV cladding was previously 
considered only as an anticorrosive layer the mechanical properties and the role in the RPV 
integrity were not properly studied. 
Stress free temperature effect very much the lifetime. In the RPV annealing, the mechanical and 
physical properties of the base, weld and cladding materials and the pressure-temperature history 
(including the first hydrotest) affect the residual stresses. The different codes and guides 
generally recommend the operating temperature as stress-free temperature, but FM calculated 
values are also accepted.  
AN.1.10. Summary and Suggestions for Further Study 
1) French and WWER claddings are similar in chemical composition and welding 
technology 
2) European and US cladding are produced by using different welding processes 
consequently the mechanical properties are different. 
3) The RPV cladding behaviour in as received and irradiated conditions are very much 
different from the RPV forgings or welds 
4) The existing literature data on the aged properties and ageing mechanisms are few, and 
many times they are in contradiction with each other 
5) Further research is suggested to elaborate proper trend curves of RPV cladding for 
practice, and for understanding the mechanism and affecting factors of thermal and 
irradiation embrittlement 
6) Further study is required to involve the cladding into the RPV stress and strain 
calculations, especially at PTS assessment 
7) Further study to elaborate stress free temperature for the RPV considering the 
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